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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to understand local service delivery in Thailand’s post-
2006 national political crisis. The researcher collected qualitative data in four 
municipalities in Khon Kaen Province. The analytical framework covered five 
moderating variables: political institutions, civic engagement, political leadership, 
governance, and political economy. The results were mixed. Local service delivery 
suffered from weakening electoral mechanisms, suspended local autonomy, weakened 
civic participation and policy networks, insecure local administrators, worsened central-
local trust, and the detrimental effect on local economies. However, there were 
opportunities for improved, or maintained, local service delivery through the lessening of 
administrative procedures, a fast-track mechanism for citizen complaints, stronger 
collaboration among local governments and with the private sector, local citizen 
initiatives, effective local leadership, and increasing trust between local governments and 
their constituents. In conclusion, national political crisis caused not only negative 
impacts, but also created opportunities for improving or maintaining local service 
delivery. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
Context of Local Government Service Delivery in Thailand  
Public service delivery is recognized as a core responsibility of local governments 
in Thailand and in many countries around the globe, especially where decentralization is 
brought into the institutional structure (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Mansrisuk, 2012; 
Oates, 1999; Sudhipongpracha, 2014; Varanyuwatana, 2006; World Bank, 2012). In the 
past, public service delivery was mainly handled by the central government and 
governmental offices located at provincial and local levels. The patterns of public service 
offered by government are “one-size-fits-all services,” with little consideration of specific 
needs of citizens who live in different conditions and contexts (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993, 
p. 168). Decision-making authority regarding public policy and public expenditures is 
based on a top-down structure with central government as the main actor in centralized 
governing processes (Boex et al., 2016).  
Due to social complexities and government administration failures, 
decentralization, as one of governing instruments in governance approach, has 
prominently influenced government service delivery reform (Oates, 1999). Importantly, 
decentralizing public service delivery from central to local governments is an important 
tool for improving government service delivery, enhancing citizen participation, 
decreasing poverty, and expanding economic development (Channa & Faguet, 2016; 
Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Lewis, McCulloch, & Sacks, 2016; Oates, 1999; Robinson, 
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2007). Citizens understand the needs and problems of their local area, so local 
governments can work closely with them. Local governments play a vital role in 
providing public services and serving the specific needs of their local residents and can 
usually perform this role much better than the central government (Lewis, McCulloch, & 
Sacks, 2016; Oates, 1999).  
In addition, decentralized public service delivery enhances the role of local 
citizens. Local citizens play a key role in local government affairs. For example, they are 
involved in political decision-making processes, public policy processes, and even 
coproduction in public service provision (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993; Stoker, 1998). As in 
the case of local citizen involvement in a municipality in northeastern Thailand, local 
citizens become the main actors in a co-production project‒ specifically a road 
construction project. This public service allows local citizens to engage in the service 
delivery decision-making process and to participate in community activity 
(Sudhipongpracha & Wongpredee, 2016).  
In general, local government service delivery includes local roads, sanitary 
facilities, water, garbage collection, hospitals, local security, culture, education, tax 
collection, etc. (Robinson, 2007; Rodrigues, Tavares, & Araújo, 2012). For fiscal 
decentralization autonomy, local governments are allowed to collect taxes and gain 
revenues from some services, while partial funding comes from the central government. 
For political decentralization autonomy, local citizens can vote for the mayor and local 
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councilors who represent them in local public service operations (Mansrisuk, 2012). This 
indicates a vital impact of local government service delivery on citizens’ roles.              
In Thailand, like many developing countries, public service delivery was initially 
handled by central government (Unger & Mahakanjana, 2016). The decentralization 
provision was adopted into the 1997 Constitution in pursuit of improving government 
service delivery performance, enhancing local self-government, strengthening local 
democracy, and stimulating economic development (Balassiano, 2011). Consequently, 
government structure was reformed and centralized public services were transferred to 
local governments (Mansrisuk, 2012). The main duties of Thailand’s local governments 
include: (1) providing fundamental infrastructure (e.g. road, public transportation, water, 
sewage, public works, and city planning); (2) developing and sustaining quality of life 
(e.g. education, public health, recreation area, park, career training, and social welfare); 
(3) providing community security (e.g. fire protection, consumer protection, and disaster 
management); (4) promoting local investment, trade, and tourism (e.g. local strategic 
planning, technology transfer, permit issuance, etc.); (5) protecting and preserving the 
environment and natural resources (e.g. community forest, pollution, wildfire protection, 
water protection, etc.); and (6) preserving and promoting local culture, tradition, and 
wisdom (e.g. local museums and archives, local festivals, etc.) (Thailand Decentralization 
Plan and Process Act, 1999, B.E. 2542). The background of Thailand’s decentralization 
and local government is further described in Chapter 2.  
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Notably, the purposes of decentralizing local government service delivery in 
Thailand are to promote local self-government, political institutions, civic engagement 
and citizen empowerment, collective decision-making, political leadership, collaboration, 
and local economy (Mansrisuk, 2012). These factors reinforce one another and they are 
instruments for local governments to enhance effective local service delivery. More 
importantly, political and institutional stability are important factors for maintaining 
effective local government service delivery performance (North, 1990). 
Since 2006, local government service delivery has faced challenges.  Recurrent 
national political crises in Thailand have been a critical concern not only for Thai society 
but also internationally (Human Rights Watch, 2016; United Nations, 2016; Whiteman, 
2014; Yaxley, 2006). The prolonged national political crisis has affected institutional 
breakdown and economic decline (Norton, 2012; Sussangkarn & Nikomborirak, 2016)      
For an institutional breakdown, political crises have caused government failures 
and a growing democratic deficit (Kurlantzick, 2011). Importantly, the military 
interventions—the military coup in 2006 and in 2014— caused constitutional suspensions 
and set back the progress of full democracy by constituting semi-democracy through 
constitutional design (Pathmanand, 2008).  
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This virtually constant political crisis1 tremendously affected the economic 
downturn because people decreased their spending, while central government suspended 
some social policies and reduced the expenses of development projects (Sussangkarn & 
Nikomborirak, 2016). In addition, political turmoil also created uncertainties for 
businesses and investors. For example, foreign tourists avoided traveling to Thailand 
during political protests and investors lacked the confidence to expand their businesses 
during political turmoil (Sethapramote, 2014; Sussangkarn & Nikomborirak, 2016).  
The effects of Thailand’s national political crisis have prompted concerns about 
its effects on local governments service delivery performance. Due to an institutional 
relationship and governmental structure, central and local governments in Thailand are 
not independent from each other. Local governments are considered as arms of central 
government. Importantly, the central government still influences local governments 
through political institutional alignment, financial support, and social policy affiliation 
(State Administration Act of 1991). 
 Moreover, political crises likely create negative effects on local government 
service delivery and other public affairs. For example, Madagascar suffered from a 
prolonged national political crisis during 2009-2014. The effects of this turmoil 
                                                          
1 I recognize that it can be argued that there have been multiple crises since 2006, with two coups, two 
democratically elected governments, and one government put in place by questionable means during that 
time. There was unrest during each of the elected governments, so, in effect, there has been a continuous 
period of turmoil. For that reason, I elected to use the singular crisis when referring to the “post-2006 
political crisis” throughout this dissertation. 
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undermined government public services such as education, health service, food security, 
and water. In addition, political crises tremendously affect microeconomic activities and 
induce the decline of public investment (World Bank, 2006). Similarly, in Zimbabwe a 
2008 political crisis delayed local political transition. Local governance remained stuck in 
the old administrative style, resulting in poor local service performance (Bland, 2011).  
Little is known about possible positive effects of national political crises in 
Thailand. In the earlier cited work by Sudhipongpracha and Wongpredee (2016), the 
local citizens actively engaged in a coproduction project, road maintenance, which was 
operated collectively among societal actors in the local community. This coproduction 
project helped transform citizens from “passive citizens” to “proactive citizens” (p.311). 
As observed, the effects of crises, both political and economic, which occurred in the past 
have been mixed, creating both positive and negative effects for local governments 
(Khoman, 2005). Interestingly, many of these studies do not highlight any moderating 
variables. These variables are influential on improvement of local service delivery 
performance (Batonon, 2015; Curristine, Lonti, & Joumard, 2007; UNDP, 2016). The 
importance of these moderating variables will be described next.  
Despite its importance, local government service delivery has often been 
overlooked in times of national political crisis. Local service delivery is where crisis 
meets citizen. Obviously, citizens are affected by conflict. With the matters of local 
government service delivery and concerns of what political crises affect help address the 
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research question, “How has Thailand’s national political crisis affected local 
government service delivery?”  This study aims to enhance the understanding of the 
effects of Thailand’s prolonged national political crisis on local government service 
delivery. Then, the study explores the impacts of five moderating variables that influence 
effective or ineffective performance of local government service delivery.  
Moderating Variables for Local Government Service Delivery  
To frame this inquiry, this study focuses on five relevant moderating variables: 
political institutions, civic engagement, governance, political leadership, and political 
economy. These five moderating variables are the variables that may influence effective 
or ineffective local government service delivery performance (Avis, 2016; Lieberman, 
2012; Yilmaz et al., 2008; Manda & Mwakubo, 2013; O’Neil et al., 2014). These 
variables are thus both practically and theoretically important variables to explore the 
effects of Thailand’s prolonged national political crisis on local government service 
delivery. These five moderating variables are the factors that interact with political crisis 
to influence local service delivery process. Since this study is interested in local service 
delivery as an outcome variable, this study looks at the antecedent conditions for local 
service delivery rather than local service delivery itself.     
To understand why these five moderating variables are important for exploring 
the effects of national political crisis on local government service delivery, the author will 
examine them in depth. Core definitions will be provided for each of these variables, key 
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reasons for using these variables, their impacts on local service delivery, and at what 
level in the system do moderating variables operate. In addition, the effects that the 
national political crisis has had on these variables and how they can affect local 
government service delivery performance are described. Figure 1.1 helps illustrate the 
relationship of how national political crisis relate to local government service delivery 
performance and indicates where these moderating variables are involved.      
Figure 1.1 Analytical Framework 
 
     
                                                                                                                                
 
 
The term “political institutions” refers to the interconnections of individuals or 
groups within political society mediated by laws and norms that shape human and social 
interactions (March & Olsen, 1989). These laws and norms are important institutional 
instruments that help provide clarity to institutional actors (North, 1990). Political 
institutions include both formal and informal institutions in the political realm. Formal 
institutions are the formal laws, constitutions, etc., whereas informal institutions are the 
norms, social agreement, cultural aspects, etc. These informal institutional tools also 
shape human interaction (Dobler, 2011; North, 1990).  
National Political Crisis 
[Resulting Changes in Politics and Policies] 
  
Moderating Variables  
(1) Political Institutions 
(2) Civic Engagement 
(3) Political Leadership 
(4) Governance 
 
 
 Local Government Service Delivery Performance 
(5) Political 
Economy 
 
 
 
Ind
ire
ct 
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This study focuses on formal institutions. Formal political institutions, in this 
study, are those established by Thailand’s constitutions, the State Administration Act of 
1991, the Decentralization Plan and Process Act of 1999, Thai national government, 
public policies, legislature, electoral rules, etc. Formal political institutions are operated 
at all three levels within governmental structure—national government, provincial 
administration, and local administration. Informal political institutions are the political 
norms, political values, political trusts, political participation, political responsiveness, 
political understanding, etc. (Narayan et al., 2000).  
Civic engagement, in this study, refers to patterns and opportunities that local 
governments provide to their citizens to share their interests in political decision-making 
processes, public policy processes, and local government service delivery (McLaverty, 
2011; Putnam, 1993). This moderating variable is important for this study because active 
civic engagement helps shape local administration and local community. More 
importantly, this mechanism assists in providing effective local service delivery and the 
growth of local values within the community through collective actions (Adler & Goggin, 
2005; Putnam, 1993). This study employs the civic engagement factor to investigate how 
local citizens engage in political activity, community service or voluntary activity, local 
coproduction or collective action activity, policy decision-making processes, and network 
building (Adler & Goggin, 2005; Pahad, 2005).  
 
10 
 
In addition, the researcher employs the spectrum of public participation to 
examine how and at what level local governments engage citizens in local government 
service delivery. The spectrum consists of five levels; informing citizens, consulting 
citizens, involving citizens, collaborating with citizens for decision-making processes, 
and empowering citizens to make decisions (IAP2, 2014). Civic engagement is minimally 
operated at the national level but is mainly operated in local government and the local 
community level by emphasizing local government-citizen interactions. In this study, the 
civic engagement mechanism helps examine whether political institutional breakdown 
and political fears affect civic engagement in local government service delivery.    
Political leadership refers to agency by actors with positional resources intended 
to improve local service delivery, especially in the contingent situations (Northhouse, 
2010; Wart, 2003). In addition, effective political leadership should be able to cope with 
complicated public problems and uncertain conditions, for instance political crisis. 
Notably, political leadership requires capacity to maintain political accountability, 
facilitate local government officers, sustain organizational alignment, and make 
appropriated decision in public service delivery (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011; Fiedler, 
1996; Wart, 2003).  
This study examines the traditional patterns of political leadership—leaders at the 
individual level (e.g. local government leaders, local officers, and community leaders) 
(Boin et al., 2017; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). In this 
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study, the political leadership factor is operated mainly at the local and community level 
and it helps examine whether national political crises and institutional breakdowns affect 
local government service delivery.    
Governance variable, as used here, refers to new governing processes in public 
organizations that emphasize the matters of interdependence between local governments 
and societal sectors in enhancing effective public service delivery. The analysis within 
this moderating variable is based upon patterns of new public governance including 
jurisdictional collaboration, multi-network, and collective actions that local governments 
employ for improving service delivery (Bevir, 2011; Rhodes, 2007; Stoker, 1998). In this 
study, the governance variable is operated at the national, provincial, and local levels 
because the governing processes of local governments are interdependent with all three 
levels.  
Finally, political economy refers to economic conditions that shape incentives and 
determine the distribution of resources. Political economy perspective emphasizes two 
dimensions. First, internal political economy focuses on internal mechanisms of 
economy, i.e. economic processes and norms of efficiency that affect internal 
mechanisms of the polity such as political structure and processes, political leadership, 
and political institutions (Stern & Reve, 1980; Wamsley & Zald, 1973). Second, external 
political economy emphasizes external mechanisms of economy, i.e. economic conditions 
and competitiveness that affect the external mechanism of the polity such as political 
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climate, influences of external actors, inter-organizational interactions, and power sharing 
(Stern & Reve, 1980; Wamsley & Zald, 1973). It is important to note that these two 
dimensions have reinforcing effects on one another. In this study, the political economy 
variable is operated at the national and local levels because political economy of local 
governments is interdependent with the national economic conditions. 
Research Objective 
This study aims to improve the understanding of the effects of the national 
political crisis in Khon Kaen Province, Thailand, on local government service delivery. 
The study examines five moderating variables that interact with the political crisis to 
influence effective or ineffective local government service delivery performance. 
Additionally, this study is relevant not only to the cases of the municipality in 
northeastern Thailand but can also develop a framework for analysis and generate 
questions as sources for large-scale quantitative and mixed methods research in the 
future.   
Research Question  
To understand whether and how Thailand’s national political crisis affect local 
government service delivery, the overarching research question is: “How has Thailand’s 
national political crisis affected local government service delivery?” In answering this 
question, the virtually continual national political crisis from 2006 until the study’s 
endpoint in 2016, is an independent variable that impacts local government service 
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delivery as an outcome variable. The five moderating variables used in this study are not 
hypotheses or theories, but rather are widely-studied antecedent conditions that are 
considered relevant to the study of local service delivery. In addition, this study used five 
moderating variables to build a framework for inquiry and a system for organizing the 
data, not to establish a hypothesis based on a particular theory that this study would test. 
The questions to be answered are whether local government service delivery will 
experience a negative impact, a positive impact, no impact, or some combination thereof 
during the political crisis.   
Value of the Study 
The impact of this research is both theoretically and practically valuable for the 
field of public administration and for policy implications. Theoretically, it is useful to 
understand if the case studies of Thailand’s local public service delivery under political 
crisis could generate a framework for analysis that might have wide applicability to 
research in political crises and local government service performance, civic engagement, 
political leadership, local governance, crisis management, political economy or other 
related theories in public administration and public policy. It is important to emphasize 
why this study matters: 1) the past ten years and counting of Thailand’s history involve 
political crises; 2) crises in Thailand are recurrent and the current crisis will likely 
continue and it may shed light on past episodes; 3) there is applicability to other cases in 
Thailand and other countries.   
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Structure of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 presents the 
introduction and statement of the problem, followed by the research objectives and the 
research question. The chapter concludes by addressing the significance of the research 
and dissertation structure. Chapter 2 provides background and literature reviews as well 
as the theoretical framework. Chapter 3 explains research design methods, chosen 
research approach, case selection, and data collection and analysis method. Chapter 4 
describes the findings on how national political crisis creates threats to local government 
and demonstrates the case performance analysis. Chapter 5 describes the findings on how 
national political crisis creates opportunities for local government and demonstrates the 
case performance analysis. The final chapter, Chapter 6, provides a conclusion and 
discussion.   
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Chapter 2  
Background and Literature Review  
 
This chapter presents the background of Thailand’s local government structure 
and the contemporary context of Thailand’s national political crises. The previous 
research on local government service delivery under political crises that provide the 
findings of research done in both global context and Thailand’s context are addressed. 
The last part provides the conceptual framework that is built upon three theoretical 
approaches, including the institutional theory, governance theory (including civic 
engagement, and public leadership), and political economy theory.  
Local Government Structure and Central-Local Relations 
Thailand local government is structured under the concept of the unitary system, 
which identifies local government as a dependent hierarchical entity within the model of 
central-local relationships. National government maintains the authority to control and 
mandate the local government (Agranoff & Radin, 2014). In Figure 2.1, there are three 
different circles. Each circle represents a level of governmental jurisdiction. For 
Thailand, the smallest circle is the local government, which is instituted within the largest 
circle of national government. The largest circle refers to a single national government 
that institutionally controls the smaller circles.  
The provincial administrative authority in the second circle is the branch of 
national government and central ministries located at the provincial level. The heads of 
provincial offices, for instance the provincial governor and chief executive officer of the 
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district, are appointed by the national government. They act as supervisors for the local 
governments, but their authority and responsibilities to provide public services at the 
local level are mandated by the national government.   
Figure 2.1 Model of National, Provincial, and Local Relationships in Thailand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The circle representing the Provincial Administration has an additional circle to 
identify the boundary and relation of provincial administration, which acts as the central 
government but is located in local areas. The model illustrated below is represented in the 
form of Thailand’s administration structure, which is derived from the State 
Administration Act of 1991 and the Local Administration Act of 1914. The Act of 1991 
promulgated the local authority as one of the state administrative branches (see Figure 
2.2)       
 
National Government 
Provincial Administration 
 
Local Government 
Source: Adapted from Wright’s model of inclusive authority 
dependent hierarchy in Agranoff & Radin 2014: p. 140.  
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Figure 2.2 Thailand Administration Structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The State Administration Act of 1991 provides for three administrative fields. At 
the top level, the national administration is comprised of the Office of the Prime Minister, 
and various ministries and departments. The national government agencies are mostly 
located in Bangkok and exercise their power primarily through the provincial 
administration, but also through local agencies. The policy processes and regulations are 
usually carried out at the provincial level (Mansrisuk, 2012; State Administration Act, 
1991; United Nations, 2004)  
The second level, provincial administration, is a branch of central government and 
the central ministry branches that are located in the local areas. However, those agencies 
are not part of the local government. The provincial administration exercises its power 
through the provincial governor and the chief executive officers of districts, who are 
National Administration  
Provincial Administration   
Local Administration 
Central government agencies  
- Office of Prime Minister   
- Ministries  
- Departments  
- Etc.  
 
- 
  
Central government agencies in the province  
- Provinces (Changwat) 
- Districts (Amphure)  
Local administration units under provincial agencies    
- Sub-districts (Tambon) 
- Villages (Moo-Ban)  
Local government agencies  
General form 
- Provincial Administrative Organizations (PAOs) 
- Municipalities (City/Urban/Sub-district)  
- Tambon Administrative Organization (TAOs) 
Special form 
- Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) 
- Pattaya City  
Source: Compiled by the researcher based on the State Administration Act of 
1991, the Local Administration Act of 1914, and the Determining Plan and 
Process of Decentralization Act of 1999 
Unitary System 
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appointed by the Ministry of Interior, a national ministry. In addition, there are two local 
administration units under the provincial administration. Those agencies are the sub-
district (Tambon) and the village (Moo-Ban). Even though the head of Tambon (Kam-
nan) and the headperson of village (Phu-Yai-Ban) are elected by the community 
residents, then they are approved and officially appointed and paid by the provincial 
administration. Though they work with the local governments, they are responsible to the 
provincial administration and, ultimately, the central government. Their duties include 
community leader, community security, conflict mediator, and central government 
representative in the community, whereas local governments provide public services 
(Mansrisuk, 2012; Nagai, Funatsu, & Kagoya, 2008; State Administration Act, 1991).  
At the lowest level, the local government is considered an administrative branch 
of the central government. It is a creature of the constitution, which values the democratic 
society and decentralization to subnational government. Thailand’s local government has 
two forms. One is a general form that is composed of the Provincial Administration 
Organization (PAO), Municipality, and Tambon Administration Organization (TAO). 
Another is a special form that is comprised of Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and 
Pattaya City and only exists in those two jurisdictions (Determining Plan and Process of 
Decentralization Act, 1999; Mansrisuk, 2012; Nagai, Funatsu, & Kagoya, 2008; State 
Administration Act, 1991).   
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Decentralization and Thailand Local Government System 
The decentralization provision in Thailand is a policy creation, which was 
provided in the Thai Constitution of 1997. It aims to delegate the authority and 
responsibilities of the central government to local government. In addition, it aims to 
enhance local community involvement in the policy decision-making process, political 
activity, citizen participation, and economic development (Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Thailand, 1997; Krueathep, 2004; Mansrisuk, 2012; Rondinelli, 1981). From a service 
delivery perspective, decentralization is beneficial for local citizens because public 
policy, public service delivery, and public welfare would be allocated into the locality to 
serve the differing needs of local residents (Rondinelli, 1981; Saito, 2011). From a 
democratic and political standpoint, it is an opportunity for citizens at the local level to 
participate in political activities and in public decision-making processes that occur in 
their communities (Rondinelli, 1981; Saito, 2011).  
Impact of Decentralization on Local Service Delivery  
To implement the decentralization provision, the legislature enacted the 
Determining Plan and Process of Decentralization Act of 1999. This act has defined the 
forms, types, and responsibilities of local government. This law has a significant impact 
on the authority transfer from central to local government— including political authority, 
administrative authority, and fiscal authority (Determining Plan and Process of 
Decentralization Act, 1999; Krueathep, 2004; Nagai, Funatsu, & Kagoya, 2008).  
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Local Structure and Political Authority 
Local government in Thailand exists in two forms. First, the general form of local 
government is responsible for providing public services in most areas of the country and 
consists of PAO, municipality, and TAO. A second is a special form of local government 
is responsible for serving the special and strategic areas. Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration provides the public services in the capital city area, as it is the 
government center, business center, and gateway to the country. In addition, Pattaya City 
serves the industrial and tourism area east of Bangkok (Krueathep, 2004). Figure 2.3 
illustrates the local government structure as well as the intra-governmental relationship in 
Thailand.  
Figure 2.3 Local Government Structure and Intergovernmental Relationship  
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Local residents accept the political authority of the local government because they 
feel it provides education and strengthens the foundations of democracy at the local level. 
More importantly, moving government closer to citizens is the best way to improve 
government performance and to respond to the different needs in local communities. 
Within this structure, Nagai and Kagoya (2011) explain that a characteristic of Thailand 
local administration is “the dual existence of various field agencies of central government 
and local government” (p. 138). This means that provinces and districts, as the branches 
of central government, remain the authorities for local governments and maintain control 
over various aspects of governance, such as annual budget approval, local planning, local 
administration, councilor removal, and so forth. In addition, we can view the relationship 
between local governments (PAO, Municipality, and TAO) and local administration units 
(Tambon and Mooban) as the parallel agencies within this structure (Nagai, Funatsu, & 
Kagoya, 2008).       
Local Functional and Administrative Authority 
The Decentralization Act of 1999 has mandated the responsibility of providing 
public services to local government, which were previously operated by central 
Source: Compiled by a researcher based on the Local Administration Act of 1914, the 
State Administration Act of 1991, the Determining Plan and Process of Decentralization 
Act of 1999, and the Image Model of Thai State Administration (Nagai & Kagoya, 2011). 
The local government units are collected from local government data as of May 18, 2017. 
Link: http://www.dla.go.th/work/abt/index.jsp.  
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government and provincial agencies, in six dimensions: (1) providing fundamental 
infrastructure; (2) developing and sustaining quality of life; (3) providing community 
security and preventing crime; (4) promoting local investment, trade, and tourism; (5) 
protecting and preserving the environment and natural resources; and (6) preserving and 
promoting local culture, tradition, and wisdom (Krueathep, 2004; Office of the 
Commission on Local Government Personnel Standards).2  
This means that local government has discretion over local management and 
public service delivery based on the mandated duties stated in the Determining Plan and 
Process of Decentralization Act of 1999. In addition, each type of local government can 
recruit and hire the employees to serve in local government offices and public service 
tasks (Determining Plan and Process of Decentralization Act, 1999; Nagai, Funatsu, & 
Kagoya, 2008).          
Local Discretion and Fiscal Authority 
After a decentralization law is enacted, a high degree of decision-making should 
occur at the local level (Krueathep, 2004; Rondinelli, 1981; Saito, 2011). The Thai 
Determining Plan and Process of Decentralization Act of 1999 devolves and transfers the 
decisions regarding fiscal authority to local government. As a result, local government 
can develop and enact local planning and regulations, especially the fiscal plan. In 
                                                          
2 Source: Office of the Commission on Local Government Personnel Standards. Link: 
http://www.local.moi.go.th/webst/botfam1.htm  
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addition, local government can collect fees for public services such as water, sewage, 
garbage, electricity, public transportation, document issuance fees, etc. According to the 
tax collection authority, local government can collect some local taxes, like property tax, 
sign tax, permit tax, and business tax (Determining Plan and Process of Decentralization 
Act, 1999; Nagai, Funatsu, & Kagoya, 2008).   
Context of Thailand’s Political Crises 
 In Thai political history, most political crises initially arose from strains and 
struggles within elite groups and the military. Political crises have become normal events 
for Thai political society (Fry, 2014; McCargo, 2000). The current political crisis is more 
complicated and dynamic than most of those in the past. There are various groups 
involved in the political networks. As Uwanno (2011) mentioned, we can see these 
networks through the dynamics of Thai politics. He explained that there are four groups 
that influence each other within “dynamics of Thai politics” (Uwanno, 2011, p. 19). 
These four groups include: 1) the monarchy, 2) the military and bureaucrats, 3) middle-
income people living in urban areas and having better market bargaining power and 
resource accessibility, and 4) people living in rural areas and having low negotiating 
power. They interact with each other and exercise power through these networks. These 
four groups are the vital mechanisms to influence both government formation and even 
government destruction (Uwanno, 2011).  
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To illustrate the patterns of Thailand political crises, McCargo (2000) classifies 
the typology of Thai political crises from 1985 until 1997. This typology demonstrates 
the causes of political crises, for example, internal disagreement among groups within the 
military, people’s dissatisfaction, political corruption, and economic collapse (McCargo, 
2000). As observed, for recurrent political crises, those causes remain in existence and 
become more powerful.  
Thailand’s Political Crises in Post-Democracy 
A political event that occurred in 1932 is considered a major turning-point of Thai 
politics.  Even though the reform was bloodless, it caused a major change in the Thai 
political system. The absolute power initially held by the King was transferred to a 
government installed by the military and by the educated class. The form of political 
system was changed from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, in which 
the King had less power in administrative and political roles. The King played a greater 
role as an institutional and ceremonial symbol under the Constitution of 1932 (McCargo, 
2000).  
In addition, the strong bureaucratic system and centralized state structure eroded 
the progress of democracy. Political crises were most often ended by using military 
power (Paribatra, 1993). Thai history shows that since 1932, Thailand has experienced 19 
military coups (Brown, 2014), with 13 of them being successful (Chambers, 2015).  The 
most recent coup d’état, carried out by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, occurred in 2014. 
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Political conflict instigated this most recent coup d’état, when the military decided that a 
coup was the most appropriate choice to resolve the political crisis in that turbulent time 
(Fisher, 2014).  
Over the course of history, Thailand’s political crises caused changes to political 
society in different ways and marked many historical events in each era. For example, 
Black May, in 1992, was a political protest which occurred in Bangkok against the 
illegitimate military government ruled by General Suchinda Kraprayoon (Pineda, 2010). 
The impact of this political uprising led to popular reform in Thai politics that extensively 
involved the citizens and political sectors to project the future of the country by drafting a 
new Constitution in 1997. This Constitution has been called the Constitution of the 
People (Chambers, 2015; Keyes, 2015).  
Recurrence of Thailand’s Political Crisis and the 2006 Military Coup  
Thailand, after the 1997 Constitution, seemed to enter into a period of peace and 
freedom. People actively engaged in political activities and freely exercised their basic 
rights. In the year 2001, the Thai Rak Thai (Thai Love Thai Party), led by Thaksin 
Shinawatra, won the national election. His populist policy attracted the voters who were 
mainly from his political base in north and northeastern Thailand, which, combined, are 
home to the largest percentage of the population in the country. He was able to 
accomplish much during his first administration (Blondel & Thiébault, 2010; 
Chachavalpongpun, 2014; McCargo, 2002).  
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Figure 2.4 Timeline of Thailand’s National Political Crisis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the 2001 general election, which was a landslide victory for Thaksin, there 
was a short period of calm. In 2006, during the second term of his administration, another 
political crisis arose (depicted in Figure 2.4). The middle-class and elite groups, called 
“Anti-Thaksin” in Bangkok, became not only displeased but were frustrated with 
Thaksin’s administration. After a short period of demonstration and protest instigated by 
the Yellow Shirt. His administration was toppled down by the military in 2006. He was 
prosecuted for corruption and conflict of interest with his populist policies. This political 
crisis not only affected economics, government stability, and public policy, but it also 
affected the unity of Thai society (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004; Pongsudhirak, 2008).  
During this political crisis, people generally divided into two groups based on 
their political advocacy. The first group was the members of Thaksin’s government who 
identified themselves as “Red Shirts.” Most of them were geographically from northern 
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and northeastern Thailand. Basically, these people have been seen as a grassroots group 
because of their rural origins and generally low income. The opposition group protested 
with the aim of removing Thaksin’s government due to alleged corruption and the lack of 
effective governance. The anti-Shinawatra people were mostly from Bangkok and the 
urban areas. Many of them were from southern Thailand, which has been a large voter 
base for the Democrat Party. This group identified themselves as “Yellow Shirts.” These 
two “colors” battled one another in major street protests. Sometimes the conflict was seen 
as a short-term political game, but repetitive political confrontation finally evolved into a 
prolonged national political crisis (BBC News, 2012; Bremmer, 2016; Prasirtsuk, 2010).  
When crisis conditions lead to deadlock among groups, a military coup is seen as 
a conventional solution in Thailand, and this strategy was eventually employed (Baker & 
Phongpaichit, 2014). On September 19, 2006, while Thaksin was attending a meeting at 
the United Nations in New York, the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra was 
overthrown by the Thai military. The national political crisis became a threat to 
economic, social, and political development and had extensively affected central, 
provincial, and local government entities (Mydans & Fuller, 2006; Ockey, 2007).   
Political Unrest and the 2014 Military Coup  
In July 2011, Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, accepted the nomination to 
run a political campaign for the position of prime minister. Eventually, her party, the 
Pheu Thai Party, won the national election and she became the first female prime 
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minister of Thailand (Low, 2012). However, the anti-Thaksin group remained critical of 
her, calling her Thaksin’s nominee. As they did before, leadership opposition came out in 
the streets and began to protest in Bangkok due to their dissatisfaction with her decisions 
relating to the Amnesty Bill, a bill that aimed to provide an amnesty for political offenses 
and political prisoners who were arrested and persecuted after the coup in 2006 (Marshall 
& Szep, 2014).  
Unfortunately for Yingluck, her administration was unable to hold power. Under 
the political pressure and with the development of a new political crisis, she decided to 
step down and call for a new election while her interim government remained in power. 
However, the election never happened because the opposition party and its protesters 
(Yellow Shirts) demonstrated to prevent it. The protest finally became more violent and 
out of control. As is common in Thailand, the conventional wisdom, a coup, was again 
used by the military (Jones, 2014).  
In 2014, General Prayut Chan-o-cha led the coup d’état and called for national 
reform and the drafting of a new constitution. In addition, he was positioned by the junta 
to rule the country as the unelected prime minister. Currently, all junta-proposed national 
reform activities are still in process. The military government expects to complete the 
reforms within the given timeframe and will allow the general election in 2016, or a year 
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after completion of a new Constitution3 (Associated Press, 2014; Crispin, 2016; Fuller, 
2014).  
The political situation is still controversial, especially the new constitution and the 
reform. Moreover, most of local government elected officials who ended their 
administrative term during this reform period were requested by the junta to continue 
serving in their positions until the central government finishes the reform mission 
(National Council for Peace and Order, 2014). Suffice to say, many things within the 
governmental structure could be affected due to political turbulence, even though the 
political unrest seems to be abating because the military government is still in power. So, 
crisis does not necessarily mean active political conflict but major unresolved 
constitutional issues and a factionalized regime. In reality, the political crisis remains just 
below the surface; it could emerge again any time after the military government steps 
down (Chachavalpongpun, 2014; French, 2016; & International Crisis Group, 2014).  
It is important to state that the military coups in 2006 and 2014, those that Baker 
(2016) called “the twin coups,”4 have had extensive effects not only at the national level, 
but they have also had a tremendous effect on economic, social, and democratic 
development throughout the country (Baker, 2016, p. 389; Pongsudhirak, 2014; 
Sethapramote, 2015; Yueh, 2014). During this period (2006 up to the completion of the 
                                                          
3 As of the final review of this thesis (February 2018), this has not happened. 
4 The author states that he called them “the twin coups” because the sources of these two coups were from 
the same groups of people and the same conditions. These two coups have a tight interrelation.   
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research analysis in 2016), Thai society has suffered severely from the prolonged political 
crisis that caused economic downturn, decline of investment, political uncertainty and 
fears, etc.  
To conceptualize the context of Thailand’s political crisis, Table 2.1 integrates 
two frameworks that include the elements of crisis addressed by Boin, t’Hart, Stern, and 
Sundelius (2017) and the aspects of crisis provided by Krieger (2001). The first 
framework provides three elements of crisis; “threat, urgency, and uncertainty” (Boin, 
t’Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017, p. 5). As Boin, et al. (2017) explain, these three key 
elements help identify the different patterns of crisis. First, the threat helps us to perceive 
and locate position and space in which such a crisis occurs. Next, urgency helps identify 
the status of crisis. It helps us to evaluate the degree of severity that such crisis causes 
and the needs for responding. Finally, uncertainty triggers fears. Nevertheless, uncertain 
conditions help produce strategic measurements and management processes for crisis 
response.  
The second framework has three components including “systemic crises, 
confrontation crises, and decision-making crises” (Krieger, 2001, p. 182). System refers 
to the whole structure that consists of socio-political interactions, norms, and 
regulations—institutions. Confrontation refers to the disputes that are caused from the 
challenges between two opposition parties. It may occur when the bargaining cannot 
reach common agreement. Finally, decision-making refers to the consequences of 
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unsuccessful policy making processes that governments conduct. The results of these 
components cause problems for their citizens and for political stability (Krieger, 2001). 
The implications of the two frameworks develop the new, integrating framework for 
introducing the context of Thailand’s political crisis. In Table 2.1, the framework 
explains how Thailand’s political crisis matters and increases an understanding of context 
of Thailand’s political crises.   
Table 2.1 Theoretical Dimensions of Thailand’s Political Crises   
 Threat to Uncertainty about Urgency of 
 
System 
 Threat of system 
and institutional 
collapse, loss of 
capacity, and 
weakness   
 Uncertainty about 
status, future, and 
behavior of 
institutions   
 System/state is 
KEY to political 
stability and 
development  
 
 
Confront
ation 
 Threat to political 
consensus in army 
elites, in society, 
and in state society  
 Fear of what other 
side will do  
 Danger of social 
conflict that has 
long term 
consequences 
(divided society) + 
longer it goes on 
harder to fix  
 
Decision 
making 
 Threat to ability of 
government to make 
decision on public 
problems  
 Uncertainty 
whether decisions 
government made, 
when, how  
 
 Public problems not 
solved cause public 
bad (e.g. garbage 
not collected causes 
disease)  
 
To understand the context of Thailand’s political crises, the framework provides 
three integrative explanations. Thailand’s political crises since 2006 were obviously 
addressed through military interventions. The effects of these political crises triggered a 
system crisis, and the system crisis created threats to specific systems and institutions. 
For example, political shocks caused by military coups dynamically induced institutional 
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turbulence and even collapse. The shocks also created threats to political and social 
systems. The government had administrative and political weaknesses. The government 
also lost the capacity to handle political instability and maintain policies. In addition, the 
system crisis created uncertainty about the status, future, and behavior of institutions. For 
example, citizens were uncertain about the status of the new constitution and future of a 
national election. The system crisis stimulated Thai society into realizing that threats 
caused by political crises are undesirable and dangerous to political stability and 
democracy. Political crises have to be addressed as an undermining factor to social and 
political development. Therefore, they need to be resolved as soon as possible. Political 
systems and civilian government should be the key to institute political stability and 
development (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017; Krieger, 2001).   
Second, Thailand’s political crises are considered confrontation crises because 
sources for political crises were created by two conflicting parties—i.e. between 
government and an opposition party and between government and the military. Both 
sides were unsuccessful in negotiating within legislative means and failed to decide on a 
way forward. Consequently, this unresolved confrontation created a threat to consensus 
in army elites, in society, and in government. The confrontation between two political 
factions also created fear of what the other side would do. For instance, government 
feared large anti-government protests or of military reaction. Eventually, society 
experienced the threat created by the confrontations that triggered the danger of social 
conflict that has long-term consequences—e.g. divided society or violence. The longer a 
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political crisis goes on, the harder it is to fix. Political crisis is an urgent agenda that 
needs every party to find a way out as soon as possible (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 
2017; Krieger, 2001).   
Finally, the prolonged political crisis in Thailand is considered a decision-making 
crisis. Political crises create a threat to the ability of government to make decisions on 
public problems and to determine a way forward. These crises trigger an uncertainty 
about government decisions being made, when they are made, and how they are made. 
Government is uncertain about making decisions on social policies that may have a risk 
of non-compliance. The anti-government people and military elites closely watch policies 
and strategies that government decides to do. As a result, public problems are not solved 
properly. Those public problems then cause negative consequences—e.g. garbage is not 
collected, causing disease (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017; Krieger, 2001).       
Literature Review  
Studies on Effects of Political Crisis on Local Government Service Delivery  
To better understand the opportunities for this study, this section explores 
previous research on the effects of political crisis on local government service delivery. 
The previous studies in this area encompass two aspects: (1) the effects of political crisis 
on local government service delivery from international experiences; and (2) the effects 
of political crisis on local government service delivery in Thailand.  
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 The related literature on the effects of political crisis and how it has affected local 
public service delivery and socioeconomic factors is examined. The emphasis of previous 
studies centers on how the breakdown or decline of national political institutions and 
political leadership affects local government service delivery and socioeconomic factors. 
The first part presents research done in the global context, followed by a discussion of 
previous studies specific to Thailand.  
After reviewing various sources, there appears to have been very little study done 
on the effects of political crisis on local government service delivery. Numerous studies 
emphasize how economic or financial crises negatively affected local governments (e.g. 
Carboni & Milward, 2012; Greer, 2010; Nelson & Balu, 2014; Reschovsky, 2004; 
Stenberge, 2011; United Cities and Local Government, 2009). However, only a few 
available studies look at the effects of political crisis on local government. Most studies 
were conducted in countries that were already experiencing fragile conditions, such as 
Somalia, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe. It is important to emphasize that the existing literature 
is insufficient to establish any working hypothesis but only useful to organize data 
collection into threats and opportunities and into the five moderating variables.   
Studies in the Global Context 
Regarding political institutions, Kynev (2006) investigated the effects of the 2004 
national political and institutional crisis in Ukraine on “the system of local self-
government” (p. 32). After the regime change, the impact of institutional change affected 
local administrative systems; that is the local council members are elected by local 
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citizens but local leaders are appointed and dismissed by the central authority. This 
change caused political monopoly controlled by central authority (Kynev, 2006).  
Importantly, Kynev (2006) stresses the importance that the 2004 political crisis in 
Ukraine developed a sustainable solution by strengthening “institutional mechanisms” 
because strong institutions help protect public interests from the intervention of a 
“monopoly of power by any single group” influenced by the central government (p. 37). 
Consequently, the stable institutions increase local authorities’ capacity in providing 
services.          
In the case of the political crisis in Zimbabwe, Musekiwa & Chatiza (2015) note 
that “political polarization” tightened the relationship between national and local 
politicians because they were from the same political party, hence the local councilors 
were not interested in, or even ignored, public participation in local activities (p. 130). In 
addition, institutional breakdown caused policy interventions of central government on 
local authorities. Muchadenyika (2015) conducted research on the effects of “allocation 
of housing land between 2000 and 2012” on cities’ service delivery in four major cities in 
Zimbabwe (p. 1219). The results revealed that prolonged political and institutional crisis 
in Zimbabwe created gaps for the central government’s struggles to intervene in the 
operations of local authorities, for example housing services. Local authorities were 
limited and some local services were transferred back to a central authority and/or 
contracted out to the private sector (Muchadenyika, 2015). 
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Regarding civic engagement, political crisis in Zimbabwe undermined civic 
engagement at the local level because political crisis caused “political polarization” that 
made a tight relationship between the national and local governments (Musekiwa & 
Chatiza, 2015, p. 130). This may seem to be a positive effect, but actually it is not 
because national and local politicians are from the same party. They felt like they had 
enough stability to maintain political power, so the local politicians were not interested in 
building civic capacity and engagement in their local governments (Musekiwa & Chatiza, 
2015)     
Moreover, during political crisis local residents tried to respond to the decline of 
local service capacity. Local citizens tried to help local authorities to provide services by 
setting up civic engagement mechanisms and affiliated organizations. Unfortunately, due 
to political circumstances, local authorities lacked capacity to handle the needs of citizens 
and low management capacity of citizen-led organizations (Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015). 
Börzel and Risse (2016) argue that “weak or limited statehood or dysfunctional 
institutions does not necessarily lead to weak or bad governance,” especially at the local 
level (p. 2). In addition, the research employed three kinds of trust (personalized-trust, 
group-based trust, and generalized-trust) as informal institutions to examine the existence 
of governance at the local level, although the status of the national political institution is 
weak and dysfunctional (Börzel & Risse, 2016, p. 4).  
In their research, Börzel & Risse (2016) reported that “personalized trust within 
close-knit communities enables effective and legitimate governance at the local level in 
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the absence of functioning state institutions” (Börzel & Risse, 2016, p. 156). In addition, 
they argue that each kind of trust could support the other in order to maintain the degree 
of governance, especially when collective groups are strong and work across boundaries 
at the local level, even though national political institutions are in a dysfunctional phase 
(Börzel & Risse, 2016).     
For governance, Kynev (2006) states that the national political crisis triggered 
negative effects on the governance system and destabilized social unity of the country. 
Moreover, during the political crisis central government intervention undermined local 
transparency. Some local public services, such as housing services, were transferred from 
the local authority back to the national government, making it difficult for local 
councilors to exercise checks and balances or even be involved in management processes 
(Muchadenyika, 2015). 
For political economy, political crisis in Somalia caused “state collapse” and 
“intractable conflicts” (Menkhaus, 2007, p. 357). Menkhaus (2007) states that the 
prolonged political crisis caused the civil war in the country. Due to the fighting, local 
communities were ruined and basic public services, such as hospitals, found it difficult to 
serve people. Citizens lived in poor conditions and lacked even basic sanitation, 
eventually causing disease and health problems within their communities (Menkhaus, 
2007).  
Musekiwa and Chatiza (2015) studied the relationship between the decline of 
local public service and the progress of citizen engagement during political turbulence in 
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Zimbabwe. Due to the prolonged political instability, local authorities encountered 
financial deficits and lacked resources, which led to the decline of local basic service 
delivery.  
In addition, Muchadenyika (2017) stressed that Zimbabwean national political 
breakdown created negative effects in both central and local service provisions. At the 
local level, municipalities were unable to provide and maintain basic public services such 
as roads, sewer, water, electricity, and housing, and also lacked the capacity to stimulate 
economic activities and employment (Munzwa & Wellington, 2010, p. 139). 
Interestingly, Munzwa and Wellington (2010) emphasize that prolonged political crisis 
caused the decline of good governance, inducing “unemployment” and other hindrances 
to public service operations (p. 140).   
Other studies done in the global context also reported negative effects of political 
crisis on local government public service delivery. Very few have shown a positive effect 
of dysfunctional state institutions on local governance. But Börzel and Risse (2015) and 
Musekiwa and Chatiza (2015) show that there are ways to have a “non-effect” via coping 
mechanisms at the local level, especially in civic engagement.  Most cases obviously 
indicated the linkage between national political crisis and low capacity of local 
governments for providing basic public services. However, it is imperative to review the 
studies done in the Thai political context and address research opportunities for exploring 
the effects of national political crises on local government service delivery in Thailand.  
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Studies in the Thai Context 
 After reviewing the recent Thailand-specific literature on political crisis and how 
it has affected local government service delivery, my observation is that available studies 
were primarily conducted more about the effect of economic crisis on government 
functions and civil society than the effects of political crisis on local service delivery. 
Nevertheless, these examples are important and useful for guiding research opportunities 
because political economy is the indirect way that national political crisis affects local 
government service delivery.  
This section begins with the effects of economic crisis on public services and civil 
society. When the economic crisis in Thailand arose 1997, it widely affected public 
agencies, business sectors, and social policies. One study reveals that negative effects of 
economic crisis led to unemployment and wage cuts, poverty and inequality, and 
reduction in health services and educational opportunities (Jung et al., 2003, p. 97).   
Similarly, there was a study examining the effects of economic crisis on the 
development of local government in Thailand. Khoman (2005) notes that even though 
economic crisis created negative effects at both the organizational and individual levels, 
“not all of its effects were negative” (Khoman, 2005, p. 58). The negative effects of 
economic crisis triggered financial deficits, decline of investment, layoffs, currency 
instability, and so forth. Surprisingly, the effects of the crisis also created an opportunity 
for government to work closely with citizens and strengthen the government-citizen 
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relationship. This stimulated Thai government to become more “transparent and 
responsive to public concerns” (Khoman, 2005, p. 58).  
This crisis triggered Thailand political reforms that included the progress of 
citizen empowerment and decentralization in Thailand (Khoman, 2005). This case 
illustrates that we can see that a crisis may help offset some of the negative effects it 
produces. While crises cause negative effects on the one hand, on the other they may 
produce some benefits.  
As mentioned, previous studies about the effects of national political crisis on 
local government service delivery in Thailand are rare. In order to investigate “social and 
political dynamics” at the local level and integration of the concept of “coproduction and 
community empowerment,” Sudhipongpracha and Wongpredee (2016) examined the 
effects of coproduction on community empowerment in two Thai municipalities (p. 302-
3). This research found that empowering local citizens to coproduce local services 
transformed them from “passive/reactive citizens waiting for government services and 
opportunity to voice their opinions to active/proactive citizens” (Sudhipongpracha & 
Wongpredee, 2016, p. 311).  
In addition, this research noted that even though the effects of “national political 
climate” may create threats for “citizens’ political engagement” in the municipalities, 
some local activities, such as road maintenance projects, successfully engaged more 
citizens into coproducing processes than other local activities (Sudhipongpracha & 
Wongpredee, 2016, p. 312). This is considered as an opportunity for local governments to 
 
41 
 
maintain a local government-citizen relationship and strengthen civic engagement in local 
public service delivery. In addition, this research emphasizes that in “urban 
municipality,” the degree of coproduction was moved from simply working together to 
co-management by creating an informal committee that included local political leaders, 
community leaders, citizens, and local officials (Sudhipongpracha & Wongpredee, 2016, 
p. 313).  
On threats, the literature presents how the economy has declined since the 2006 
political crisis and how it has affected socioeconomic factors. Sussangkarn and 
Nikomborirak (2016) affirm that prolonged political crisis in Thailand obviously creates 
negative effects on the Thai economy as a whole. Political crisis induces uncertainty for 
both Thai and foreign investors to expand their investments in Thailand. Due to an 
unclear direction of the political situation, the export growth has been declining 
dramatically compared to times of stable political conditions. In addition, political 
turbulence and “declining competitiveness” labels Thailand as the “sick man” of the 
region (Sussangkarn & Nikomborirak, 2016, p. 41). It is inevitable for local governments 
as public service providers to avoid these threats because a declining economy surely 
affects local revenues and discourages local investments.  
Based on the data presented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), since 
2006 Thailand total investment (percentage of GDP) has been declining due to political 
instability (International Monetary Fund, Thailand World Economic Outlook Database, 
2017; Sussangkarn & Nikomborirak, 2016).  
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The continuing political crisis since 2006 has undermined foreign and local 
investments. Manufacturers and investors lack confidence to invest and expand their 
businesses and especially to make capital investments. Instead, the investors prefer to 
increase their labor force rather than investing in machines; human labor being cheaper 
than machines in the short term. Additionally, labor forces are flexible to mobilize and 
demobilize when the situation is uncertain (International Monetary Fund, Thailand World 
Economic Outlook Database, 2017).    
In summary, the literature reflects the effects of political crises that entail both 
opportunities and threats. Public service delivery is an important and a major 
responsibility of Thailand local governments. There continue to be concerns that the 
prolonged national political crisis in Thailand will affect public service delivery based at 
the local level. Many studies conducted in the global context reveal that political crisis 
creates negative effects on local affairs and basic public services operated by local 
authorities. In the Thai context, a few studies show how national political crises affected 
institutional breakdown, political participation, and add to a declining economy. Few of 
these studies spotlight specific intervening factors, for instance political institutions, 
citizenship, governance, political leadership, and economic factors that may affect local 
government service delivery. Addressing this gap is something that this current study will 
attempt to do.   
This study explores how national political crisis, a fact of life, to some degree, 
since 2006, has affected local government service delivery in Khon Kaen Province, 
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Thailand. The five moderating variables employed in this study are not used to formulate 
a hypothesis, but rather are used for looking at the antecedent conditions for local service 
delivery.  The specific questions to be answered are: (1) whether local government 
service delivery experiences a negative impact, a positive impact, or some combination of 
the two; and (2) which moderating variables explain this. In order to guide the conceptual 
framework of this research, the following section addresses the relevant theories in 
political science and public administration.    
Theoretical Foundations 
While the intent of this study is not to test any hypotheses, it is necessary to use 
certain established theories to build a foundation for the analysis used in this study. There 
are three theoretical approaches that must be examined; institutional theory, governance 
theory (including civic engagement and public leadership), and political economy theory. 
Their theoretical implications for local government service delivery under political crises 
are also addressed. First, the discussion describes the broad concept of institutionalism 
and then concentrates on formal institutions and laws, and looks at the concept of 
decentralization. Next, governance theoretical approaches explain the core concepts of 
new public governance, civic engagement, and public leadership. Political economy 
theory is explored to provide an understanding of the institutional interrelation between 
politics and economics and explore how change in political institutions triggers change in 
economics or vice versa. Finally, how these three relevant theories are related to each 
other is studied and their implications for current research summarized.       
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Institutional Theory 
Defining Political Institutions. Institutional theory plays a vital role in political 
studies, economics, and governance studies. The essence of institutional theory provides 
the sophisticated framework to reflect public policy processes, behavior of individuals in 
political society, and impacts of changes within political institutions (North, 1990; Peters, 
2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Putnam, 1993). Scholars have presented approaches to study 
institutions using various assumptions. Nevertheless, they commonly agreed that the 
institutions do matter (Peters, 2011, p.79; Teske, 1991).  
To understand the complicated patterns of institutions, North (1990) characterized 
institutions into two forms; formal constraints and informal constraints (p. 4). The 
constraints generally are created by individuals or groups in order to contour human 
interaction and narrow the choices. In addition, those constraints are the sources to form 
institutions. For example, the formal rules generally are developed from traditional and 
social norms or agreements. They are evolved and institutionalized due to the constraints 
and social complexities (North, 1990).  
The patterns of formal institutions include constitutions, formal laws, political 
rules, economic rules, and contracts (North, 1990, p. 47). These formal institutions are 
created in order to guide and shape human interactions and behaviors, especially at the 
individual level. The impacts of formal institutions create the interrelations within 
institutions. For example, the formal political rules trigger economic compliances or vice 
versa. Typically, the formal institutions are officially written down and constituted 
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through the legislative process such as constitutions and laws (Dobler, 2011; North, 
1990).  
For this research, I focus on the formal institutions, or what North (1990) called 
“formal constraints,” because much of the informal institutions are considered as 
governance (p. 46). The formal institutions can help us understand whether change or 
instability in formal political institutions affect Thailand’s local government service 
delivery performance or even social economics in times of national political crisis.  
Theoretical Implications. The institutional theory helps guide the analysis in this 
study. Political institutions rest in an analytical framework as one of the moderating 
variables that are affected by national political crisis, so that the result may affect the 
effectiveness of local government service delivery (March & Olsen, 1984; Peters, 2012). 
To examine whether political institutions impact local government service delivery, the 
institutional theory helps explain how changes in formal rules, systems, and procedures—
e.g. constitution, laws, elections, voting—at the national level influence citizens’ 
interactions, individual behaviors, local political institutions, and civil society (March & 
Olsen, 1984; North, 1990; Peters, 2012).  
The literature on political institutions in Thailand generally shows that Thailand’s 
political institutions influence the patterns of politics (i.e. policy making processes), the 
political structure (i.e. centralized structure and authority), and “bureaucratic autonomy” 
(Hicken & Selway, 2012; Painter, 2004, p. 377). In recent decades, due to political 
instability, formal political institutions in Thailand such as constitutions, formal laws, and 
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the electoral system are unstable and fragile, and are undermined by political unrest. The 
institutional formations and distortions are influenced by various actors such as 
bureaucrats, civil society, the military, and the judiciary. Prominently, the military and 
judiciary are the most influential actors in political institutional progress (Kuhonta & 
Sinpeng, 2014; Ockey, 2009).  
For example, Kuhonta and Sinpeng (2014) argue that political institutions in 
Thailand are designed and steered by not only the “usual suspects such as the military, 
but from unexpected actors, such as the judiciary and civil society” (p. 334). The 
prominent evidence shows that the military and constitutional courts are influential actors 
in changing political institutions by legitimizing the two military coups in 2006 and 2014. 
Consequently, the constitutions and other formal laws, as formal political institutions, 
were changed or suspended. The new institutions were drafted and constituted by the 
same actors in order to serve their own political interests (Kuhonta & Sinpeng, 2014).  
A change in one influential political institution affects the function of other 
institutions, such as the suspension of the constitution affecting the electoral system and 
political parties (Dalpino, 2012; Waitoolkiata & Chambers, 2015). In addition, Kuhonta 
and Sinpeng (2014) emphasize that the formation of Thailand’s political institutions 
seemingly serves specific political interests of the military and political elites rather than 
protecting citizens’ rights and promoting good governance. Further, Bureekul and 
Thananithichot (2012) argue that political institutional instability in Thailand reduces 
 
47 
 
confidence among citizens and undermines social interactions. This becomes an obstacle 
to successful reconciliation.               
To understand the influences and interrelation between institutions and local 
governing processes, the following section discusses governance theory, which includes 
governance, civic engagement, and political leadership.  
Governance Theory 
Defining Governance. The meaning of governance has been discussed widely 
across academia and in studies of modern government practices. Some scholars identify 
the meanings that help illustrate the core features of governance as a “new process of 
governing” (Rhodes, 1996, p. 623). Stoker (1998) defined governance as “the 
development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and 
private sectors have become blurred” (p. 17). In this sense, governance is not only 
utilized for the public sector, but also the private and voluntary sectors. For public 
sectors, the meaning of governance refers to the interdependence between roles of 
governments and societal sectors in providing public services. The traditional styles of 
governing, i.e. “bureaucratic hierarchy” and command and control, have been replaced by 
multi-jurisdictional collaboration, networks, and collective actions (Bevir, 2011; Rhodes, 
2007; Stoker, 1998).  
In the private sector, governance refers to the process of “corporate governance” 
that derives business concepts to apply to government practices and public service 
delivery (Rhodes, 1996, p. 654). The voluntary sector refers to governance as “self-
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governing networks” (Rhodes, 1996, p. 658). Self-governing organizations play a vital 
role in providing service delivery by replacing or supporting the works of government 
through societal networks and partnerships. The lifetime of a self-governing organization 
is short because it is easily influenced by interest-groups or potential members (Hirst, 
2000).  
Even though the definitions of governance are diverse based on levels of use and 
forms of institution, I conclude that governance and institutions are not equivalent terms. 
Rather, governance is about the values of collective actions and collaboration for 
common goals. In theory, excessive power of central government is restrained by 
individual citizens and civil society in pursuit of improving quality of public services, 
expanding policy networks, enhancing social equality, increasing transparency, and 
promoting accountability. To understand the evolution of the foundations of governance, 
the following section illustrates the development of governance theory, from a state-
centered approach to a society-centered approach.     
Effect of the Evolution of Governance Theory on Public Service Delivery   
Governance is considered a new paradigm of public management that developed 
out of traditional public administration (Osborne, 2006). Due to social complexity and 
various needs of public service delivery, government is no longer a major policy actor 
and a main public service provider. Governments have to blur boundaries and connect to 
societal actors and professional service providers in order to cope with complicated 
services and improve the quality of public services (Klijn, 2002). Still, a new paradigm 
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evolves by overlapping or interconnecting with existing paradigms. The shadow of 
hierarchy remains influential in the operation of traditional public administration and 
public management (Klijn, 2002; Osborne, 2006). The evolution emphasizes three main 
stages: public administration, new public management, and new public governance. 
Public Administration. Traditional public administration sees government as a 
main actor in the process of governing, as well as policy processes. Economic and 
societal sectors are also steered by the central government (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; 
Peters & Pierre, 1998). Public service delivery and policy decision-making are controlled 
and dominated by the central government through the ministries (Hirst, 2000). As a 
central actor, government exercises power through formal institutional procedures. 
Meanwhile, subnational governments and societal sectors are controlled through 
hierarchical structures (Renn, Klinke, & Asselt, 2011; Stoker, 1998). In addition, “public 
institutions offer one-size-fits-all services” to citizens and societal sectors (Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1993, p. 168). As mentioned, the hierarchy is a governance mechanism that is 
used within governmental administration (Osborne, 2006, p. 383). Also, bureaucracy 
plays a dominant role in policy decision-making processes and policy implementation 
(Osborne, 1993; Osborne, 2006). The public administrative systems are designed and 
directed by bureaucratic concepts in order to facilitate public administrators and civil 
servants rather than citizens and society (Osborne, 1993; Osborne & Gaebler, 1993).   
When society is more complex and traditional public service provisions are 
challenged by diverse needs and expectations of civil society, government no longer has 
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as large a role in service delivery and public problem-solving (Renn, Klinke, & Asselt, 
2011). Plus, when government encounters fiscal hardship for expanding public services 
and even lacks budget to subsidize subnational governments such as states and local 
governments, most public services are transferred to local governments without funding 
(Osborne, 1993). These factors push government to change administrative approaches in 
order to improve their performance (Osborne, 1993). In order to deal with these 
challenges and also improve government performance, government employs business 
administrative approaches in public organizations in pursuit of enhancing efficiency and 
effectiveness of public services (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). The poor performance of 
bureaucracies and old administrative techniques are increasingly criticized and attacked 
by the public, and eventually the old public administration is transformed to new public 
management (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Osborne & Gaebler, 1993).  
New Public Management. New public management (NPM) is developed based 
on “managerialism” that values privatization and business administrative approaches as 
the core of governing process in the public sector (Rhodes, 1996, p. 655). Government 
employs the successful concepts of business administration and market-based strategies 
to improve public service provision (Peters & Pierre, 1998). The constraints and poor 
performance of traditional public administration put pressure on governments to expand 
networks and horizontally coordinate with other sectors to provide services (Rhodes, 
2007). In addition, most government-led programs depend on “market mechanisms” and 
focus on the outputs rather than procedures (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003, p.13 & Hood, 
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1991, p. 4). NPM emphasizes customer-centric and performance-based management. 
Public-private partnerships encourage out-sourcing activities that help reduce public 
investment and improve the quality of service delivery. To accommodate this process, the 
government devolves authority and service provision to quasi-public organizations and 
the private sector (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Heinrich, 2011). More importantly, 
political leadership is one of the key success factors for achieving NPM because public 
leaders need to have “political entrepreneurship” in order to coordinate with both public 
and private networks (Peters & Pierre, 1998, p. 227).     
Even though NPM is asserted to be a reconnecting mechanism between theory 
and practice (Frederickson et al., 2012), NPM is still criticized by many public 
administration scholars. As Osborne (2006) stressed, NPM is merely a transitory stage, 
which transforms public administration to new public governance. Government uses 
NPM as an instrument to merely maintain intra-public organizational performance rather 
than being of public value (Osborne, 2006; Rhodes, 1996).  
Even though most public services are devolved to other public organizations and 
even the private sector, the shadow of public institutions, e.g. bureaucracy and hierarchy, 
remain influential because the government wants to ensure that public services are fairly 
and efficiently distributed (Moe, 1984). In addition, to be successful, government 
management has to understand and implement monitoring and measuring processes for 
those service provisions that have been contracted to the private sector. Some contracted 
activities may result in poor performance or may not respond to the needs of society. 
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Additionally, management failures can cause problems to government (Hefetz & Warner, 
2004; Moe, 1984). Moreover, some are concerned that NPM may create a channel for the 
private sector to take advantage of public service provisions rather than provide “cheaper 
and better services for all” (Hood, 1991, p. 9).    
The call for more collective action and societal collaboration prompts 
governments and society to shift orthodox and business administrative approaches to new 
public governance that values social interaction and networks. The sense of customer 
service in NPM is shifted to the sense of serving citizens in new processes of governing 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). Due to theoretical and practical transition, new public 
governance emerges as a new process of governing in the public sector (Kickert, 1997; 
Rhodes, 2007).  
New Public Governance.  New public governance (NPG or “governance”) is a 
recent administrative concept of government that challenges, and even replaces, the 
limitations of traditional public administration and state-centered approaches (Rhodes, 
2007; Stoker, 1998). NPG values collective action and network-based management. 
Government mutually shares power, authority, and resources with “multi-actor 
networks,” especially in public policy—i.e. policy network, and public service provisions 
(Enroth, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Renn, Klinke, & Asselt, 2011, p. 233).  
In this new process of governing, government changes its role from one single 
actor to having multiple interactions with societal sectors from both public and non-
public sectors that have diverse roles, levels, and institutional settings. More specifically, 
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these governance networks are dynamic and work across boundaries (Renn, Klinke, & 
Asselt, 2011). Peters and Pierre (1998) stated that new public governance helps enhance 
policy engagement, public-private partnerships, and voluntarism in public service 
provisions. Governmental structure is less hierarchical and a top-down administrative 
approach is replaced by a bottom-up approach (Kickert, 1997).  
In addition, new public governance influences the features of institutions because 
the new process of governing induces dynamic and collective patterns of human 
interactions and behavior. The actors within collective interactions are more diverse in 
terms of goals, needs, and interests, so that institutions are more adaptive and flexible to a 
dynamic society. More specifically, the interactions link not only the actors within 
institutions, but also those from outside. New public governance emphasizes coordination 
and networks across boundaries (Peters, 2011). 
Collaboration 
The new governance approach creates new procedures and opportunities for the 
public sector to flexibly collaborate with various actors and networks across boundaries. 
To pursue effective collaboration in public service delivery, governance stimulates active 
interactions among actors through collaborative decision-making processes in order to 
enhance effective policy engagement and achieve collective goals (Bevir, 2011). 
Additionally, institutional design and formal rules are important factors to help the 
progress of collaborations because the scope of collaboration is bounded not only by the 
public sector, but also the private and non-profit sectors (Bingham, 2011). The following 
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section addresses the key definitions of collaboration as theoretical and practical 
dimensions in governance perspective and then discusses the features and impacts of 
collaboration on public service delivery.   
Defining Collaboration. From a governance perspective, collaboration refers to 
interactions among collective actors as partners from both inside public organizations and 
“outside a single organization” in order to reach an achievement of policy objectives and 
public service delivery (Bingham, 2011, p. 386). Bevir (2006) underscored that 
collaboration is a new governing approach that is a consequence of the change from 
“laws and commands to negotiation and diplomacy” and from “a monolithic bureaucratic 
hierarchy toward multilevel institutions” (p. 426 & 434). Collaboration occurs when the 
actors interplay and exchange skills and resources across organizations in order find 
better solutions and innovations. Collaboration stimulates public engagement in policy 
discretion and administration. The stakeholders who are involved in collaborating 
processes are from different facets of civil society, for example, the public sector, the 
private sector, and non-profit organizations (Bevir, 2006; Bingham, 2011; Emerson, 
Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). To truly understand the importance and impact of 
collaboration on public service delivery, we must examine the forms of collaboration that 
occur between various sectors (Bingham, 2011).   
Collaboration among Multiple Sectors. Collaboration is an important governing 
mechanism to improve effectiveness of public service provisions. Government no longer 
acts alone in service delivery due to lack of capacity and resources, hierarchical barriers, 
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and ineffective bureaucratic instruments (Bingham, 2011; Sirianni, 2009). Collaboration 
creates space for linking strategic partners from multiple sectors and different 
institutional settings to work together in partnerships (Bevir, 2006).  
To understand the distinctive features of collaborative partnerships, Mackintosh 
(1992) presented three models of partnership as mechanism to develop effective 
collaboration; “synergy,” “transformation,” and “budget enlargement” (p. 213). Even 
though the model is developed to explain public-private collaborative partnerships, the 
implications of this model are useful for today’s collaborative governance. The synergy 
model emphasizes collaboration among diverse stakeholders across boundaries by 
sharing and exchanging skills, resources, and goals in pursuit of gaining mutual benefits 
and producing innovations (Mackintosh, 1992, p. 213; Pollitt, 2003). Additionally, 
Tschirhart, Amezcua, and Anker (2009) suggested that resource sharing is important for 
effective collaboration. Nevertheless, public managers should be concerned about 
“functionality,” that those resources can be utilized effectively (p. 17). Resource sharing 
should be viewed as an important factor for achieving organizational purposes. Tangible 
resources provide a source for estimating an availability of resources before sharing them 
with other partners (Tschirhart, Amezcua, & Anker, 2009).  
Secondly, the transformation model offers mutual opportunities for both public 
and private sectors to exchange or adapt values and practices between one another as a 
“joint venture” partnership (Mackintosh, 1992, p. 216). The public sector can take this 
opportunity to encourage the private sector to better understand public value and public 
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interest. Conversely, the private sector should also try to transfer useful practices and 
successful experiences to the public sector so that these lessons help encourage the public 
sector to perform efficiently and accountably (Mackintosh, 1992).  
Finally, the budget enlargement model is a strategic approach for collaborative 
partnership that is used for gaining financial support from a third party, such as central 
government (Mackintosh, 1992, p. 217). In this sense, the public sector lacks the budget 
to operate public services or infrastructure programs, while the private sector is 
concerned about failures and risks. In order to minimize risks and increase financial 
feasibility, these two parties seek to build common agreements and collaborative 
partnerships in order to be in a better position to request financial subsidies from central 
or local governments (Mackintosh, 1992). Pollitt (2003) argues that joined-up 
government, or what Mackintosh (1992) called joint venture, is not a one-size-fits-all 
approach. The public sector should carefully employ a joint approach to use for certain 
types of projects based on contexts and conditions because the effective collaboration 
relies on these contextual factors and appropriations (Connick & Innes, 2003; Gray, 
Jenkins, & Leeuw, 2003).  
For collaboration among multi-sectors, Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that this 
form of collaboration is considered an informal collaboration. It is developed based on a 
conventional approach that emphasizes an achievement of partnership through informal 
connections between the public sector and interest-groups rather than collective decision-
making and public agreement. In contrast, formal collaboration refers to collaborations 
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that focus on building public consensus among the various stakeholders, i.e. citizens, 
public sector, private sector, non-profit sector. These are facilitated through the “formal 
forum”—e.g. town hall meetings, council meetings, etc. (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 547).   
   The literature on governance in Thailand generally shows that initially 
government played the role as the main actor in the public sphere. The centralized 
bureaucratic system and hierarchical structure influenced policy processes and public 
service delivery. National government and ministries in Bangkok were the actual power-
holders in public administration (Painter, 2004; Wongpredee & Sudhipongpracha, 2014). 
Later, government was faced with economic and political constraints. These challenging 
factors pressed Thai government to improve administrative performance to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public service. Most of the public services were 
transformed to quasi-organizations or even to the private sector in order to enhance 
collaborative governance and quality of public service (Bowornwathana, 2000; Painter, 
2004).  
In addition, Thailand political reform triggered a new pattern of governing 
process that valued the role of the citizen, self-governance, transparency, and 
accountability. The decentralized governing process (written in the 1997 Constitution) 
was adopted as a mechanism to improve public services, enhance local self-governance, 
and stimulate citizen participation (Bowornwathana, 2000 & Sudhipongpracha, 2016). 
Nevertheless, Thailand’s national government remains an influential actor in resource 
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allocation and political power, impeding the progress of governance and decentralization 
(Marks & Lebel, 2016; Sudhipongpracha & Wongpredee, 2015).      
Civic Engagement  
As a result of the decompressed nature of authority in the governance framework, 
civic engagement and public leadership have emerged as important and related 
frameworks of research. 
Governance creates new patterns and chances for engaging citizenry in public 
policy processes and public service provision (McLaverty, 2011). Civic engagement 
becomes a vital element of new political and governing processes that value the role of 
citizens as primary participants in designing policy and public service. Civic engagement 
also generates positive impacts on democracy and the public policy process (Michels & 
Graaf, 2010; Holmes, 2011). In addition, some scholars emphasize that the life of public 
service agency and civic community are shaped by active citizen participation in order to 
develop effective public service and progress community value (Putnam, 1993; Adler & 
Goggin, 2005).  
The characteristics and practice of civic engagement can be seen in various ways, 
depending on the organizational and institutional settings. Furthermore, it can be different 
in terms of public or private entities (Holmes, 2011). To understand the meaning of civic 
engagement, scholars define civic engagement in various ways depending on the 
purposes and aspects of engagement activity (Adler & Goggin, 2005). The following 
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section discusses the definition of civic engagement theory and theoretical implications 
of civic engagement on this current study.  
Defining Civic Engagement. To narrow down the specific definition of civic 
engagement, Putnam (1993) defines civic engagement as when “citizens in civic 
community devote and share their interests by performing active public participation in 
public affairs” (p. 87). Citizens in civic community should abandon the sense of self-
interest and increase the value of mutual interests. To be citizens in civic community, it is 
not necessary for obligating every citizen to remove self-interest or hold to selflessness. 
However, citizens should not use their self-interest to advantage over the interests of 
other citizens. The sense of self-interest should be preserved for protecting personal 
rights rather than harming the rights or interests of others (Putnam, 1993). The benefit 
sharing within civic community is a useful definition of civic engagement. Public space 
should be open to every citizen to engage in public activity, no matter who they are, 
where they are from, or to what political party they adhere. Eventually, the public 
interests gained from civic engagement will benefit every citizen and citizen group within 
civic society.  
Spectrum of Public Participation. To classify the level of public participation in 
public service delivery and also in civil society, the International Association for Public 
Participation (IAP2) provides a spectrum of participation in order to identify the roles of 
the public sector in public participation processes. There are five levels within the 
spectrum, and each level indicates an “increasing impact on the decision” (IAP2, 2014). 
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The first level of public participation is to inform the public about basic objectives; 
information that helps them to comprehend the background of issues and proposed 
solutions. The second level is to consult citizens to gain their input, e.g., options, 
opinions, and proposals. The third level is to involve the public in working sessions. This 
creates an opportunity for the public sector to work closely with citizens. The fourth level 
is to collaborate with the public for developing tools for the decision-making process. 
The fifth level is to empower discretional authority for the public to finalize the choices 
that meet their needs (IAP2, 2014).  
The literature on civic engagement in Thailand generally shows that citizen 
participation is more recognized and influential over public and political decision-making 
processes since the 1997 Constitution was promulgated. Bringing citizen participation 
into the Thai Constitution was inspired by the participatory democratic era 
(Bowornwathana, 2000; Krueathep, 2004; Munger, 2007). For example, Bureekul (2009) 
argues that the formation of Thai political institutions since the 1997 People’s 
Constitution valued citizen engagement as a foundation of participatory democracy. This 
institutional reform enhanced the roles of citizens in policy making processes, political 
processes, and legal processes at both the national and local levels. Specifically, at the 
local level, Bureekul (2009) emphasizes that Thai citizens engage in policy and political 
processes from beginning to end as well as exercising their roles in the process of checks 
and balances (i.e. informing, consulting, deciding, checking, and removing).  
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In recent decades, citizen engagement in public and political activities has 
progressed dramatically because citizens understand and realize the importance of their 
roles in policy and politics. Nevertheless, in certain political contexts, it seems like the 
bureaucrats and the political power-holders remained reluctant to welcome citizen 
engagement because engaging citizens in public activities paves the way for [potentially 
unwanted] government transparency and accountability (Bureekul, 2009). In some local 
communities, citizens engage more in interactive and co-productive activities in their 
communities because they have a channel to express their voices and work together with 
other local residents and local leaders (Mutebi, 2006; Sudhipongpracha & Wongpredee, 
2016).    
In conclusion, it is important to stress that civic engagement is an important factor 
to increase trust and transparency in government. Citizens have confidence in their 
government because they are involved in every process of decision-making. Having high 
transparency in public organizations triggers better governance and legitimacy. Also, 
eventually it helps improve public services and government performance (OECD, n.d., 
para.1).  
Public Leadership   
Leadership is an important mechanism for achieving the process of governing in 
organizations, whether in the public or private sectors. In organizational administration, 
competent leadership helps enhance quality and efficiency of public services (Wart, 
2003). In new governance regime, leadership is a driver for furthering new public 
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governance that values collaboration across levels and sectors. Effective leadership in 
collaborative governance requires the capacity to create civic engagement, promote 
motivation, and initiate mutual partnerships (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). In 
public governance today, leadership encounters many challenges that are generated from 
both internal and external events. These factors trigger changes in terms of senses and 
features of leadership, especially leadership in public organizations, in order to respond to 
complicated social problems and uncertainties in society (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011; 
Wart, 2003).  This study investigates political leadership in local governments as a 
moderating factor in public service delivery performance. To understand the meanings 
and various patterns of leadership, the following section provides key definitions in, and 
the relevance of, leadership theory.   
Defining Leadership. The meanings of leadership are diverse and are based on 
practices and contexts. To ascertain definitions of leadership in the context of public 
organizations, scholars provide five meanings of leadership in administrative 
circumstances. First, leadership refers to the processes of generating results mandated by 
formal institutions and organizational structure. The administrative processes are 
completed based upon effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance. This type of leadership 
is applicable for frontline public administrators who perform their duties while 
maintaining political accountability. Second, leadership refers to supporting and 
improving processes that facilitate frontline officers who provide services. Next, 
leadership refers to capacity of executives to control and maintain an organizational 
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alignment with the changes and the stresses of external and internal circumstances. 
Fourth, leadership varies based on specific roles and services that public administrators 
are responsible for. Finally, leadership refers to the capacity of public leaders in 
providing vision and unitizing skills for making decisions on public service provisions, 
especially in difficult situations (Fiedler, 1996; Wart, 2003).   
As can be seen, these meanings of leadership vary based on the contexts and 
institutions in which the leaders are involved. In modern organizations, leadership can be 
described through processes that allow people to use their competencies for solving 
problems, collaborating with other organizations or networks, and responding to public 
issues (Bao et al., 2012). It is essential that modern public service organizations, such as 
local governments, should have this kind of a leader. The following section explains the 
importance of leadership theory in public service, especially in times of crisis. To 
understand the related leadership theories, I discuss contingency leadership and 
leadership in crisis management.   
Contingency Leadership.  Contingency theory in leadership explains how 
leadership styles differ and relate to specific contexts or situations. Northhouse (2013) 
states that contingent leaders should be able to perform effectively when their leadership 
styles are suitable to those situations or conditions. The contingency leadership theory 
consists of two dimensions of leadership. The first dimension explains styles of 
leadership, which include “task motivated” and “relationship motivated” (Northhouse, 
2013, p. 123). Leaders with a task-motivated style likely aim to achieve goals, while 
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those with a relationship-motivated style primarily concentrate on building relationships 
among individuals and groups in organizations as mechanisms to achieve that goal 
(Fiedler, 1971; Northhouse, 2013). The second dimension of contingency leadership 
depends on three situational factors, which include leader-member relations, task 
structure, and position power (Fiedler, 1971, p. 129; Northhouse, 2013). 
 According to Fiedler’s classical contingency model, leader-member relations are 
evaluated based on the degree of confidence and faith of followers on their leaders in 
such situations. Task structure is considered based on how well-organized the structure is. 
The degree of leadership is highly acceptable when people feel comfortable with clear 
directions. Position power explains a clear and strong relationship between positions and 
power. This means that leaders should have executive power and decision-making power 
in organizational administration (Fiedler, 1971). The current study employs contingency 
leadership framework to investigate how leadership operates as a mechanism to affect 
local service delivery performance in times of political crisis.              
Leadership and Public Service. The concepts of leadership in new public service 
have widely discussed the ways that patterns of leadership in the new governance era 
should be in collaborative form, adaptive form, ethical concentration, and engaging form 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011). These new forms present a new objective of leadership 
that is shifted from a traditional pattern, which emphasizes leaders at individual level, 
power structure, formal authority, and steering (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2011). The new patterns of leadership in new public service, rather, emphasize 
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values in society, citizenship, empowerment, and collective actions where the public 
organizations share these mechanisms with their citizens (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003).  
Similarly, Frederickson (1996) describes how the pattern of leadership in new 
public administration is concerned with the effectiveness of public service professionals 
and a fairness of public policy implementation. In addition, a new form of leadership is 
proposed as a catalytic factor to achieve collaboration across sectors (Bryson, Crosby, & 
Stone, 2006). In the current study, the concept of leadership in new public service is 
employed to help explain how local government leaders and public service professionals 
effectively provide and maintain public service delivery in times of national political 
crisis.   
Crisis Management Leadership. In crisis situations, the critical tasks that public 
leadership needs to respond to are to reduce the effects of the crisis and to bring the 
situation back to normal (Boin et al., 2017). In order to guide the effective and 
appropriate ways that public leadership should employ when faced with a crisis, Boin et 
al. (2017) propose five critical tasks for strategic crisis leadership; sense making, decision 
making and coordinating, meaning making, accounting, and learning (p. 15).  
To understand each critical task for strategic leadership, Boin et al. (2017) 
describe that, for sense making, strategic crisis leadership should have a sense of 
predictability by harvesting information, estimating causes and effects, and understanding 
the situation. Once a crisis occurs, they can measure and select an appropriate tool to 
strategically detect or minimize the effects of the crisis.  
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In addition, making decisions and maintaining coordination in a crisis situation is 
difficult because crises are not routine events. Strategic crisis leadership should have 
thoughtful decision-making and careful responses. Gathering ideas and coordinating with 
various groups and various levels of social and governmental sectors helps increase 
leadership capability to cope with a crisis (Boin et al., 2017).    
In a crisis situation, making sense of the situation is also necessary for strategic 
crisis leadership. Public leaders should take immediate action to minimize the effects of 
the crisis. Before doing that, public leaders should carefully consider details and define 
the components of the situation. This task guides leaders to deal with a crisis in an 
appropriate way and also increases credibility to the public (Boin et al., 2017). 
Being accountable to the public is imperative for creating leadership trust because 
crises may cause public uncertainties. Sometimes, citizens lack understanding and gain 
insufficient explanation from public organizations. Therefore, it is important to give them 
the reasons for the situation, share what is going on, and advise them what to do next 
(Boin et al, 2017).  
Lastly, a crisis situation is not always a bad thing. It creates an opportunity for 
learning. This type of learning triggers experiences and lessons for future strategy. 
Strategic crisis leadership learns from the past in order to build a better system for the 
future. This learning helps strengthen not only leadership capacity, but also produces 
inputs for forming policy and developing formal institutions (Boin et al, 2017).  
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The literature on public leadership in Thailand generally shows that leadership in 
public organizations focuses on the leader at the individual level and the leader within 
power structure. For example, Charoensiri, Getsuwan, and Girdwichai (2016) argue that 
leaders in public organizations in Thailand, especially in local government, are highly 
competent to create a vision and respond to the needs of local residents. Because they 
also live in the community, leaders tend to listen to the voices of citizens and react to this 
input in order to solve problems. In addition, these leaders’ characteristics can help 
enhance civic participation among local residents and encourage them to work together in 
local government activities. This becomes a source for building new patterns of public 
leadership that are derived from collective actions. Nevertheless, political institutional 
circumstances and centralized resource allocation influence the progress of public 
leadership at the local level. For example, local governments have to count on the fiscal 
transfer from the national government, so this central influence can also impede the 
development of local public leadership.  
Further, Charoensiri, Getsuwan, and Girdwichai (2016) stress that external social 
and political conditions in each community are diverse. Hence, local governments need 
leaders who can see the contingencies and contexts and who can foresee and prepare for 
rapidly-changing situations. Moreover, Krueathep (2004) argues that local leaders who 
have business experience can create innovative administration for local government. 
However, this leadership characteristic may not succeed in every context because leaders 
with business backgrounds might use business tools in a negative way in order to further 
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their personal interests. Local governments may also have leaders who have competency 
to build networks with business sectors.  
Political Economy 
 The concept of political economy provides an understanding of the institutional 
interrelation between politics and economics. In addition, the political economy describes 
the impacts of political and economic institutions on economic performance (North, 
1994). The concept of political economy also helps us to understand the factors or 
incentives that stimulate government to react to serve their citizens (Besley & Burgess, 
2002). The following section presents the definition of political economy and describes 
the relation between political economy and public service delivery. Also, the contribution 
of the theory to this research will be discussed.     
 Defining Political Economy. Political science and economic scholars have 
various definitions of political economy (Wamsley & Zald, 1973). Buchanan (1964) 
stated that the concept of political economy originated in The Wealth of Nations, a classic 
work of renowned economist Adam Smith. The original “political economy” in this work 
refers to the circumstances of production where the fruits of the laborers’ work produced 
wealth for the industrial barons. Importantly, the definition and characteristics of political 
economy are described through the patterns of human activity that eventually trigger the 
formation of institutions, for instance, laws and regulations (Buchanan, 1964).  
Wamsley and Zald (1973) write that political economy is the relationship of 
government to the economy that stimulates a “competitive marketplace” and promotes 
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efficiency of resource allocation and production (p. 64). In a public policy and public 
welfare perspective, political economy means policy options that efficiently benefit the 
public at large (Wamsley & Zald, 1973). Hence, politics and economics influence each 
other through interacting processes. Once one variable becomes turbulent, it could have 
an effect the other as inter-dependencies between polity and economy occur (Arndt, 
1983). To illustrate the components of political economy, the following section will 
describe the dimensions of political economy that include internal and external political 
economy.  
 Dimensions of Political Economy. The political economy can be illustrated in 
two dimensions. First, the internal political economy consists of internal mechanisms of 
economy—structure and processes of economy and norms of efficiency, and internal 
mechanisms of polity—socio-political structure, political processes, leadership, and 
political institutions (Stern & Reve, 1980; Wamsley & Zald, 1973).  
Second, the external political economy includes the external mechanisms of the 
economy—economic conditions and competitiveness, and the external mechanisms of 
polity—political conditions, influences of external actors, inter-organizational 
interactions, and distribution of power (Arndt, 1983; Stern & Reve, 1980; Wamsley & 
Zald, 1973). Importantly, some factors such as proximity, capacity, differentiation, 
concentration, and turbulence can be the environmental variables on the interactive 
relationship between internal and external political economy (Arndt, 1983; Stern & Reve, 
1980).  
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For political economy analytical strategy, Stern and Reve (1980) suggested that 
the interactions between economy and polity are very important for an analysis of 
political economy. So that economy and politics should not be separated from each other 
in this analysis, this study employs the concept of political economy to investigate 
whether politics and economics are the determinant factors of local public service 
performance. The study also examines the interactions between national political 
conditions and economic distribution at the local level during the prolonged national 
political crisis in Thailand since 2006.   
The literature on political economy in Thailand generally shows that Thailand’s 
economy is shaped by political institutions. The interaction between politics and 
economics impacts policy success or failure at both the national and local levels. Notably, 
Thailand’s political economy can be observed through the process of decentralization, 
especially fiscal decentralization, as Oates (1999) mentions in his essay on fiscal 
federalism. In the case of Thailand, one of the purposes of the decentralization was to 
promote local economy. In fact, fiscal decentralization remains limited and controlled by 
the central government. Due to this constraint, it creates fiscal inequality in some local 
governments and it also discourages local governments to improve the local economy 
(Kamnuansilpa, Wongthanavasu, & Ando, 2013; Krueathep, 2004).  
For example, Wongpredee and Sudhipongpracha (2014) argue that the formula 
used to calculate the budget allocation from the national government favors those local 
governments that have high capacity in revenue collection over those with a poorer base. 
 
71 
 
Equitable budget allocation systems should prioritize the local governments with poor 
financial capacity to solve their budget imbalances. Importantly, local budget allocation 
processes are politicized and meddled in by politicians and bureaucrats who have close 
relationships with the national government. In addition, Kamnuansilpa, Wongthanavasu, 
and Ando (2013) argue that local governments in Thailand lack an incentive to promote 
local economy because they are not only controlled by, but also looked down upon by, 
the national government in terms of economic development capacity. They have been 
treated by the national government as the recipients rather than the generators. As a 
result, this causes in them a lack of incentive and capacity to stimulate the local economy 
and attract investment. These examples help illustrate that national political institutions 
shape economic performance at local level.            
Conceptual Framework 
The contributions of the three theoretical approaches discussed above help build 
the conceptual framework in this study (See Figure 1.1). First, the institutional theory 
describes the roles of formal institutions on social interactions and behaviors. 
Specifically, this study emphasizes the impacts of changes in formal institutions during 
political crisis on social interactions. In addition, instability of formal institutions may 
affect the progress of decentralization, the interplay between local government and local 
citizens, and the effectiveness of local governments in delivering public services.  
Second, governance theory provides significant definitions of governance by 
drawing the evolution and development of governance concepts from the public 
 
72 
 
administration perspective to the new public governance perspective. Importantly, this 
study employs three theoretical components of new public governance‒civic engagement, 
collaboration, and leadership‒to guide the analysis in this study. Civic engagement 
emphasizes collective action and socio-political interaction in order to enhance political 
decision-making, improve effective services, create social capital, and increase trust and 
transparency. Hence, it is interesting to see the patterns and levels of civic engagement in 
local activities through the lens of both formal and informal political participation in the 
midst of political crisis. In addition, collaboration provides the opportunities for building 
networks and working across boundaries. The emphasis of this study centers on 
collaboration among collective partners (informal collaboration) and collaborative 
deliberation among multiple stakeholders (formal collaboration) in local service 
provision.  
The last governance component employed in this analysis is political leadership. 
The scope of leadership emphasizes contingency leadership, public service leadership, 
and crisis management leadership. Contingency leadership depends on style of leaders 
and situational factors. Moreover, the patterns of leadership in new public services‒
awareness in social values, citizenship, empowerment, collective actions, effectiveness, 
and fairness‒employed in this study concentrate on how local leaders and public service 
professionals provide and maintain local services by using these leadership patterns. 
Additionally, crisis management leadership provides a framework for strategic crisis 
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leadership, which includes sensemaking, decision-making, coordinating, meaning 
making, accounting, and learning.            
Finally, political economy theory provides two major dimensions of political 
economy that explain the inter-relationship and interactions between polity and economy. 
These two dimensions include the internal political economy and the external political 
economy. In this study, the relationship between politics and economics act as 
moderating variables that could affect the effectiveness of local government service 
delivery.    
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology and Design 
 
 This chapter describes the research design and methods employed for this study. 
The chapter consists of six sections: a rationale for an exploratory approach using 
multiple case studies; the research design; the site and case selection strategy; the data 
collection methods; data analysis methods; and data validity.       
Rationale for Exploratory Approach Using a Multiple Case Study 
This study explores how prolonged national political crisis in Thailand has 
affected local service delivery. To answer this question, this study looks at the antecedent 
conditions for local service delivery and considers national political crisis as an 
independent variable that interacts with five moderating variables to influence local 
government service delivery as an outcome variable. It is important to note that, in most 
cases, interviews tend to be subjective, which is why there is not necessarily a definitive 
difference between low- and high-performing cases on most variables. The question to be 
answered is whether local government service delivery has experienced a negative effect, 
a positive effect, or some combination of the two.  
While the main focus of this study is not on the comparative analysis of how the 
high-and low-performing cases are affected by the protracted national political crisis, the 
author selected multiple cases for data collection. This helps to gain a better 
understanding of phenomena and events across a range of municipal jurisdictions and 
communities. In addition, the author feels that a multiple-case-study design provides 
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multiple perspectives within a similar context, which may lead to future study of the 
“relationships and interactions” among local government’s stakeholders (Buckwalter, 
2014, p. 576). These stakeholders are both organizational and individual (e.g. 
municipalities, municipal leaders, community leaders, local residents, and municipal 
officers). 
 Data collected for this study are qualitative in nature and were collected by semi-
structured in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions. This sort of inductive data is 
not suitable to use for testing hypotheses (Nishishiba, Jones; Kraner, 2014), but rather 
provides “a more generalizable conclusion” about the cases themselves (Lawton & 
Macaulay, 2014, p. 78).  
 As a multiple-case study, the fieldwork allows the researcher to interact with 
selected participants from different municipalities. These participants provided an 
“insider’s view” through face-to-face, in-depth interviewing and focus-group discussions. 
Through this approach, the researcher gains direct information, e.g. real words, 
interactions, emotions, or gestures, from the participants who live and work with and 
experience those specific contexts or phenomena (Yin, 2014).  
Research Design 
To examine effects of national political crisis on local government service 
delivery, there were four steps for conducting this research. The first was research case 
selection. Using local self-collected revenue data available from 2009 to 2015, the author 
identified four municipalities within Khon Kaen province. Employing the Statistical 
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Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program, the revenue data were used to stratify 
the municipalities into two groups: high- and low-performing cases. Two municipalities 
were selected from each of these groups, for a total of four municipalities in the study. 
How the four municipalities were selected will be discussed in detail in the next section.  
The second step was protocol preparation and participant selection. Based on the 
research question, the author developed semi-structured questions for the in-depth 
interviews and discussion guides for the focus-group discussions. Prior to the interviews, 
the author tested the consistency of the questions by interviewing volunteers in order to 
ensure the interview questions were appropriate and clear. Having these practice sessions 
helped the author to become familiar with interviewing protocol and the interview 
questions. Before doing the fieldwork, the author recruited the participants based on their 
political or municipal stakeholder roles who were directly involved in local service 
delivery—both from the perspectives of service providers and recipients. The author 
specifically invited the participants who lived and worked in that municipality for at least 
one year prior to the date of data collection.       
In the next step, data collection, the author collected interview data from four 
municipalities in Khon Kaen province. The participants for the in-depth interviews 
included municipal leaders and municipal councilors. For the focus-group discussions, 
the author invited community leaders, local residents, and municipal officers to 
participate. The reasons the author conducted two methods of data collection were to 
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ensure both efficiency of time utilization and breadth of coverage. Conducting only in-
depth interviews consumes a significant amount of time and resources but may not 
capture the interaction of the members of the communities, whereas relying on in-depth 
interviews alone may limit the boundary and multiple perspectives of data due to the 
involvement of only one participant in each interview. Therefore, using both focus-group 
discussions and in-depth interviews makes best use of the time allotted and captures the 
diversity of data from individual as well as group perspectives, thus creating richness of 
data for qualitative analysis.  
For confidentiality and human subject requirements, every participant received an 
explanation of the purposes of this study from the author and was provided a consent 
form (see Appendix E). Once the form was signed, the author asked for permission to use 
an audio recorder while interviewing, using those records for transcribing the interviews. 
For the interview locations, the author was permitted by the four municipalities to use the 
meeting rooms in the municipal offices to interview the participants.  
The fourth step was data transcription analysis. After completing the two types of 
data collection, the data were transcribed from the audio recorder into text format. Both 
in-depth and focus-group discussion data reflected the opinions and experiences of the 
participants. In addition, the author reviewed and classified the interview transcripts into 
the systematic themes. The themes basically were built around the moderating variables 
discussed earlier. For the focus-group discussion data, the author used thematic reading 
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and summarized the transcripts into themes according the five moderating variables. 
Moreover, the emotional interaction among the participants, i.e. gestures, sounds, 
laughter, or other nonverbal reflections, was included in this analysis. For capturing this 
kind of data, the author noted when the participants expressed such emotions during the 
sessions. The notes taken from the focus group sessions were added into the audio 
transcriptions.  
For data collected through in-depth interviews, the author also coded them into 
themes according to the five moderating variables. Based on these variables, each theme 
was assigned a different color by using Post-it© notes and pens. The author removed the 
names and the positions of participants from all transcribed documents before doing data 
validity.  In order to confirm the data validity, the author asked two graduate students 
who have had experience with conducting qualitative research to review the transcripts.  
Once the themes emerged and were consistent, the author started writing the 
research report. In this process, some of the more important and closely-related quotes 
from the interviews were identified and included in the report. These quotes provided 
evidence to support the arguments and descriptions. For anonymity, names and personal 
information of interviewees were removed from the quotes.  
Research Site Selection  
This research was conducted in four municipalities in Khon Kaen province. Khon 
Kaen province is geographically located in the center of northeast Thailand and is the 
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largest province in upper Northeast region. The justification of selecting Khon Kaen 
province instead of the other provinces in the region included: (1) Khon Kaen is the 
center of economic, commercial, transportation, and logistics in upper northeast 
Thailand; (2) Khon Kaen is a hub of government service agencies, of which there are 
about 450 government agencies consisting of agencies of the central government, 
provincial administration, and local government; (3) Khon Kaen is the medical, health, 
and educational center in the region;5 (4) Khon Kaen Province has 225 local governments 
(1 Provincial Administrative Organization, 84 Municipalities, and 140 Tambon 
Administration Organizations), the highest quantity of any province in upper northeast 
Thailand6; and (5) Khon Kaen province is a major political base of the Pheu Thai party, 
the ruling political party before being overthrown by the military coup of 2014. These 
factors distinguish Khon Kaen Province from the other 19 provinces in the same region in 
terms of social, economic, and political characteristics (see Figure 3.1).   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Khon Kaen province strategic plan (2014-2017), link: http://www.khonkaen.go.th/ 
6 Khon Kaen province has 225 local governments, which compose of 1 PAO, 1 City (Municipality), 6 
urban municipalities, 77 rural municipalities (sub-district municipality), and 140 TAO. Source: Department 
of Local Administration as of March 9, 2015, link: http://www.dla.go.th/work/abt/index.jsp.  
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Figure 3.1 Map of Khon Kaen Province and Research Sites   
 
Source: Designed by the researcher, 2017.   
The initial case selection was based on an attempt to find an objective measure of 
local service delivery. The most suitable, in the author’s opinion, was local revenue 
collected. This is considered to be a causal or cause measure of local service delivery and 
is assumed to be an important input to local service delivery. To select four research sites, 
the author therefore used local self-collected revenue data from 84 municipalities in Khon 
Kaen province. These data collected covered the period from fiscal years 2009 through 
2015. This was a period of significant national political events and changes in 
governments and policies in Thailand (e.g. two democratic governments, the Democrat 
Party and Pheu Thai Party; two coups d’état ending in military juntas, and significant 
political violence). The objective of the author was to identify and select two groups of 
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potential case studies (high performers and low performers), each group consisting of two 
potential municipalities (research sites).  
The average change in revenue of all 84 municipalities during 2009-2015, was 
88%. Low performance was considered to be less than 88% and high performance was 
above 88%. The author chose the top 10 high performers and bottom 10 low performers. 
With these 20 municipalities identified, the next process was to select the two most 
relevant research sites for each group by using cluster analysis, followed by paired-
comparison analysis. The cluster analysis was employed for calculating some basic 
control factors that explain better revenue performance in the high than in the low. Then, 
the author used paired comparisons for matching cases that shared similarities and were 
relatively close. The cases that held the most similar control variables were selected for 
the data collection process.  
For the research, the author felt that two cases in each group would be sufficient 
given the time allotted. Prior to paired comparison analysis, cluster analysis was used. 
The control variables the author used for cluster analysis were from the categories of: 
demography (population density); geography (distance to provincial town); history (year 
established); and revenue transfers (general grant and grant for local government). The 
author made these four categories worth 25% each and then used a scale of 1 to 7 for 
each category, where 1 indicated the lowest level of self-collected revenues and 7 the 
highest. 
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The result of the cluster analysis showed that the three lowest high performers 
were Nong Sao Lao, Nong Pai-Chumpae, and Kra Nuan, which could be paired with any 
of the top low performers—Khao Suan Kwang, Nong Kae, and Don Mong. The author 
used paired comparison analysis to identify the most relevant cases that share similarities 
in terms of intuitive choices—e.g. culture, location, region, and other relevant factors. 
Finally, two potential pairs (four cases) were identified.  
The first pair was Kra Nuan Municipality and Khao Suan Kwang Municipality. 
These two municipalities are located in the same region (northeastern part of Khon Kaen 
Province). They also share similar community characteristics and culture, e.g., they are 
considered semi-urban municipalities. Both have similar agricultural activities--e.g. sugar 
cane, rice, and rubber trees. Culturally, they are Buddhist communities and speak a 
dialect that is closely related to Lao. Kra Nuan is located along side of national highway 
connecting Khon Kaen Province to Kalasin Province. Similarily, Khao Suan Kwang is 
located along the national highway connecting Khon Kaen Province to Udon Thani 
Province (see Figure 3.1).  
The second pair is Nong Pai Municipality and Don Mong Municipality. They 
share similar cultural and community characteristics as well as location and direction. 
Both are located in the Western region of Khon Kaen Province. Nong Pai is on a national 
minor highway which connects to a major national highway connecting Khon Kaen 
Province to the northern provinces of Thailand (Maliwan Road or Highway 12). Don 
Mong is located on this highway (see Figure 3.1). As in the first group, the residents 
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speak the same Lao dialect and Buddhism is the main religion. Local people are 
predominantly farmers, with some working in local industries. The author used all the 
above information for research site selection to finalize the two pairs.  
Data Collection 
In this study, the data were collected from two types of interviews. For in-depth 
interviews, the participants included municipal leaders and municipal councilors. For the 
focus-groups, the author conducted the discussions with community leaders, local 
residents, and municipal officers  
The first step was face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with three participants 
in each municipality: 
Municipal Mayors. The author had expected to interview four municipal mayors, 
but only three were interviewed. The other mayor was not available at that time, but he 
assigned a deputy mayor to substitute for him. The author interviewed the municipal 
mayors in order to investigate their administrative experience, as they are local political 
leaders and local policy decision-makers. The interviews took about 45 minutes each and 
the interviews took place in offices of each municipality.     
Municipal Councilors. The municipal councilors were interviewed in order to 
explore their views and experiences as policy makers, local legislators, and neighborhood 
representatives. The author interviewed one chair and one councilor in each municipality 
by assuming that a chair and a councilor can provide different perspectives.  
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            Prior to the in-depth interviews, the author developed an interview guide and used 
a semi-structured interview technique to conduct the interviews. Semi-structured 
interviews helped the author to control an interview protocol by using an interview guide 
(see Appendix C). Also, the author was able to adjust the interview questions following 
each encounter. It is of note that all three interviewees from each municipality were 
males. That notwithstanding, the interview data from these individual interviews 
provided the author an in-depth perspective from different political and policy actors. The 
in-depth individual interviews provided the author limited multiple perspectives of data, 
so the focus-group discussions were an essential part of the process.             
 The focus-group discussions for the two groups of participants gave the author a 
diversity of data useful for analysis. More importantly, focus-group discussions allowed 
the author to gain “several perspectives at once from the population of interest” 
(Nishishiba, Jones, & Kraner, 2014, p. 102). During the focus-group discussions, 
participatory observation techniques were employed. This provided the author not only 
interview data, but the ability to note the interaction and participation among participants. 
In this study, the author conducted two focus-group discussions by dividing the 
participants into two segmentations; heads of municipal divisions and local residents. 
Heads of Municipal Divisions. The focus-group discussions conducted with the 
heads of municipal divisions consisted of 5-6 participants from each community. The 
participants were from various divisions within the municipality, e.g. fiscal and revenue 
division, municipal personnel division, public health division, education division, public 
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work division, and social work division. These participants provided the author with 
various perspectives on local government management and public service delivery as 
well as local-society relationships. For this group, the author selected the participants by 
considering the divisions that worked most closely with the community and 
intergovernmental agencies.      
Local Residents. The focus-group discussions conducted with local residents had 
4-6 participants from each municipal community. Each group consisted of some 
combination of local resident(s), a village headman, a village health volunteer, and a local 
entrepreneur. This group makeup provided various perspectives on citizen-local 
interactions, social collaboration, civic engagement, local economics, political leadership, 
and state-society relations. The participants were conveniently recruited and invited by 
the municipalities. Table 3.1 illustrates the sites, number of participants, and sex of the 
participants in the in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions within the four 
municipalities. 
Table 3.1 List of Research Sites and Interview’s Participants  
Municipalities  In-depth Interview Focus-group discussions  
Kra Nuan 3 (males) 5 (male 4, female 1) / 4 (male 2, female 2) 
Nong Phay 3 (males) 6 (male 3, female 3) / 6 (male 4, female 2) 
Kao Suan Kwang  3 (males) 5 (male 3, female 2) / 5 (male 1, female 4) 
Don Mong 3 (males)  5 (male 4, female 1) / 6 (male 3, female 3) 
 
 
 Before conducting the research, the author received IRB approval from Portland 
State University. Before conducting the interviews, the author requested participants to 
read and ask questions about the consent form or any other concerns they may have had. 
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Everyone expressed understanding of the information the author provided. They signed 
the consent form and seemed to be quite happy to participate in the interviews. 
Importantly, every participant allowed the author to do an audio recording. The author 
also asked them if they wanted a copy of the interview transcript for review, but no one 
needed that.     
Data Analysis 
The digital recording files were transferred to a secured drive. Then, the interview 
data were transcribed from the audio recorder into text format. For data analysis, thematic 
analysis was employed to analyze the interview data based on the research question and 
moderating variables as the analytical framework. In this study, the author employed the 
processes of thematic analysis presented by Braun and Clarke (2006). There were six 
steps in the analysis: 
Familiarization with the Data. After finishing the interviews, the author 
transcribed the data from the digital files into text. The author became familiar with the 
materials by reading them and linking them to the analytical framework. Since the author 
collected and transcribed the interview data, the author interpreted and understood from 
the characteristics of data. The author also cross-checked in order to make sure that the 
transcripts were consistent.  
Generating Initial Codes. While reviewing and reading the interview transcripts, 
the author summarized and interpreted them in a short version. Then, the author used 
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some initial codes that helped develop the informal themes (see Appendix I). At this 
point, the author was able to see the initial features of the data and identify them in a 
systematic way.  
Searching for Themes. The codes helped the author to develop themes by 
grouping them in a systematic way. Initially, there were a lot of interconnected ideas, but 
the author selected only the ones that linked to the analytical framework.      
Reviewing Themes. In order to make sure that the themes selected were correct 
and suitable for further explanation, they were carefully reviewed again and linked to the 
interview data because those data can help support the themes when writing the report.  
Defining and Naming Themes. The themes were defined in order to provide a 
clear sense for readers. This helps people to read and understand what the themes mean. 
In addition, it helped to organize the order of themes.         
Producing the Report. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the author put the themes in a 
table. The table illustrates some examples of themes that linked to the data presented. In 
this study, the author used the interview quotes to support the themes and related 
arguments.   
For data validity, there are several questions that could be asked‒whether the 
municipalities represent Khon Kaen, whether the interviewees were given honest 
answers, whether criteria settings and selection processes were influenced by a 
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researcher, etc. In addition, there might be some concerns about reliability caused by 
unexpected variations such as time, environment, etc. For example, the data gathering in 
2016 may accurately portrait the situations existing during this period, but may be 
different in the next 10 years.     
In order to ensure data validity, data triangulation process through multiple 
experts was used during data analysis in order to decrease “the potential bias that comes 
from a single person doing data collection” (Patton, 1999, p. 1193). The author asked two 
graduate students who have experience with conducting qualitative research to review the 
transcripts. After the review, both of them agreed with the interpretation and the themes 
the author had developed from these transcripts.   
Initially, the original interview quotes were transcribed into Thai language. To 
support the research findings, some relevant interview quotes that were significant and 
related to each theme were later translated into English. To ensure that the original 
interview quotes were correctly translated, the author asked an expert who had translating 
experience and familiarity with qualitative research to proofread for the consistency and 
accuracy of each quote. The names of interviewees remained anonymous throughout the 
validity review process.        
With regard to reliability, the author attempted to enhance the reliability by 
practicing the interview protocol with the volunteers in order to get familiar with 
questions and interview conditions. In addition, the author asked each municipality to 
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create a positive environment for the interviews by providing a meeting room for 
conducting the interviews. This reduced the possibility of unanticipated situations that 
may interfere with the reliability of the data collected from the interviews. Time of 
interview is also important for maximizing reliability. The author made appointment with 
the participants on a date and time of their convenience so they were not concerned or 
frustrated about business or personal situations they had to attend to at the time of the 
interviews. The author also made sure that the participants who were the municipal 
officers were granted permission to participate in the interviews so that they could 
participate in the interviews without worrying about revealing their own personal 
opinions.  
While attempting to ensure that the reliability of data was not jeopardized, the 
author, however, could not control the conditions as the effects of crisis rise and fall over 
time. In other words, it is questionable whether a study a conducted in 2010 or 2012 
would get the same findings.  Similarly, if this study were to be conducted again 10 years 
from now, would we still get the same results? Only future research can test the reliability 
of the data and thus research results over time. 
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Chapter 4 
How National Political Crisis Creates Threats for Development 
in Local Government 
 
The research question asks how Thailand’s national political crisis has affected 
local government service delivery. Thailand’s national political crisis since 2006 raises 
concerns about its effects on local government service delivery performance. While there 
were studies that pointed out to the detrimental effects of protracted political crises, none 
of them looked at the interface of the moderating variables with political crises and the 
service provisions of local government.  
It is widely accepted that political crises are threats to social, economic, and 
political development. The literature generally argues that a political crisis triggers 
government failures and undermines the progress of democracy (see Kurlantzick, 2011). 
Notable is that prolonged political turmoil due to military intervention causes formal 
institutional suspensions (e.g. constitutions and electoral systems), inefficient public 
services, and economic decline (Norton, 2012; Nikomborirak, 2016; Sethapramote, 2014; 
World Bank, 2016). The following section explores how Thailand’s national political 
crisis interacted with five moderating variables to have a negative impact on local 
government service delivery. 
It is important to note that one of the major themes that emerged from the 
interviews was that stakeholders perceived both threats and opportunities, and threats and 
opportunities were found in almost all cases. However, for the purposes of this study they 
will be presented in two separate chapters. Even though threats and opportunities are not 
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conceptually distinct, they will be treated separately in this study. This chapter will deal 
with threats and the next, Chapter 5, with opportunities. 
Results 
The preliminary results indicate that groups of local residents and groups of 
municipal officials shared and understood the political crisis in the same way. Concepts 
that participants saw as negative effects included: political and social conflict, political 
violence, political protests, government policy and project suspension, economic 
downturn, and military directives. The focus-group discussions were guided by 
discussing prepared questions (see Appendix C). The discussions also prompted further 
questions.   
In this chapter, the results demonstrate that participants saw the national political 
crisis as a threat to local service delivery. The data gained from the participants were 
thematically analyzed and presented through five moderating variables: political 
institutions; citizen engagement; political leadership; governance; and political economy.  
Political Institutions 
In this study, the literature on institutionalism focused on formal institutions (e.g. 
constitutions, formal rules, laws, and political structure). The main debates in the 
literature argue that changes in political institutions influence interactions among 
institutional actors—individual citizens and groups (i.e. organizations) in society. 
Importantly, these changes also influence the effectiveness of public service provision 
(March & Olsen, 1984; North, 1990; Peters, 2012). Additionally, as Shah, Thompson, 
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and Zou (2004) concluded, “institutional arrangement” (e.g. formal autonomy) impacts 
the outcomes of local public service delivery, which include “efficiency and equity” (p. 
12).   
For Thailand, formal political institutions shape patterns of policy making 
processes, government structure and authority, and bureaucracy (Hicken & Selway, 2012; 
Painter, 2004). In some political contexts, formal political institutions (e.g. constitution, 
electoral laws) are constituted to serve political interests of influential individuals and 
groups in political society. The effects of change in one institution trigger constraints in 
the functions of other institutions, e.g. constitutional suspension affects the electoral 
system and political parties (Dalpino, 2012; Kuhonta & Sinpeng, 2014; Waitoolkiata & 
Chambers, 2015).             
Since 2006, the continuing national political crisis in Thailand has resulted in the 
formal institutions (e.g. constitution, laws, bureaucracy, and political structure) being 
suppressed at the local level. This institutional breakdown affected not only individual 
actors, but also organizational actors—i.e. the status of local governments. The following 
results describe the effects of the institutional breakdown that negatively influenced the 
status of local government.  
According to the data analysis, the post-2006 national political crisis created 
particular threats to political institutions, which include a weakened electoral mechanism 
and suspension of local autonomy. The main themes and samples of key responses gained 
from the participants are presented and summarized in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Political Institutions  
Themes Samples of Key Responses  
 Weakened electoral 
mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 Suspension of local autonomy  
     “...local people wanted to have a local election; they 
probably feel frustrated...” 
     “Because they were elected, they had to be accountable 
to their constituency and concerned about their voters…” 
     “...national government has lost interest in local 
government such as budget allocation and the like.” 
 
 
      “We are limited to respond to what people need. Some 
things are prohibited to do.” 
      “Nowadays, it seems like we are moving backwards. 
They pretend to give us autonomy, but they still withhold it.” 
      “…they don’t fully decentralize authority to local 
government. They still maintain their power, which includes 
duties, responsibilities, and autonomy.” 
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews. 
Weakened Electoral Mechanism  
The main institutional threats arose from the suspension of local elections, the 
removal of local control of budgeting, and a shift of authority from the local to the central 
government due to a suspension of policies established by the previous elected 
government. The participants described how the post-2006 national political crisis 
weakened the electoral mechanisms (e.g. election law, party law, ballot type, 
campaigning rules, electoral financial law, etc.) (Kreuzer, 2000).   
Since 2006, elected governments and legislators in Thailand have existed under a 
prolonged national political crisis. This was especially severe with the post-2014 military 
coup, when political institutional failure instigated by the junta resulted in suspension of 
regular elections at both the national and local levels. The military used the 2014 Interim 
Constitution to replace the 2007 Constitution. One result was that the democratically-
elected national government and legislators were suddenly removed. The military 
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authority, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), then appointed a military 
government. Thai election law as an important electoral mechanism was suspended and 
replaced by a non-democratic process. The current political parties have not been allowed 
to play any political role since. Politicians have been prohibited from becoming involved 
in any political activities at both national and local levels. Especially noteworthy is that 
local elections have been suspended until after the completion of a new constitution. 
Due to the suspension of elections, local citizens lost their sense of representation 
in both national and local political institutions. It was difficult to give feedback and voice 
their preferences to the elected representatives. In effect, the representative role of the 
national legislature was abolished; however, local residents still wanted to have an 
elected government and elected legislature representing them at the national level. These 
suspended political institutions are important for local development in terms of political 
relationships, policy support, fiscal transfer, revenue collection, and infrastructure 
projects. Regarding this point, comments from participants included: 
 “…Nowadays, it seems like we don’t have people who represent us. We don’t 
have people who can help us. It’s broken and disconnected.” (Member of 
municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 2016)      
 
“…The relationship is apparently estranged because national government has 
lost interest in local government regarding items such as budget allocation and 
the like.” Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 
2016)      
 “Having national democratic representatives was good for us. We could follow 
up and know who represents us from our community. Because they were elected, 
they had to be accountable to their constituency and concerned about their 
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voters…” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 
2016)  
Since the post-2014 national political crisis, the NCPO suspended all local 
elections. To maintain service provision during national reform, the NCPO extended the 
terms of office for local politicians who were scheduled to end their terms during this 
period. 
According to the interview data, there was only one municipality that obviously 
reflected the negative effects of the electoral suspension ordered by the NCPO. This case 
is important to address here because the suspension of local elections caused frustration 
among local citizens. Local people wanted to have an election. They should have had the 
opportunity to decide who would be their next mayor and next local legislators. Notably, 
the suspension of local elections undermined an accountability between local citizens and 
their elected officials. An interviewee stated on this point that    
“Currently, local people want to have a local election, they probably feel 
frustrated. The mayor and some municipal councilors already finished their terms 
of office but they remain in power. Local people raised a question! We just told 
them it depends on the National Council for Peace and Order.” (Municipal 
official, personal communication, August 24, 2016)  
 
 As observed, Thailand’s 2014 national political crisis had more of an effect on 
political institutions than the 2006 political crisis, especially regarding the electoral 
mechanism. The following section will discuss the negative effects on the suspension of 
local autonomy.   
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Suspension of Local Autonomy 
The prolonged national political crisis weakened not only electoral mechanisms 
but also local autonomy, especially regarding budgets, because of a suspension of 
existing policies. National government policies are an important mechanism for 
improving local communities, stimulating economic activities, and maintaining 
intergovernmental relationships. Notably, Thailand’s post-2006 political crisis caused 
changes in election policies and also undermined policy alignment between national and 
local governments.  
Following the 2014 military coup, the military-installed government suspended, 
and even terminated, some social and economic policies created by the previous elected 
government. Some municipal leaders mentioned that the political crisis created barriers 
between local governments and national legislators in terms of financial support, budget 
allocation flow, and degree of development. Local governments found it difficult to 
request fiscal support from the national military-installed government. This relationship 
differs from the time of elected governments in that those governments tended to be more 
approachable and supportive. Regarding this point, some participants observed that: 
“…We don’t have a national elected legislature. Due to political suspension, it is 
difficult for us to ask for budget from national government to develop the local 
community”. (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 30, 
2016)   
 “…If municipal administrators have good connections with national legislature 
and government, we usually obtained the grants. It was difficult if they did not 
know someone there.” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 24, 
2016)                 
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“In the past, when we needed budget about 50-60 million baht for local 
development. We took local residents to ask for financial assistance from elected 
representatives.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, 
August 24, 2016)    
 Since the military government took power, local autonomy appears to be in decline, 
with some local duties being recentralized under the authority of national and provincial 
organizations. The decision-making authority became more highly centralized so that it 
was difficult for local governments to operate their services. It is important to understand 
that while there is less autonomy when the junta decides to get involved in governance, it 
decides to get involved in local governance less often than prior to the coup. The result is 
that while there is less autonomy for local government (which can be seen as a threat), 
there is also less interference in local government (which can be seen as an opportunity) 
as a result of central power not being exercised locally as regularly as in pre-coup 
Thailand. Seeing less interference as an opportunity will be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 5. Regarding the decrease of local autonomy, an interviewee reflected that:   
“The limitation of local administration is something like when we want to solve 
some problems and respond the needs of local people. We are limited in our 
response to what people need. Some things are prohibited. They (central 
government agencies) just said it might be illegal.” (Municipal councilor, 
personal communication, August 30, 2016)    
 
Political turmoil since 2006 delayed the progress of decentralization, which was a 
power-sharing mechanism connecting national and local political institutions. Often, 
local governments have been accused of corruption and functioning as nontransparent 
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organizations. The national government took this opportunity to interfere with some local 
duties and to pull back local autonomy, especially regarding budgeting.  
An interesting example given by some of the participants was the creation of a 
politicized policy called the “Pracha-Rat Project” or “People’s State Project.” This policy 
aimed to boost local economies and quality of life by allocating block grants through 
ministries, provincial authorities, districts, villages, and business sectors instead of 
directly distributing grants to local governments (Jikkham, Mala, & Sattaburuth, 2015). 
This politicized policy eroded the progress made toward the decentralization to local 
governments and its role in relation to the higher governing institutions. Most projects 
granted by the national government invested in the fundamental infrastructure of local 
communities. However, municipalities, as the main local service providers, were not 
empowered to be responsible for these projects. Regarding this point, one of the 
participants stated that:  
“I personally thought that they (central government authorities) tried to pull them 
back. Nowadays, it seems like we are moving backwards. They pretend to give us 
autonomy, but they still hold it.” (Municipal official, personal communication, 
August 30, 2016)      
 
 When the national government allocated grants for local infrastructure 
development projects in local areas, the national government and provincial authorities 
should have involved the local leaders in the funding process for that project, but they did 
not. Instead, the national government reduced local autonomy on budgets by transferring 
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the grant and mandated decision-making authority to the District Chief Officers, who are 
appointed by the central government. On this point, a municipal mayor expressed that:  
“No, they don’t [involve the local leaders], because this grant was transferred 
directly to the District Chief Officer to implement government policy. If each sub-
district receives 5 million baht, right? They have to spend that grant for road 
improvement projects following the needs of the local community. But they still 
need our assistance in terms of construction specialists in order to calculate and 
estimate the project construction costs. They still borrow our staff…” (Municipal 
mayor, personal communication, August 30, 2016)    
 
In addition, the suspension of local autonomy affected the local government-
citizen relationship. For example, one municipality provided financial support to local 
communities in order to promote local culture and tradition. During an elected 
government administration, it was very common for local governments to support such 
activities. Currently, municipalities have been prohibited from supporting or funding 
these same activities. As noted by some participants, the Office of General Auditor of 
Thailand suggested that traditional and cultural activities should be voluntary among 
local citizens, thus financial subsidies provided by municipalities would be recognized as 
an act of noncompliance. This limitation reduced the autonomy of local leaders to initiate 
new policies or support similar activities for local communities. Some participants 
presented these perspectives:     
[Referring to a local sporting event] “If people are not the athletes, the law does 
not allow us to buy them the sportswear. Last year, I just returned money to 
government due to an act of non-compliance. When we had traditional and 
cultural events, such as a Songkran Festival, we’ve not been allowed to provide 
financial support for the local community in order to organize and decorate the 
procession. The government said this kind of activity should be a voluntary 
activity.” (Municipal mayor, personal communication, August 30, 2016)  
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“It looks like we did everything wrong. Why do I have to do that? I can’t sleep 
and I am concerned about doing what I don’t want to do. I want to do the things 
that local residents agree are good for them. When we do something, the national 
auditing office told us that we acted in non-compliance on that project. We’ve 
encountered the difficulty. We would like to comply but at least they should 
provide us the right regulations that help avoid the act of non-compliance. We’re 
happy to have that.” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 24, 
2016)  
“One problematic issue that constrains our administrative mission is the activity 
that is related to local tradition and culture. For example, on the Buddhist Lent 
Day our municipality wanted the community to organize an activity. We cannot 
provide them financial support because the Office of General Auditor of Thailand 
does not allow us to do that. We cannot even support the costumes and make-up 
for the traditional dancers…” (Member of municipal council, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016)  
“My point of view is that it is not a real autonomy. For decentralization, they 
don’t fully decentralize authority to local government. They still maintain their 
power, which includes duties, responsibilities, and autonomy. They like pushing 
the fault to us instead of facilitating us to do it the right way. The regulations and 
laws do not accommodate us to work properly. If we don’t do anything, people 
complain and blame us. This affected us a lot. We work closely with people in the 
local community, but we cannot respond their needs, so people complain about 
us.” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 31, 2016)  
 
The participants perceived that local autonomy, especially on budgets, has been 
undermined. For example, the actions of the office of the Auditor General of Thailand (an 
autonomous governmental sector) in one case lead to a prime example of this kind of 
insecurity for local leaders. In this case, local governments were accused of corruption. 
The national auditing agency actively began checking local administrative transparency, 
especially regarding local expenditures and noncompliance issues. This auditing authority 
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appeared to be very active during the administration of the military government, as 
underlined by these comments:   
“The current government created a lot of problematic issues for us. They became 
government by a military coup. For local government, citizens elected us. We 
don’t like that they are accusing us as the corrupted local government. It’s not 
true! Each process follows transparent procedures. There is the rule. We do 
everything following the orders and laws. When a mayor ordered or assigned 
municipal staff to do something. If it is considered an act of non-compliance, 
municipal staff just avoided doing it. They carefully protect themselves to do 
that.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 2016)      
 
Moreover, since 2014, the military government suspended some local 
development projects and local expenditures even though those projects were needed for 
improving local public services, such as supplying new fire trucks. Instead, the national 
government provided financial support to provincial authorities (the governor’s office, 
and the district, sub-district, and village agencies) for all development projects. All the 
issues described above resulted in losing local autonomy. One of the participants 
reflected that:        
 “There were the effects because our annual budget was not enough. We have 
long term vision to do something but we cannot operate on that. It looked like we 
lied to our people. If we received 35% of the annual grant, we could manage 
everything. For example, nowadays we have two fire trucks. We wanted to buy 
another but we cannot because we don’t have enough budget. We wanted to buy it 
this year but all local project expenditures were terminated. Each project was 
suspended. For example, some government policies wanted to stimulate 
economy...” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 25, 
2016)  
 
Importantly, the participants emphasized that the important laws related to 
decentralization and local autonomy were suspended. Centrally-elected legislators 
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worked during these hard times because of the dissolution of the parliament. The 
military-installed government and its legislators have focused on solving the political 
crisis and conducting political reform rather than concerning themselves with 
strengthening formal political institutions. Newly imposed legal constraints began to 
threaten local decision-making in providing services. Due to new regulations, local 
governments encountered difficulty in making decisions on budgets. Concerning this 
issue, an interviewee expressed that:   
“Local governments encountered the difficulty on spending local expenditures. 
They [the current military government] don’t review and revise the laws and 
regulations that are related to local expenditures. We have money we have saved, 
about 50-60 million baht, but we cannot use that due to the non-compliance with 
those regulations.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, 
August 24, 2016)         
 
In addition, the existing laws were not able to respond to current complex problems, 
which varied by community. The laws imposed by the central ministries limited local 
autonomy. Problems in local communities should be solved by local people through local 
governing processes, not by central ministries. The process of decentralization has been 
reversed during the political crisis because central ministries have tried to suspend local 
autonomy and designed the regulations without understanding local contexts and local 
needs.  
Local people realized that local governments are public service providers that are 
closer to them than central governmental agencies. They expected that local governments 
should have full autonomy to decide local policy and provide services. Local 
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governments now have limited autonomy that is influenced by national and provincial 
administration. Regarding this point, one of the participants stated that:  
“Actually, local administration has a problem with the conflict between 
regulations and implementers. Sometimes we cannot do anything because of the 
limitation of regulations and laws. The auditing authority does not care whether or 
not you are corrupt. They restricted the laws and regulations we are using. 
Actually, a group of national government officials working at the national 
authorities creates the laws and regulations. Nowadays, there is only that group 
that influences and controls local government official. These officials work in the 
departments within the ministries. They designed and made the laws and 
regulations. This created the problem because they did not understand the real 
problem and needs of people at local level. It does not get along well.” (Municipal 
official, personal communication, August 24, 2016)    
 
The national political crisis negatively affected not only political institutions but 
also civic engagement at the local level. The following section will describe the negative 
impacts of Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis on civic engagement that can be 
a moderating variable for effective local service delivery.   
Civic Engagement 
The central debates in the literature on civic engagement argue that engaging 
citizens in the process of public decision-making enhances transparency and legitimacy. 
Importantly, it induces effective public services and improves government performance 
(OECD, n.d. para.1). In new public governance, civic engagement is one of the vital 
mechanisms that helps promote public participation in policy processes and voluntarism 
in public service provision (McLaverty, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998). In addition, new 
governing processes value civic engagement as a way to build networks and coordination 
between citizens and the public sector in public policy processes. It also creates a positive 
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impact for the progress of participatory democracy (Bureekul, 2009; Holmes, 2011; 
Michels & Graaf, 2010; Peters, 2011). Civic engagement is difficult in particular political 
contexts because government and political power-holders are hesitant to engage citizens 
in some public activities. Those political power-holders may be concerned about being 
subjected to transparency and accountability laws that inspire citizens in a democratic 
society (Bureekul, 2009).             
To explore how civic engagement as a moderating variable impacts local service 
delivery in the midst of national political crisis, the participants in both in-depth 
interviews and focus-group discussions were guided by the interview questions (see 
Appendix C). The findings show that Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis has 
created threats to civic engagement, which include three main themes: (1) reduced civic 
participation; (2) weakened policy networks; and (3) increased civil conflict. These 
findings are also presented and summarized in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Civic Engagement  
Themes Samples of Key Responses  
 Reduced civic participation     “Nowadays it is prohibited to have a public 
gathering of more than five people. This undermines 
rights and freedoms of Thai people.” 
   “When we want to invite the villagers to patriciate in 
some activities or share their voices, they feel fear to 
join the activities.” 
 
 Weakened policy network  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Increased civil conflict 
    “They were not allowed to do any political activity 
nor even meet with their advocates. How could they 
know the needs and problems of people in local 
communities?” 
    “Actually, the MP should be allowed to meet and ask 
people what they needed and what problems they have 
encountered with.” 
 
    “Nowadays, people divided themselves by colors.” 
    “Obviously, people can’t talk or even don’t talk to 
each other. This change triggered increasingly conflict 
among people in the community”. 
    “People don’t like each other. Also, the community 
committee is from different side. It’s very difficult for 
gathering or asking people to do activity.”  
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews. 
Reduced Civic Participation  
The findings indicate that since Thailand’s post-2006 political crisis, the freedom 
of expression of political opinions was reduced, if not totally prohibited, thus 
discouraging the public from civic engagement. It is important to note that there are 
differences in civic participation at the national level and at the local level. This study 
indicates that civic participation in matters related to national affairs has declined, 
particularly those related to politics. The situation is different at the local level, as citizens 
participated more in local affairs. This point will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter.      
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After the 2014 military coup, the military-installed government imposed martial 
law to limit citizens participating in political activities. Citizens were no longer allowed 
to talk openly about politics or gather in a group of more than five persons in public. As a 
result, local citizens felt fear and anxiety around engaging in national political activities 
or even just complaining about the government during this period.  
Martial law also caused the decline of public engagement in local activities. For 
example, when a municipality invited local residents to participate in public meetings that 
required collective decision-making, the local residents were reluctant to attend because 
they were afraid of being in a gathering of more than five people. This created barriers 
blocking the flow of important public participation on public policy processes. 
Surprisingly, some participants stated that even though local people disagreed with 
certain military orders and laws, no one opposed the decision to enact these laws. 
Regarding this point, participants shared their perspectives:    
“It affects us a lot. There are changes in laws and regulations. In the past, we 
have had freedom to gather and talk. Nowadays it is prohibited to gather 
publicly with more than five people. This undermines rights and freedoms of 
Thai people.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, 
August 25, 2016)   
  
“Nowadays, municipality avoided organizing the activity that may involve in 
politics. They were afraid of being investigated for a gathering of more than 
five persons. Some people said, any activity that was organized by 
municipality, I didn’t want go.” (Member of municipal council, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016)   
 
“…If there was a change in politics, then the law was enforced over the public 
wishes. People cannot oppose that change. I heard people talk against this 
change, but no one can oppose their power, because they feared the laws and 
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regulations that were enforced by the military. They feared being arrested…” 
(Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 25, 2016) 
 
Since the military took over in 2014, most activities relating to politics have been 
prohibited. Even though local governments and communities were allowed to organize 
some public activities, such as sports, religious, social, and traditional activities, the 
military government still keeps an eye on those events and explicit political activities 
have not been allowed. Even though citizen input is vital for improving local service 
performance, political fears have impeded local attempts to build effective citizenship 
and find venues to share their thoughts or offer feedback. Some participants expressed 
their notions regarding this issue as follows:        
“…It’s different nowadays, with a government that was installed by the 
military. When we want to invite the villagers to participate in some activities 
or share their voices, they feel fear to join the activities. They are afraid that 
the military may call them to the military fort. Nowadays, we cannot freely 
express our voices as usual. This impeded the understanding of local people. 
Some understand, some don’t. We are uncertain about talking to you openly. 
We don’t like this type of political form.” (Member of municipal council, 
personal communication, August 24, 2016) 
 “People are afraid of prohibitions, for example, after the military coups 
people are not allowed to politically gather more than five people. People 
respect the rule because of fears and anxieties. In the recent coup, people fear 
the rules and orders of military installed government.” (Municipal councilor, 
personal communication, August 25, 2016) 
 
Political fears and anxieties resulted in not only a decline in freedom of 
expression and municipal engagement, but also a decrease in political feedback from 
local citizens. Since the military coup in 2014 and the military-installed government took 
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power, Section 447 has been enforced. This law gave authority to the head of the NCPO 
to rule the country and deal with all political and managerial problems, causing an 
increased sense of fear and anxiety in the citizenry. Consequently, these fears and 
anxieties decreased political awareness and reduced constructive forms of political 
feedback. People lost interest in politics and public issues and abandoned the values and 
responsibilities of citizenship. The participants expressed their perspectives on this point:         
“In the past, we used to have a protest but after the coup d’état we didn’t have 
it anymore. We are afraid of being carried to a cold room (military base). No 
one wanted to challenge that. I feel that people get really tired of politics. It’s 
different from the past; we had energy when we talked about politics.” (Local 
resident, personal communication, August 31, 2016) 
 
“This is an absolute power; nobody can say anything, right? Section 44 of the 
interim Constitution has been enforced, so don’t talk too much.” (Municipal 
mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016) 
 
“The enforcement of Section 44 affected some citizens. We don’t know how 
they prove whether it is a real mistake or false mistake, if someone just 
complains and reports some issues to government. During an investigation, 
they enforced Section 44, so that person was suspended from his job.” 
(Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 2016) 
 
 During national political crises, local people are less interested in political news. 
In the past, political issues encouraged people to follow the news. They wanted to know 
what was going on and how politics would impact their lives. Currently, local people do 
                                                          
7 Section 44 refers to a section in the constitution that was promulgated by the NCPO in 2014, which gave 
power to the head of the NCPO, who, as it happens, is also the Prime Minister (see Chapter 5 for complete 
wording of Section 44). When the 2017 Constitution superseded the 2014 interim constitution, the powers 
under Section 44 were transferred to Section 265. However, the term “Section 44” is still generally used to 
refer to these powers. 
 
109 
 
not want to even turn on the television, especially on Friday evening when the nation-
wide television channels broadcast the weekly address of the Head of the National 
Council for Peace and Order and the Prime Minister of Thailand. It seems like they 
refused to listen to news and information that is related to politics. Political fears and 
uncertainties reduced feedback from local residents and also created barriers to receiving 
information from the national government. Regarding this point, local residents expressed 
their opinions:   
“On Friday, I didn’t want to watch television. When I turned it on and saw that 
program, I just wanted to turn it off right away.” (Local resident, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016) 
 
“In the past, during the new constitutional referendum, I didn’t see even the draft 
of the new constitution. Give me a copy of the constitutional draft please? I’ve not 
seen it even as of today. I don’t know whether or not it was distributed. I got 
bored with politics. I don’t want to even read the news.” (Local resident, personal 
communication, August 31, 2016) 
 
An engaged citizenry offering feedback concerning local issues is important to 
improving local government service delivery. Since 2006, the ongoing national political 
crisis has created a political barrier for citizens to get involved in local public activities, 
especially local political participation.  
Moreover, political uncertainties and fears made local people lose trust in the 
direction of the government and its economic policies, especially the policies created by 
the current military government. This negative impact undermined the progress of social 
trust and social capital in local communities. In developing democratic societies, public 
trust is built upon active civic engagement. Civil society should have the confidence to 
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interact and work closely (co-production) with public organizations without uncertainties 
and fears. Also, active civil participation and a high degree of value sharing trigger the 
improvement of social capital (OECD, 2011).           
This study found that the political crisis created uncertainties and fears that 
resulted in decreased trust in creating or expanding previously existing economic 
activities. In addition, changes in the government and its policy discouraged local 
people’s interaction with each other as well as with their government. They were also less 
willing to form community networks. Sharing common values was impeded by political 
uncertainty and fear:  
“When we talk about the connection between local government and local 
residents, we think that local government should have to provide an incentive for 
encouraging local people to participate in municipal activities. That strategy is 
wrong and it looks like we are stepping back. In reality, if people get benefits 
(income) from what they are participating in, they are OK to come. Now, when 
they participate in municipal activities, they have to leave their jobs and lose 
income. So, municipality should consider having an incentive as compensation in 
order to attract them to come…” (Municipal official, personal communication, 
August 24, 2016) 
 
As an interviewee mentioned above, it appears that local people lacked incentive 
to participate in community activities, some ignoring all involvement in even social 
activities. They believe that they should spend their time making money to take care of 
their daily needs, rather than becoming involved in political activities and public 
influence. In some municipalities, people considered money an important incentive for 
them in deciding whether to attend and engage in public activities. The participants 
shared these perspectives:  
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“For social involvement, people are likely concerned about working and making 
money to live from hand-to-mouth, so they lose interest in participating in social 
activity. (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 30, 
2016) 
 
“…Comparing the pattern of social involvement between nowadays and in the 
past. In the past, we can gather our neighbors to help at harvest time. Nowadays, 
we have lost that kind of activity, especially when we planted rice and harvested 
rice. I think society and economy have been changed. People get in trouble and 
become poor. They just wanted to make money.” (Local resident, personal 
communication, August 31, 2016)  
   
The political crisis undermined not only public trust and reduced local civic 
participation, but its effects weakened interactions among social actors that are source for 
policy networks.  
Weakened Policy Networks  
Participants expressed the opinion that political fears and uncertainties reduced 
not only civil participation in local public service and local activity but also weakened 
policy networks. Especially after the 2014 military coup, the military-installed 
government has repeatedly used Section 44 of the interim Constitution to justify the 
implementation of martial law to evade regular laws. As a result, the connection between 
lawmakers and policymakers has been eliminated.  
Some thoughts provided by the participants emphasized that national legislators 
were not allowed to interact with local citizens. Most political activities were prohibited 
by martial law and the military’s orders. Local citizens were not allowed the flexibility to 
involve themselves in political activity. In contrast, under the previous elected 
government, representatives usually met with their constituents at the local level in order 
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to obtain engaging feedback regarding potential problems for the legislature. Now, due to 
political institutional breakdown, state-social interaction has declined. Network and 
policy actors at the local level are uncertain about initiating new policy ideas and 
innovations. One participant observed that: 
“Currently, the legislators are constrained by laws and regulations imposed by 
military-installed government. They are not allowed to do any political activity or 
even meet with their constituents. How could they know the needs and problems of 
people in local communities? Does the current government believe that the former 
elected legislators would try to further their political interests regarding this 
movement? Actually, the MP should be allowed to meet and ask people what the 
people need and what problems they have encountered.” (Member of municipal 
council, personal communication, August 25, 2016)  
When military officials replaced the former elected legislators, these legislators 
were, of course, out of office. Nonetheless, they can still serve as the link between local 
communities and central political institutions. Gathering feedback and maintaining the 
coordination of local input was a collective and engaging mechanism within the policy 
network of the previous elected government. The deconstruction of this policy network 
reflects a declining state-society interaction under the military government.  
Due to the constraints of new laws and regulations, local governments and citizens 
became tired of the military government. The government did not attempt to rebuild 
mechanisms to bring feedback from the local level to develop their national policies. 
Instead, they created legal barriers to constrain the freedom of decision-making and civic 
participation in local governments. As the participants mentioned, local governments 
wanted to provide services for their local residents, but the limitation of laws and the 
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orders enforced by the central government impeded local government to support those 
policies, even though some local activities still remained from the previous government. 
The constraints induced a weariness that discouraged local government and local citizens 
from participating in public activities that would provide feedback to the central 
government. The participants reflected their perceptions through focus-group discussions:  
“In town hall meetings, local people agreed and needed to have something from the 
municipality, but we cannot do as we agreed. For example, people needed to have 
the ponds and the roads. When we asked, [the central] government did not agree. It 
was not the right way to do so. We just followed the government’s directions 
because our budgets relied on government subsidy…” (Local resident, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016)     
“…Each community has different problems and needs. [central] Government just 
wanted them to do and have the same thing. For example, the government said that 
this money should be used for buying fertilizer. All 98 villages of ...  district just 
bought fertilizer, even though some villages did not have any problem and they also 
did not want to use fertilizer. This affected us a lot.” (Local resident, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016)     
“In the recent Songkran Festival, we could not organize a Songkran procession 
because the Office of General Auditor of Thailand said a municipality cannot 
provide budget to support Songkran activities. As a result, people did not 
participate. Actually, local residents from each community want to engage in 
particular activities, but laws and regulations imposed by the military-installed 
government constrained civic engagement at the local level.” (Local resident, 
personal communication, August 30, 2016)       
The effects of the national political crisis not only undermined policy networks in 
local government but also resulted in enhancing civil conflict among local residents who 
have different political beliefs.  
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Increased Civil Conflict  
Discussions with the participants across the four municipalities reflected that the 
prolonged national political crisis since 2006 has caused conflict among local residents, 
especially for people who are politically polarized. The conflict in the national political 
institutions divided people into two sides. People on each side identify their political 
stance by the color of their shirts. A red shirt represents people who are advocates of the 
Pheu Thai Party. Red-shirt people are also the major political supporters of the former 
government of Yingluck Shinawatra and are influenced by Thaksin Shinawatra, 
Thailand’s former Prime Minister in exile. Most red-shirt advocates are also based in 
Northeastern Thailand, where my research sites are located. Conversely, a yellow shirt 
represents people who oppose Thaksin’s administration. They also have political 
connection to the Democrat Party and supported the military-installed government (BBC 
News-Asia Pacific, 2012).  
The political conflicts caused by political institutional failures appear to have 
increased civil conflict within local communities. This civil conflict resulted in reduced 
civic participation in local activities. One of the participants expressed this notion, 
describing that: 
“It is a long story for the conflict among citizens. Nowadays, people divided 
themselves by colors.” (Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 
24, 2016) 
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In some local communities, political conflict among local residents discouraged 
people from talking to those who oppose their political affiliation, creating increased 
levels of animosity among local residents. In traditional forms of democratic society, 
citizens express their opinions and needs at municipal town-hall style meetings. Since 
2006, if people anticipated members of the opposite group coming to town-hall meetings, 
they would avoid the meeting all together. This divided not only communities, but also 
split families.  
An interviewee mentioned that a husband and a wife watched different political 
news programs because they had different political stances and could not bear media that 
was sympathetic to the other side. This type of political conflict undermined any 
productive sense of citizenship or pride in one’s local community and limited individual 
interaction with local governments. Even though the status of the current political crisis 
seems to be more peaceful, these conflicts have resulted in a declining interest in local 
politics. It has resulted in creating a barrier for local governments to gain feedback from 
its voters. Some participants explained the features of political conflict in their local 
community as follows:  
“I can say that it’s very obvious. People can’t talk or don’t talk to each other. This 
change triggered increasing conflict among people in the community. People 
obviously divided and identified their political belief by colors. It even happened 
that people hate each other if they know they talk to the opposing group.” (Vice 
Municipal Mayor, personal communication, August 25, 2016)       
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“When we hold a meeting, the opposite side does not come when they know the 
other group will be coming. This happened not only in our community, but also in 
some families...” (Local resident, personal communication, August 25, 2016)       
 
“If one group is doing something, the opposite side won’t come. It becomes a 
problematic issue especially in [this] community. People don’t like each other. 
Also, the community committee is from different sides. It’s very difficult for 
gathering or asking people to participate in an activity. It’s not easy.” (Local 
resident, personal communication, August 25, 2016)      
 
The national political crisis caused not only a political institutional breakdown of 
local government status and weakened civic engagement, it also resulted in the decline of 
political leadership. The following section describes how the national political crisis has 
eroded local political leadership.    
Political Leadership 
 The main debates in the literature on political leadership argue that public leaders 
who have leadership competencies help increase the efficient and effective organization 
of public services (Wart, 2003). In addition, public leaders should have the ability to 
control and maintain an organizational alignment with political changes and political 
pressures from both internal and external forces. Leaders should have decision-making 
skills on public service operation and provision, especially in difficult situations (Fiedler, 
1996; Wart, 2003). In classical contingency leadership, public leaders should have full 
autonomy that includes administrative power and decision-making power in order to 
achieve organizational goals (Fiedler, 1971). In the literature on leadership in Thailand, 
the patterns of leadership focus on contextual leadership and leaders at the individual 
level who have leadership skills (e.g. skills of preparation and prediction for future, 
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network building skill) to cope with contingent situations (Charoensiri, Getsuwan, & 
Girdwichai, 2016; Krueathep, 2004). This study, however, investigates local political 
leadership at the individual level.        
To explore how local political leadership as a moderating variable affects local 
service delivery in the midst of national political crisis, the participants in both in-depth 
interviews and focus-group discussions were guided by the interview questions (see 
Appendix C). Based on interviews of the participants, the post-2006 national political 
turmoil in Thailand created particular threats for political leadership at the local level. 
The findings present two main themes; reduced autonomy of local leaders and increased 
risks for local leaders. The findings are presented and summarized in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Political Leadership 
Themes Samples of Key Responses  
 Reduced autonomy of local 
leaders 
 
 
 Increased risks for local 
leaders 
     “I want to do the things that local residents agree are 
good for them. When we do something, the national 
auditing office told us that we were non-compliant on 
that project.”  
    “Its effects created inconvenience for local autonomy” 
 
 
    “People can complain that we don’t work” 
    “We work for local community and work closely with 
local people. Unfortunately, we cannot serve the needs of 
people. Eventually, we got complaints from local 
people.”  
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews. 
Reduced Autonomy of Local Leaders  
The findings indicate that most local leaders had the capacity to maintain public 
service provision, but they lacked confidence and were reluctant to use their autonomy 
for making some policy decisions. Especially after the 2014 military coup, political and 
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legal constraints did not accommodate local leaders to be able to respond to the concerns 
of local citizens. For example, municipal mayors wanted to provide financial support for 
local communities to organize traditional activities such as the rocket festival, Thai New 
Year festival, etc. Formerly, local leaders had autonomy to approve local budgets to 
support local activities without any national concern or investigation. Political 
uncertainties and legal limitations suspended the capacity of local leaders to make the 
decision to undertake similar projects. Local leaders perform routine administrative 
duties, but they lack decision-making power. Regarding this point, some participants 
stated that:  
“It looks like we did everything wrong. Why I have to do that? I can’t sleep and I 
am concerned about doing what I don’t want to do. I want to do the things that 
local residents agree are good for them. When we do something, the national 
auditing office told us that we were non-compliant on that project. We’ve 
encountered difficulties. We would like to do right, but at least they should 
provide us the right laws that help avoid the act of non-compliance. We’re happy 
if we have that.” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 24, 2016)  
 
“…Its effects created inconvenience for local autonomy…In the past, they [local 
leaders] had done that …Nowadays, they can do nothing. Anyway, they are trying 
to find solutions. It happened like that so it’s very difficult for their 
administration.” (Local resident, personal communication, August 24, 2016) 
 
The national political crisis reduced not only autonomy of local leaders, but also 
increased risks for local leaders in making decisions and serving local residents.8 The 
                                                          
8 It is important to note that while overall leadership autonomy decreased, the roles of the mayors are more 
recognized by the local citizens, thus elevated. The author will discuss about this point again in Chapter 5.   
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following section will discuss how the national political crisis created risks for local 
leaders.    
Increased Risks for Local Leaders  
 The weakening political leadership became one of the negative effects caused by 
the national political crisis. Local leaders lacked autonomy to make certain decisions, 
especially regarding budget approval. Moreover, political turmoil and legal constraints 
increased risks for local leaders in two aspects. First, due to these limitations, local 
leaders have tried to solve problems and help out local residents to get financial support 
from the municipality by using what autonomy they do have. This shows that local 
leaders still have some capacity and autonomy to make decisions on local budgets, but 
this may increase risks for local leaders in terms of fiscal non-compliance monitored by 
centralized authority. For example, we can look at one important national event, the 
National Day for Older Persons. Normally, the mayors can approve the budget to buy 
mementos for older residents who attended the municipal activity. Recently, due to an act 
of fiscal non-compliance, the mayors cannot use local budget to buy and offer mementos 
to older persons. Regarding this issue, one of the participants reflected that:  
“…This is our important national day but we [local leaders] cannot give anything 
to them. Our decision is legally monitored by the National Audit Office. Actually, 
we want to honor them. We have enough budget, but we cannot use it. This affects 
municipal administration a lot.” (Member of municipal council, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016).  
 
 The other risk political leadership constraints caused for local leaders was in 
terms of public complaints and losing public trust. When some local leaders are faced 
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with decision-making and problem-solving, especially on budgeting and some local 
policies, they have the personal capacity to determine solutions and please local residents. 
However, those local leaders who lack personal skills in problem solving and were 
fearful of making the wrong decisions, so they made no decision. These local leaders 
with low capacity then risked getting complaints from local residents, resulting in losing 
leadership trust. Eventually, its effects could trigger negative impacts for future political 
popularity (i.e. local elections) of those leaders. Regarding this point, one of the 
participants expressed that:  
“…Regulations and laws are not able to accommodate our work. But, if we don’t 
do anything, this eventually affects us. People can complain that we don’t work. 
We got a lot of effects from this issue. We work for the local community and work 
closely with local people. Unfortunately, we cannot serve the needs of people. 
Eventually, we got complaints from the people.” (Municipal official, personal 
communication, August 31, 2016).    
 
“…Last year I didn’t dare organize the Songkran Festival. We actually wanted to 
stimulate local economy. If we had Miss Songkran Contest, we would have had 13 
competitors. But giving rewards is prohibited, so we don’t have any reward for 
this contest. In the past, we supported the festival with a budget for dressing up 
and rewards for the processions.” (Municipal mayor, personal communication, 
August 30, 2016).     
 
Governance 
 The majority of the literature on governance argues that the term “governance” as 
used in public organization refers to new governing process that values interactions 
among societal actors, collective actions, inter-organizational collaboration, power-
sharing, and networking (Enroth, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Renn, Klimke, & Asselt, 
2011). These new patterns of governing processes aim to replace the limitations of 
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conventional public administration that emphasized state-centered approach (Rhodes, 
2007; Stoker, 1998). The impacts of governance in public organizations help improve 
voluntarism in public service delivery, state-local interaction, intergovernmental 
collaboration (i.e. blur boundaries), and a bottom-up style of administration (Kickert, 
1997; Peters, 2011). Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis repeatedly entailed 
changes in politics and policies at all levels of governance. A question has been raised 
regarding its effects on governance as a moderating variable to local service delivery. 
Importantly, having good governing processes induces effective public service delivery 
(Bowornwathana, 2000)  
In order to explore how governance mechanisms mediated local government 
service delivery in the midst of political crisis, the participants in in-depth interviews and 
focus-group discussions were guided by interview questions (see Appendix C).  
Based on the viewpoints of participants, Thailand’s post-2006 national political 
crisis entailed threats for governance in two ways: (1) decreased trust and communication 
between central and local government; and (2) hierarchical interactions in internal 
governance settings. These effects are presented and summarized in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Governance  
Themes Samples of Key Responses  
 Decreased trust and 
communication between 
central and local government  
 
 
       “When I looked at government policy, they wanted to 
directly connect to local citizens without the influence of 
local government.” 
       “…Currently, the military-installed government 
empowered procurement authority to village headman to 
manage the construction project without the supervision of 
municipal construction staff.” 
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 Hierarchical interactions in 
internal governance settings 
      “…we had close relationship and they [central 
government] were easily approachable. Nowadays, 
government officials don’t recognize us.” 
 
       “Those central authorities then ordered Ministry of 
Interior. After that the Ministry of Interior delivered an 
order to provincial and district authorities. The districts 
then ordered local governments.” 
      “…when we have a provincial meeting. The chair of the 
meeting is from Ministry of Interior. The Governor is a 
representative from central government.”  
      “This person (Chief District Officer) has authority to 
sign and approve our municipal budget.” 
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews. 
Decreased Trust and Communication between Central and Local government  
Since Thailand’s ongoing political crisis began in 2006, participants observed that 
the administrative processes governed by the national government, especially the 
military-installed governments, did not engage local authorities in some public service 
provisions and policy processes. Thus, these processes became more centralized and less 
accountable to local residents. In addition, the national government preferred ordering the 
central and provincial authorities to complete their projects as fast as they could, resulting 
in poor quality of the delivered projects. Its effects resulted in decreasing trust and 
communication between national and local government. Regarding this point, some 
participants expressed these perspectives:    
“When I looked at government policy, they wanted to directly connect to local 
citizens without any influence of local government. Those duties look similar to 
what we usually do but they wanted to change responsible organizations from 
municipalities to the district, sub-district headman, or village headman (provincial 
authorities). In reality, the corruption still exists. It just becomes less accountable.” 
(Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 25, 2016)      
 
“…The things like this we [municipal council] have to check and debate for finding 
the best solution and decision. The municipal executive members have to answer 
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and clarify those questions raised by the council members. The meeting minutes 
have to report to the provincial governor for review. That happened like this but 
what they [central government] do we cannot check or investigate.” (Member of 
municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 2016)     
 
 “…Currently, the military-installed government empowered the village headman 
with procurement authority to manage the construction project without the 
supervision of municipal construction staff. Government wanted them to run 
projects by themselves. A community committee was appointed from local residents 
in order to investigate the projects. My question is whether there is anyone to be 
responsible for the projects? Is there anyone? Normally, if the municipality is 
responsible for the projects, we have municipal regulations to control that, such as 
road construction projects...” (Member of municipal council, personal 
communication, August 30, 2016)   
 
Interaction between the national and local governments is an important 
mechanism for building effective local governance and local service delivery. In a strong, 
democratic society, government and local society—e.g. local government including local 
political actors and local residents—exist within a dynamic and interactive relationship in 
order to fairly share power. The boundaries between central government and local 
societal actors were somewhat blurred but interdependent. National and local 
governments cooperated with each other mutually and horizontally. In addition, authority 
was not one sided, as we believed that while the national government has greater 
authority than the local, both sides can also influence each other (Kooiman, 2003).  
Since 2006, the degree of interaction between the national government and local 
societal actors has decreased, especially during the administration of the military-
installed government. Some participants mentioned that military governments imposed 
special laws, for instance, martial law or Section 44 of the Interim Constitution, to 
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monitor and push pressure on local governments. This caused uncertainties and fears for 
local administrators and local residents, limiting the interactive relationship between local 
and national governmental agencies and actors. Regarding this point, some participants 
expressed that:    
“It changed a lot. In the past, we had close relationship and they [central 
government] were easily approachable. Nowadays, government officials don’t 
recognize us. It seems to be far away, even though we stay close.” (Member of 
municipal council, personal communication, August 25, 2016)     
 
 “People are afraid of prohibitions, for example, since the military coup, people 
are not allowed to politically gather more than four people. People respect the 
rule because of fears and anxieties. In the recent coup, people fear the rules and 
orders of the military-installed government.” (Municipal councilor, personal 
communication, August 25, 2016) 
 
In addition, the military-installed government used direct orders to control local 
governments and citizens. This interactive pattern appears overwhelmingly vertical rather 
than horizontal. Societal actors at the local level have less power to bargain with central 
government, such as the national government and the national legislative assembly, due 
to the abolition of nationally-elected legislators. Moreover, those former elected 
legislators and other political institutions have been prohibited from politically 
connecting with their constituencies. Since 2006, the power of the national government 
was primarily shared only with provincial authorities, a branch of the central ministries, 
rather than local governments. Local governments and local citizens lacked any sort of 
buffering mechanism to protect themselves from the consolidation of power in the central 
government. Its effects clearly resulted in reducing trust and communication between two 
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levels of governmental authorities. Eventually, losing trust and communication among 
public sectors caused ineffective public service provision. The participants shared their 
views on this issue:   
“Currently the legislators are constrained by laws and regulations imposed by 
the military-installed government. They were not allowed to do any political 
activity or even meet with their constituents. How could they know the needs and 
problems of people in the communities? Was government afraid that they would 
pursue political gains? Actually, the MPs should be allowed to meet and ask 
people what they needed and what were their problems.” (Member of municipal 
council, personal communication, August 25, 2016) 
 
“It affected a lot. People were happy with the past elected governments because 
they received new things from government policy that addressed and responded to 
their needs. In recent years, some important budgets, as people used to have, 
were cut, such as healthcare policy and community loan programs. The patterns 
of policies and programs were changed, even though those policies look similar, 
they are not. One example was the budget for stimulating the economy. The 
original aim was to help local people in creating business activities within their 
community. In reality, they did not get benefits from this policy.” (Member of 
municipal council, personal communication, August 25, 2016) 
 
The national political crisis caused not only an institutional breakdown, but also 
served as one of the critical factors disrupting the implementation of central government 
policies.  Although, municipalities retain some small degree of autonomy in designing 
and implementing their own policies and in providing services that are empowered by the 
central government, they nonetheless required a clear policy direction from central 
government. Due to institutional breakdown, both national politics and policy were 
turbulent and municipalities began to distrust the central government’s policy direction. 
As one interviewee said, losing confidence in the central government affected political 
 
126 
 
involvement as witnessed during the recent Thai constitutional referendum. Only 40-50% 
of qualified voters cast a vote. Participants observed:  
“My question is if they wanted to terminate the economy? Because they already 
approved some government projects but they ordered us to stop them. Their 
policies were discontinued. So that discontinuity caused trouble to the country. 
We cannot continue to go forward.” (Local resident, personal communication, 
August 31, 2016)  
 
“In the past, municipalities were flexible and government was not strict on this 
regulation. Previous governments were not too strict on the things that aimed to 
facilitate municipal affairs or supported the communities. The current government 
is very strict so that the municipal bureaucrats are afraid of acting in non-
compliance.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 
30, 2016)  
 
Hierarchical Interactions in Internal Governance Settings 
Participants noted that in the midst of the national political crisis, the absolute 
power of the military-installed government enforced specific directives on local 
governments. The hierarchical structure and bureaucratic governance at the national and 
provincial levels increasingly influenced municipal governing processes. This influence 
undermined the responsiveness of local governments that needed some degree of 
autonomy to cope with local issues and provide local public services in their 
communities.  
The increase of power in the central government and provincial administrative 
authorities entailed not only the return of a staunch hierarchical administration, but also 
the erosion of accountability. This means that local governments are placed in a difficult 
position to be able to perform their jobs as usual, even though they had been providing 
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these services prior to the military coups. The national government interacted with local 
governments by using a top-down administrative approach. Some duties (e.g. 
infrastructure development projects in local areas) initially operated by local governments 
were recentralized and operated by national and provincial administrative organizations. 
Some participants expressed that:  
“These things are ordered by central government. The government directed central 
ministries and central departments. Those central authorities then ordered the 
Ministry of Interior. After that, the Ministry of Interior delivered an order to 
provincial and district authorities. The districts then ordered local governments. 
This is the pattern of their work.” (Municipal mayor, personal communication, 
August 24, 2016) 
 
“The problem is that who will do that duty. Today, I can tell you who will do that. I 
can tell that they wanted the District Chief Officer to do that. Because of what? I 
can tell when we have a provincial meeting. The chair of the meeting is from 
Ministry of Interior. The Governor is a representative from central government. 
Who sits beside him, you know? Medical doctor, civil engineer….” (Municipal 
mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)      
 
The reintroduction of this hierarchical structure of government eroded any sense 
of accountability in the local citizenry. In some cases, municipal administrators seemed to 
listen to the direct orders of national and provincial authorities rather than recognize the 
legitimate power of their citizens. Municipalities tried to maintain good relationships with 
upper levels in order to balance their bargaining power while pursuing mutual interests. 
In some sense, we could consider this capacity as an opportunity; however, it is more 
likely that this relationship channels other forms of corruption and non-compliance, 
creating a threat to local governance.  
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This happened because municipalities tried to avoid confrontation with higher 
authorities, which had renewed influence on decision-making at the local level. For 
example, one municipality maintained their political relationship with the District Chief 
Officer and the Provincial Governor. The municipality offered a series of favors to these 
offices in exchange for the passage of a local expenditure bill because the Governor of 
province and the District Chief Officer now influenced the approval of all local budgets. 
Regarding this point, a member of a municipal council said:       
“…The district also requested financial support from us to organize Sport 
Promotion for Anti-Drugs. We cannot say no to that request because municipal 
administrators told us that the Chief District Officer requested that support. This 
person [Chief District Officer] has authority to sign and approve our municipal 
budget.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 30, 
2016)  
 
 In addition, the participants mentioned that the effect of the political crisis 
increased national and provincial interventions into local autonomy. The top-down and 
hierarchical patterns remained existing in the administrative system. The role of 
provincial administrative bureaucrats was influential, but they did not concern themselves 
with local development. Those government officials appear to value their own promotion 
and job progress over concerns about the development of local communities. However, 
local governments have to recognize them because their authority remains powerful and 
beneficial for local administration. One of the participants reflected that:  
“I understand them [provincial administrative officers]. They do for themselves 
because they want to get promotions and progression in their career path from 
Deputy Governor to Governor. This is what they do for themselves. Is it beneficial 
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for local people, is it touchable? When you come, you come only four years. Then, 
you’re gone. I saw and had experiences with almost ten District Chief Officers.” 
(Municipal mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)    
 Moreover, local operational autonomy at local levels was redistributed to national 
and provincial authorities, thereby recentralizing power. Central ministries and provincial 
administrative units became more powerful while local governments floundered. It is not 
difficult to explain this phenomenon as the history of Thai governmental structure is one 
that evolved around the hierarchical power of the central authority down to the local 
governmental entities. That said, this study found an increase in collaboration between 
local governments during the political crisis, a point for discussion in Chapter 5.     
 Regarding the increase of hierarchical interactions, some participants addressed that 
problem:  
 “...My question is who is responsible for this project? Normally, when local 
government is responsible for this kind of project, we have our own regulations, 
such as an annual plan to build roads. We also have processes for checks and 
balances. For the project operation, we have professional staff to take care of 
that. They have to check it carefully. They have to take responsibility if there are 
mistakes.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 30, 
2016)         
 
“The limitation of local government is the slow progress of decentralization. If they 
fully decentralize human resources or money to local governments for example, the 
system will be perfectly functional. Public service delivery would be more effective. 
If human resources and money were fully decentralized, that would be responsive 
to the needs of local people...” (Municipal official, personal communication, 
August 24, 2016)   
 
The national political crisis created threats to governance not only at the local level, 
but also resulted in declining political economy. Economic and social weakening then 
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undermined local revenues and social trust in one’s community. The next section 
describes how the national political crisis undermined political economy 
Political Economy 
 
The main debates in the literature on political economy argue that political 
economy is the interdependent mechanism between politics and economy. Once one 
mechanism (e.g. politics) is disrupted, the effects could impact other mechanisms (e.g. 
economy). This interaction is useful to explain the effects of political crisis on economic 
status as a moderating variable to public service delivery (Arndt, 1983). The political 
economy has two facets. First is that the internal political economy consists of an internal 
economic mechanism (the processes and structure of economy) and an internal political 
mechanism (the political structure and institutions). In addition, the external political 
economy includes an external economic mechanism (economic environment) and an 
external political mechanism (e.g. intergovernmental relations, interest groups) (Arndt, 
1983; Stern & Reve, 1980; Wamsley & Zald, 1973). These two aspects of political 
economy interact with one another. It is important to note that the interactions between 
politics and economy cannot be separated from each other (Stern & Reve, 1980).      
The prolonged national political crisis in Thailand had a detrimental effect on 
political economy at the local level. Its effects resulted in low investment and a 
production decline in local communities. This eventually decreased local revenue 
collection and affected local public service delivery. In order to explore how the national 
political crisis brought about negative effects on political economy as a mediated 
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mechanism to local public service, the participants were guided by the interview 
questions (see Appendix C).  Based on the participants’ comments, the national political 
crisis entailed particular threats for political economy in three ways: output decline, 
revenue decline, and household financial weakening. These findings are summarized in 
Table 4.5.  
Table 4.5 Themes and Samples of Keys Responses on Political Economy  
Themes Samples of Key Responses  
 Output decline  
 
 
 
 
 Revenue decline  
 
 
 Household financial weakening  
        “People don’t have income as usual.” 
       “…In harvest season, the current government 
stopped helping people on the rice pledging policy 
but local farmers already invested more than 1,000 
baht per rai.” 
    “My wife runs a grocery store business; she said 
her business was not good. She observed that local 
people seem to have a decline in consumption.” 
 
      “Opening a new shop during this time is not a 
good idea due to the economic status.” 
      “The big investors can easily run their 
businesses but the small enterprises (household 
level) closed down their businesses.” 
 
     “Our household debt has increased compared to 
the past.” 
     “My debts highly increases because of the failure 
of growing rice.” 
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews. 
Output Decline  
The national political crisis resulted in a demonstrable economic turndown, not 
only at the level of the national economy but also at local levels, undermining the 
progress of the local political economy. The political crisis also caused a negative impact 
on the relationship between politics and the economy. In the post-2006 national political 
crisis, the main social policies created by elected governments were suspended and some 
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programs were terminated. This situation created uncertainties and fears, triggering the 
decline of the local economy. The local economy is considered a dynamic system where 
one factor (politics) interacts with another (economics).   
Even though the crisis induced economic weakening at the local level, some types 
of businesses (e.g. franchise department stores) continued to run their businesses because 
they have higher financial capacity than the local small and medium enterprises. Hence, 
local entrepreneurs were careful when investing in local businesses. Small and medium 
enterprises are the mechanisms that help strengthen local economies, but fears and 
uncertainties caused by the political crisis made these people reluctant to increase their 
investments. In addition, the decline of the political economy caused hesitation in the 
local people to spend money for buying goods. This reluctance to purchase resulted in a 
decrease of available money within local communities. Regarding this point, some 
participants mentioned that:  
“The current economy has been slowing down and is unpredictable, so that local 
people have been waiting for change. It looks like local people don’t want to 
invest in some businesses. We are talking about the local area. But the external 
investors, such as Big C and Lotus department stores, have capacity to run their 
businesses because they have a lot of money to invest. It’s different when we talk 
about local people; they fear to invest and to do businesses with just a little 
money like 100,000, 200,000 or 300,000 baht. They don’t have too much money. 
In addition, they are concerned and uncertain about the market and customers. 
They are afraid of the return and who will buy their goods. Where do local people 
make their money from?” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 
24, 2016)  
 
“It affected us directly. It triggered a domino effect. Ten years ago, we paid 15 
baht for a bowl of Chinese noodle soup, nowadays in [the local] area we pay 80 
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baht for a similar bowl of Chinese noodle soup.” (Local resident, personal 
communication, August 31, 2016)  
 
 In some municipalities, local people complained about paying property taxes. The 
effects of the national political crisis caused a decline in personal income resulting in 
decreasing personal income tax payments. The economic weakening during the political 
transition created uncertainties within the local community. Therefore, as mentioned 
earlier, local enterprises and local people were very careful about spending their money. 
Local people unfavorably compared the economic situation under the current political 
regime with the previously elected government. In the normal political situation, policy 
and political stability induced economic growth. Local people were satisfied with their 
stable revenues because local businesses performed well. People did not complain about 
paying their taxes. Regarding this issue, some participants expressed that:    
 
“During this time, people complained about paying tax and they didn’t want to 
spend money, especially in the transition of a political regime. It differs from 
Thaksin’s government. People were very happy and it was an economic boom! 
After that, people complained about paying tax but we have to pay as we 
expected. We paid tax during Thaksin’s regime; people didn’t complain much 
because of economic growth. People can sell everything. It was so good for doing 
business. Then they had money to pay tax. They didn’t complain and negotiate 
about tax.” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 24, 2016)     
 
“…Wherever I went, I heard people complain about economic constraints. It’s 
difficult for them to make any money. It also affected me. My wife runs a grocery 
store business; she said her business was not good. She observed a decline of 
consumption. It looks like people work but they did not earn sufficient income. 
When people have less money to spend, it caused the decline of money to spend in 
our local community.” (Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 
25, 2016) 
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In addition, the national political crisis caused changes in the national policies. 
Some major social policies initiated by the previously elected government were 
suspended or even terminated, such as the rice pledging policy9. These changes also 
created a negative impact on the price of other agricultural products such as rubber.  
Local people invested a lot of money into growing rice and producing a wide-array of 
agricultural products. Certainly, people expected to gain greater benefits from the 
government’s policies. The political crisis caused government and legislative dissolution 
that resulted in negative changes in how previous government policies were 
implemented. Immediate change in politics led to an associated change in policy. As a 
result, the price of and market for agricultural products dropped. The change undermined 
the economic output of local communities. The participants shared some experiences that 
occurred in their local communities:   
“…In harvest season, the current government stopped helping people through the 
rice pledging policy but local farmers had already invested more than 1,000 baht 
per rai. To solve this problem, the farmers tried to sell it at a low price. They, 
themselves, sold it at about 5,000-6,000 baht, while the investment cost had 
already reached almost 5,000-6,000 baht per rai10. In addition, they have to pay 
for hiring the harvesters, right?” (Local resident, personal communication, 
August 31, 2016) 
 
 “People don’t have the usual income. For example, in the past they can sell 
rubber at about 70-80 baht per kilogram, but nowadays it is just 20 or 30 baht 
per kilogram. They cannot run this business profitably anymore. The solution was 
just to cut the rubber trees because they cannot hire the labors for tapping the 
rubber trees. The price was in decline. All money went into the hands of traders. 
                                                          
9 http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/thailand-crisis-in-thai-rice-pledging-scheme/ 
10 A Thai unit of measurement equal to 1600 sq. meters. 
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Local people began to cut the rubber trees”. (Member of municipal council, 
personal communication, August 24, 2016)     
 
 The national political crisis created a negative impact not only for the political 
economy at the local level, but it also weakened revenues in local communities. The 
following section describes how the national political crisis created threats to these 
activities. 
Revenue Decline  
 It is important to make clear at the outset that local self-collected revenue data was 
employed as one of the criteria for case selection as described in Chapter 3. It also serves 
as a proxy measure for local government performance. Therefore, a decline in revenue, in 
this sense, is seen as an impact that was influenced by political economy, one of the five 
moderating variables.  
 Policy discontinuity and political instability triggered weakening business activities 
at the local level, especially concerning agricultural and local small and medium business 
enterprises (SMEs). In this section, the participants emphasize that the political crisis 
made people less willing to invest in and expand businesses. Even though the big 
investors were able to maintain their businesses, most local SMEs slowed or even closed 
down. In some cases, the weakening economy caused by the political crisis increased the 
risk of declining tax revenue, especially from SMEs. Regarding this issue, some 
participants stated that:    
“Opening a shop during this time is not a good idea due to the economic status. 
The economic and commercial activities within [the local] Municipality area are 
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not good. People mostly sell chicken BBQ and that is OK for them. When we look 
at the construction and appliance shops, it appears that their businesses are not 
good...” (Municipal mayor, personal communication, August 30, 2016) 
 
“… most businesses have to close down.” (Municipal official, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016)   
 
“The big investors can easily run their businesses but the small enterprises 
(household level) closed down their businesses.” (Local resident, personal 
communication, August 31, 2016) 
 
         
The effects of changes in government policy created economic uncertainties and 
fears. As a result, the price of goods in local markets increased, resulting in reduced 
buying power on the part of local residents. Consequently, these changes negatively 
affected business activities in local communities. Some local shops encountered difficulty 
in running their businesses. Some of them reduced their business scale, while others 
closed down, especially local manufacturing. Moreover, some participants mentioned that 
when the price of local products increased, cheap agricultural products that were illegally 
imported from neighboring countries took over local markets, undermining them. The 
participants shared some evidence of business activities within their local communities 
that were affected by political crisis as follows:  
“Actually, it has large effects because the impact of the rice pledging policy 
created by the previous government generated high incomes for local residents. 
They had money for shopping and buying things in our municipal area. The local 
shops and department stores earned a lot of benefits from their businesses. Then, 
the business sectors had the capacity to pay tax. So that they would not complain 
like. ‘Oh…the economy turns down!’” (Municipal official, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016) 
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“For agricultural products, the limes were so expensive in the past, right? So, our 
community grew them by ourselves and sold them within our community. 
Nowadays, they bring the limes in the van [from Laos]. They took the seats out and 
put in bags of limes instead. They brought them through Thailand border and sold 
them at a very cheap price. The green and red onions were also moved across the 
border. Those agricultural products took over the Thai domestic products. Hence, 
what happened to the farmers? What should they do? They cannot sell their local 
products.” (Local resident, personal communication, August 31, 2016) 
 
“We used to have a garment manufacturer in our community. It closed for long 
time because of the effect of the economic downturn and the increase of minimum 
wage policy. This business was operated by foreign investors. Their business got 
affected since the minimum wage increased. Consequently, they closed and moved 
to a neighboring country. In addition, after the opening of ASEAN community, it 
caused a negative effect to our country.” (Local resident, personal communication, 
August 25, 2016)       
 
The economic downturn created a domino effect resulting in the decline of 
business activities. Some local entrepreneurs reduced labor costs by hiring cheap, 
undocumented laborers from neighboring countries such as Laos, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam, instead of hiring local laborers. The increase of illegal laborers caused not only 
a job crisis for local people, but also increased disease transmission and the rise of 
unregistered and illegal migrants. Even though only a few participants from one 
municipality mentioned these points, they are important to address in order to illustrate 
the dynamic effect regarding business activities during the national political crisis:  
“You can see there are a lot of Cambodians working in gas stations. They (Thai 
employers) don’t like to hire Thai employees. The foreign employees work harder 
and are cheaper than local employees.” (Local resident, personal communication, 
August 31, 2016) 
 
“We’re concerned about public health since the ASEAN community boundary has 
been opened. Some neighboring countries, such as Myanmar and Laos, do not 
have a good health service system like us. They could have disease when they 
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come. Most of them are Burmese. I saw a lot of them in [this] province that made 
me afraid of that.” (Local resident, personal communication, August 31, 2016) 
 
The decline of business activities at the local level caused by the national political 
crisis demonstrates the interactions between politics and socioeconomic conditions. The 
effects of the crisis discouraged local entrepreneurs from investing in and expanding their 
businesses. Its effects resulted in not only revenue decline in business but also household 
financial weakening.   
Household Financial Weakening  
 
Turbulent economic conditions caused by the national political crisis increased 
personal and household debt. The declining of local business activities and the 
suspension of important economic policies contributed to household financial weakening. 
In order to maintain their lifestyles during this time of crisis, local people participated in 
loan programs from government and private money lending institutions. Some 
households and enterprises incurred debt by borrowing from illegal money-lending 
operations. Initially, local people tried to find jobs or invest in businesses within their 
communities in order to cover their daily expenses, including debt repayments. However, 
current economic conditions did not allow them to do so successfully. The participants 
expressed their regard for this point as follows:  
 “In the current situation, I cannot get money back from people who’ve borrowed 
from me. Some people borrowed things from my shop, but they’ve not paid me back 
yet. The rubber price, rice production, and so on is declining. All trading activities 
have been constrained. Either legal or illegal money lending has been spreading 
over all local communities. In the past, during previous elected governments, 
people did have debts. They [the government] helped us to eliminate the debts. I 
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can say a baby was born without debt. Whereas, nowadays a baby has debt since 
he or she was born.” (Local resident, personal communication, August 24, 2016)    
 
“Our household debt has increased compared to the past. Some people have a 
salary of only 1,000 baht. They can buy a motorcycle because they can pay in 
installments. That’s right. However, they have to pay 3,000 baht monthly not only 
for the motorcycle, but also Internet and telephone bill. All the money is gone! 
Their monthly income equals their monthly expenses.” (Local resident, personal 
communication, August 31, 2016) 
 
“My debts greatly increased because of the failure of growing rice. Due to the 
drought, we cannot grow rice. We also lost money from doing farming. The cost of 
producing rice went up, while the market price considerably declined.” (Municipal 
official, personal communication, August 30, 2016) 
 
 All the themes described above present the negative effects of the national 
political crisis on local public service delivery mitigated by five moderating variables. 
These patterns were shared by the participants from four municipalities through in-depth 
interviews and focus group discussions. In this chapter, the data gained from various 
participants within different municipalities provided us with an understanding of how the 
national political crisis created threats to local public service delivery. The following 
section illustrates the comparative characteristics of case performance that are analyzed 
across four cases.  
Comparison of the High- and Low-Performance Cases in Dealing with the Threats 
Resulting from the National Political Crisis  
 
Case performance analysis provides an explanation of how four selected cases, 
which are categorized into two groups (two high-performance cases and two low-
performance cases), matter in this study. This analysis aims to map out the characteristics 
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of two types of cases through five moderating variables: political institutions, civic 
engagement, leadership, governance, and political economy. Local performance in this 
study was measured by the rate of change in revenue between 2009 and 201511 of each 
municipality under study. Again, it is important to emphasize that in this study, local 
revenue is considered a proxy measurement of local economic performance. In analyzing 
threats in this chapter, it is noted that both the high and low performers experienced 
declines in their revenue. This implies that comparing them on the degrees of threats they 
experienced would be a tautology. Therefore, this study will not try to compare the level 
threat in this measurement between the high and low performers.      
This analysis explores what characteristics of these cases minimize this threat. At 
the beginning, this analysis employed “categorical aggregation” to explore the collective 
patterns that emerged from the interview data that have related interpretations (Stake, 
1995, p. 74). In addition, the patterns were categorized across two sets of cases (high-
performance cases and low-performance cases) by using “cross-case synthesis” (Yin, 
2014, p. 164). This form of analysis helps map out the similarities and differences of 
characteristics between two groups (Yin, 2014). The cases indicated the same or different 
characteristics through the five analytical dimensions. Then, those emerging 
                                                          
11 The formal data sources provided by the Department of Local Administration are available in the system 
from years 2009 through 2015. Some missing and updated data were collected from each municipality via 
telephone and annual reports provided on the municipal websites. Research case selection was described in 
Chapter 3: Data and Methods.          
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characteristics help answer the questions concerning high-performance cases versus low-
performance cases.   
In Table 4.6, the key findings are summarized in order to illustrate the 
characteristics of each group. Then, the analysis provides some explanation on the 
similarities or differences between high- and low-performance cases through each 
moderating variable.       
Table 4.6 Case Performance Analysis (Threats) 
 
Moderating 
Variables  
High Performance  
(What characteristics of high-
performance cases minimize 
this threat?)  
Low Performance  
(What characteristics of 
low-performance cases 
inability or failure to 
minimize this threat?) 
Same/Different  
Political 
Institutions  
 Maintained inter-
institutional relationships, 
but not extremely reliant 
upon central political 
institutions  
 Positioned in political 
neutrality 
 Maintained partnership and 
network with non-
governmental alliance for 
balancing and bargaining 
political power  
 Kept policy alignment  
 Open for institutional 
interactions and feedback 
from actors and society  
 Central government 
dependency on fiscal 
subsidy  
 Stagnant fears and 
uncertainties 
regarding limitation 
of political 
institutions 
 
Different 
Civic 
Engagement  
Same Characteristics  
 Political fears and 
uncertainties  
 Political exhaustion and 
ignorance  
 
Same Characteristics  
 Political fears and 
uncertainties  
 Political exhaustion 
and ignorance  
 
Same 
(Local citizens 
remain engaged 
in nonpolitical 
activities, but 
still have small 
concerns. High-
performance 
cases were less 
likely to 
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minimize this 
threat.) 
Political 
Leadership  
Same Characteristics  
 Responsiveness   
 Maintained problem-
solving capacity  
 Valued collective decision 
making  
 Open for gaining feedback 
 Inter-coordination and 
resource seeking capacity 
 Prioritized public interests 
but still maintained internal 
administrative capacity   
Same Level but Different 
Characteristics  
 Maintained tight 
partnership with local 
citizens  
Same Characteristics  
 Responsiveness  
 Maintained problem-
solving capacity  
 Valued collective 
decision making  
 Open for gaining 
feedback 
 Inter-coordination 
and resource seeking 
capacity   
 Prioritized public 
interests but still 
maintained internal 
administrative 
capacity   
Same Level but 
Different Characteristics 
 Flexibility and open 
for any possible 
opportunity  
Same 
(Low-
performance 
cases were able 
to minimize this 
threat as high-
performance 
cases did.) 
 
Governance  Same Characteristic  
 Maintained inter-
governmental & inter-
organizational relations  
 Maintained horizontal 
collaboration with local 
organizations    
 Reactive to trans-boundary 
issues 
Same level but different 
characteristics found 
exclusively in high-
performance cases   
 Performed adaptive 
governance capacity  
 Avoided political 
confrontation  
 Accountable to voices of 
citizens  
 Reduced local service 
procedures  
 Increased internal co-
working cultures   
Same Characteristics  
 Maintained inter-
governmental & 
inter-organizational 
relations 
 Maintained 
horizontal 
collaboration with 
local organizations   
 Reactive to trans-
boundary issues  
 
Same 
 (Low-
performance 
cases were able 
to minimize this 
threat as high-
performance 
cases did.)   
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 Table 4.6 provides an explanation of characteristics found in both high- and low-
performances cases. The prominent characteristics were identified and summarized 
through the five moderating variables. The case performance analysis in this study can be 
explained as follows:    
 Political Institutions. During Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis, the 
relationship between national political institutions and local governments has declined, 
especially the weakened electoral mechanism and the suspension of local autonomy. 
Nevertheless, the high-performance local governments were able to minimize threats 
caused by the national political crisis. They were able to maintain institutional 
relationships between national and local political institutions. In addition, their local 
policies were aligned with the policies of the national government and central ministries. 
This policy alignment positively impacted grant subsidies.  
Political 
Economy   
 Stimulated external 
investment  
 Increased opportunity for 
local entrepreneurs  
 Facilitated investment 
capital for local 
entrepreneurial outreach  
 Improved self-collected 
revenue strategy  
 Maintained fiscal self-
reliance  
 Absence of fiscal 
and economic 
strategy  
 
 
Different 
(Low-
performance 
cases merely 
addressed 
economic 
weakening in 
their local 
communities; 
however, this 
analysis did not 
find any 
significant 
characteristic 
that indicated 
inability or 
failure of local 
governments to 
minimize this 
threat.) 
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Although, local governments inevitably began to turn away from the political 
sphere, the high-performance cases placed themselves in a state of political neutrality in 
order to avoid direct political effects that may arise after political institutional changes. 
The high-performance cases utilized networking mechanisms through the National 
Municipal League of Thailand to help bargain and balance power in relation to national 
political institutions. Most of Thailand’s municipalities are members of this organization. 
To maintain institutional value and trust, they provide easily accessible channels for local 
citizens to interact with local political institutions and to receive institutional feedback.     
The characteristic institutional dimensions of the low-performance cases 
performed slightly differently from the high-performance cases. Although, the 
relationship between national political institutions and local governments has declined in 
the current political crisis, it generated threats to both the high- and the low-performance 
cases. It was essential to maintain relationships and take opportunities to improve local 
autonomy; however, low-performance cases failed to do this. They were more likely to 
rely on fiscal subsidies from the central government rather than improved organizational 
autonomy. In addition, they were fearful about institutional constraints, especially 
regarding legal constraints and acts of non-compliance. Political fears and uncertainties 
limited their capacity to cope with threats caused by the national political crisis. Based on 
the different characteristics of the high- and low-performance cases as described above, 
the low-performance cases failed to minimize threats as much as the high-performance 
cases.              
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 Civic Engagement. Although, local citizens in both categories remain engaged in 
nonpolitical activities held by local governments, they still have concerns. Based on case 
performance analysis, civic participation remains weakened and it may negatively affect 
other forms of civic engagement. To cope with this threat, both high-performance cases 
and low-performance cases suffered from similar conditions. High-performance cases 
rarely minimized political fears and uncertainties, reducing civic engagement. In these 
contexts, local citizens avoided talking about politics. Fears, uncertainties, and constraints 
caused by the national political crisis became critical factors that induced political 
exhaustion and political ignorance within civil society. Its effects weakened policy 
networks between local governments and societal actors. This seemed to be far beyond 
these local governments’ capacity to minimize this threat.     
 For low-performance cases, this analysis similarly indicated that political fear and 
uncertainties limited motivation as well as the capacity of local governments to minimize 
this threat. Fears and uncertainties caused by political and legal constraints created 
barriers to local innovation. Local people were less likely to express their voices 
regarding politics as the political crisis caused conflict within civil society. Local 
governments were less likely to perform their roles as mediators for resolving conflicts 
among local citizens. Both high- and low-performance cases encountered difficulties 
minimizing this threat.    
Political Leadership. Even though the national political crisis threatened political 
leadership within local governments, these governments provided a variety of responses 
 
146 
 
that ranged in effectiveness. Based on the case performance analysis in this study, though 
all four cases were affected by the threat caused by political crisis, both high- and low-
performance cases were capable of maintaining political leadership. For high-
performance cases, local governments worked closely with local citizens and were 
responsive to the needs and problems of the local community. Due to political and legal 
constraints, high-performance cases prioritized public interests, but still maintained legal 
compliance. Local leaders valued intra-organizational communication and internal 
feedback and consultation before making their decisions. If some issues were beyond 
their capacity, they were capable of asking for help from external connections to solve 
those basic problems.  
Moreover, it is interesting to observe that low-performance cases were able to 
minimize this threat using the same strategies as the high-performance cases. They were 
still responsive to the needs of local community. In addition, they maintained their 
problem-solving capacity, even though they encountered political and legal constraints. 
They were capable of seeking financial support from external sources in order to 
maintain progress in local development activities. Low-performance cases valued 
leadership as a vital mechanism during the transitional period and local leaders valued 
feedback gained from frontline officers as part of collective decision-making. They 
prioritized solving local problems by cutting municipal administrative costs. In 
conclusion, both high- and low-performance cases shared similar characteristics 
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demonstrating that the low-performance cases were capable of minimizing this threat as 
much as the high-performance cases.  
Governance. Case performance analysis revealed that high-performance cases 
were able to minimize political threats to local governance. Local governments employed 
adaptive governance to deal with changes in political institutions and policies. They tried 
to be flexible with new governing procedures that were installed by the military 
government. In addition, they avoided confrontation, instead creating more collaboration 
with upper-level political authorities. To respond to local needs and seek collaboration, 
they coordinated with internal and external networks such as neighboring local 
governments, village headmen, provincial governmental agencies, the business sector, 
and the National Municipal League of Thailand. They proactively dealt with trans-
boundary issues that might affect local communities, even though those problems or 
complaints did not fall under the province of their formal duties. High-performance cases 
were likely to listen to citizen voices and stakeholders in order to encourage robust trust 
and accountability. To maintain good performance of local services, they reduced 
municipal service procedures. This helped increase trust and service satisfaction in local 
citizens. Interestingly, they built co-working cultures and improved intra-organizational 
collaboration so that municipal officers could work across departments. 
Similarly, the low-performance cases shared the same characteristics as the high-
performance cases. They tried to maintain working relationships with the provincial 
offices of the central ministries. For example, the local governments provided their staff 
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and financial support to provinces and districts when those organizations requested 
assistance. In addition, the low-performance cases were capable of keeping close 
connections with permanent officers from central government organizations, such as the 
Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior. Those organizations were 
important for accommodating local governments and connecting with policy makers in 
the central government. They also influence budget and resource allocation at the 
national level. Based on the data analysis, both groups of local government have the same 
characteristics and they are both able to minimize this threat.    
  Political Economy. In this analytical dimension, the high-performance cases 
were particularly capable of minimizing the political threats that caused economic 
weakening in the local community. One of the cases tried to stimulate the local economy 
by encouraging franchise department stores to invest in its municipal area. Even though 
the investors in these businesses were not local, they nonetheless helped to develop 
robust local economies. Additionally, local governments provided commercial spaces 
like small, open markets for local entrepreneurs who lacked investment capital and also 
helped them find funding sources by coordinating with local banking institutions to 
provide loans to those who lacked investment capital. High-performance cases minimized 
their financial constraints in the midst of the political crisis by improving tax collection 
strategies, helping to increase self-collected revenue. Effective tax collection did not 
merely impact economic factors, but also operational factors administered by municipal 
officers. In this vulnerable situation, the high-performance cases maintained financial 
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security by employing collective decision making that included local administrators, local 
legislators, and municipal officers in the process.           
  However, this dimension was different in the low-performance cases. Both cases 
merely addressed economic weakening in their local communities. The analysis 
demonstrated an absence of fiscal and economic strategies. This assumes that the low-
performance cases lacked the ability to minimize this threat.      
Summary  
In conclusion, this chapter described the effects of Thailand’s post-2006 national 
political crisis and the resulting threats to local government service delivery. The key 
findings were illustrated through five moderating variables in “Graphical Representation 
of Findings: How National Political Crisis Creates Threats to Local Government Service 
Delivery” (see Appendix A).  
First, political institutional breakdown of local governments weakened electoral 
mechanisms at both national and local level. Institutional breakdown also caused the 
suspension of local authority policies. Then, political fears and uncertainties reduced 
civic participation and weakened policy network in local communities, thus increasing 
civil conflict. Next, the effects of national political crisis reduced autonomy of local 
leaders and increased risks for local leaders. Fourth, due to national political crisis, trust 
and communication between central and local governments have decreased, resulting in 
suspended decentralization and declining accountability. Also, hierarchical interactions in 
internal governance settings were increased. Finally, political turmoil interactively 
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induced negative impacts for political economy at local level. This caused local economic 
output decline, revenue decline within local business sectors, and personal and household 
financial weakening. 
In the final part of this chapter, case performance analysis identified the 
characteristics of high- versus low-performance cases. The analysis articulated both 
similar and different characteristics found in each analytical dimension. Similar 
characteristics were identified within the dimension of civic engagement, leadership, and 
governance. It is important to note that the characteristics of both high- and low-
performance cases in the civic engagement dimension are similar in their negative results; 
both the high- and low-performance cases failed to minimize the political threats posed to 
civic engagement. The high- and low-performance cases within the leadership and 
governance dimensions did share positive characteristics. In these dimensions, low-
performance cases were able to minimize the threat as well as the high-performance 
cases. Differences in characteristics were identified within the institutional and social 
economic dimensions. In this sense, the low-performance cases failed to minimize the 
threat as much as the high-performance cases.        
As mentioned at the outset, Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis created 
not only threats, but also opportunities for development in local government service 
delivery. The next chapter will describe how the national political crisis created 
opportunities for local government service delivery through five moderating variables 
and case performance analysis.     
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Chapter 5  
How National Political Crisis Creates Opportunities  
for Development in Local Government     
 
The previous chapter presented the effects of national political crisis that created 
threats to local service delivery. While the national political crisis was seen by 
participants as overwhelmingly negative in its impacts on local service performance, they 
also believed that it had created some opportunities for improvement.  
In some cases, such as Thailand’s institutional breakdown, threats to formal 
institutions, especially the existing constitution, were created. The military-installed 
government imposed Section 44 of the 2014 Interim Constitution to address political 
conflicts, eliminate certain laws, and remove certain appointed government officials from 
their positions. This was considered a threat to the democratic institutions and 
fundamental rights of Thai citizens (Forum-Asia, 2015). Nevertheless, these threats 
created some opportunities for facilitating local service delivery. These opportunities 
were embedded in the very same threats to local service performance.  
In other instances, these opportunities arose separately from the threats. For 
example, Khoman (2005) states that Thailand’s economic crisis that began in 1997 was 
not necessarily considered a threat but its effects triggered opportunities for boosting 
Thailand’s political reform and stimulating government to work closely with citizens. 
The idea that crisis, disaster, or catastrophe can yield important opportunities for social, 
economic, and even political development and performance has been widely studied by 
scholars.  
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For example, in “Antifragile; Things That Gain from Disorder,” Nassim Taleb 
(2012) argues that systems that respond favorably to threats are called “antifragile” (p. 
31). The concept of antifragile explains the positive things as opportunities gained from 
turmoil or uncertainty. Threats create opportunities for building methods of prevention or 
solutions for the future (Taleb, 2012). In addition, Horwich (2000) proposes an economic 
recovery concept that was developed based on the experiences of the Kobe Earthquake of 
1995. The recovery concept employs the idea of “accelerated depreciation,” by which a 
crisis leads to a more rapid replacement and upgrading of outmoded systems (Horwich, 
2000, p. 523).  
In public policy perspective, Kingdon (2003) argues that change in “political 
stream,” for example change in government and/or a change in policies, induces the 
opportunities for an “open policy window” (p. 168). An open policy window is an 
opportunity for revising or even changing policy and proposing policy initiatives. 
Importantly, political crisis can be a vital factor that opens a window of opportunity for 
rearranging political institutions (Kingdon, 2003). While crisis was seen as a negative 
thing, it created opportunities for youth in Africa to express their ideas regarding policy 
discontent, governance, and democracy. As a result, their voices were heard and became 
a powerful mechanism that improved their roles in the social movement (Iwilade, 2013).   
Results  
 Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis entailed not only threats to local 
governments but also brought opportunities. This chapter discusses how the national 
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political crisis created opportunities for local service delivery. The results are presented 
using the five moderating variables as the analytical framework. To substantiate the 
findings, pertinent quotes from the participants are presented. At the end of this chapter, 
as in the last chapter, the results from a comparative analysis of the low and high 
performers are presented.  
Political Institutions 
The main discussion in the literature on political institutions argues that 
“institutions do matter” to both individuals and organizations in civil society (Peters, 
2011, p. 79; Teske, 1991). Political institutions influence political arrangements, political 
structure, and autonomy. The results of institutional change may create both negative and 
positive impacts to social interactions and behaviors as well as public local service 
performance (Hicken & Selway, 2012; March & Olsen, 1984; North, 1990; Painters, 
2004; Peters, 2012). Even though crisis is generally seen as having a negative impact at 
the individual and organizational levels, opportunity is concealed within every crisis. 
Generally, a crisis provides particular opportunities to political institutional evolution and 
strengthens the institution-citizen relationship (Fry, 2014). For example, Thailand’s 
political crisis in 1992 triggered positive impacts on political reform and the progress of 
decentralization (Khoman, 2005).           
According to the participants of the study, the opportunities to political 
institutions created by political turmoil were described in three themes: (1) Section 44 
reducing the need for a long approval process; (2) Damrongdharma Centers providing an 
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outlet for local voices; and (3) Provincial Administration Organization (PAO)-local 
institutional capacity. The themes and key responses on political institutions are 
presented and summarized in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Political Institutions 
Themes Samples of Key Responses  
 Section 44 reducing the need 
for a long approval process  
 
 
 Damrongdharma Centers 
providing an outlet for local 
voices  
 
 PAO-local institutional 
capacity 
      “Section 44 can order and terminate the inconvenient 
issues or the limitations of those regulations in order to 
facilitate our work when we want to assist people.” 
      “When the current military installed government 
enforced Section 44, the administrative system moved very 
fast. People were satisfied on this point.” 
   
       “Since the Damrongdharma Center was established, 
people thought it helped them faster, so they just skipped the 
municipal process and sent their complaints to this center.” 
      “…having this center [the Damrongdharma Center] 
made them [the local people] feel safe…” 
 
 
     “The sun never sets [for our local network]. The sub-
district administration organizations and the provincial 
administrative organization are always welcoming us. We 
can coordinate with them anytime.”  
      “Recently, the mayor asked for financial support from 
the PAO in order to improve and develop a bigger 
playground.” 
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews. 
 
Section 44 Reducing the Need for a Long Approval Process 
Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis created particular opportunities for 
institutional responsiveness. Positive influences arose especially after the 2014 military 
coup. One of the participants noted that Section 4412 as used by the NCPO created an 
opportunity for administration and decision-making at the local level. Section 44 states 
that: 
                                                          
12 The Government Public Relation Department, 
http://thailand.prd.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=1581&filename=index  
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“In the case where the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order deems 
necessary for the purpose of reforms in various fields, for the enhancement of unity and 
harmony among people in the country, or for the prevention, restraint, or suppression of 
any act which undermines public order or national security, the Monarchy, the national 
economy, or State affairs, irrespective of whether such act occurred inside or outside of 
the Kingdom, the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order, with the approval of 
the National Council for Peace and Order, shall have power to order, restrain, or perform 
any act, whether such act has legislative, executive, or judicial force; the orders and the 
acts, including the performance in compliance with such orders, shall be deemed lawful 
and constitutional under this Constitution, and shall be final. When those have been 
carried out, a report shall be submitted to the President of the National Assembly and the 
Prime Minister for acknowledgement without delay.” (Thailand. Const. (Interim) § 44, 
2014).    
 
According to many participants, Section 44 provided a shortcut in decision-
making and an administrative tool for local governments to serve citizens’ needs and 
solve specific problems. In this sense, its impact was useful for local service delivery in 
terms of legal facilitation and responsiveness. In the past, local governments needed to 
gain approval from central ministries and provincial administrative authorities via many 
hierarchical procedures prior to providing some services or undertaking certain public 
projects. Section 44, when invoked by the Prime Minister, helped resolve legal and 
technical problems and streamlined some complicated bureaucratic processes. 
Nevertheless, there were many criticisms concerning the effect of using Section 44 in 
government administration. A major criticism was that the fast-track operation and quick 
decision-making may threaten accountability and transparency in both the national and 
local governments. Some participants described their concerns:    
“Frankly speaking, I would say that in the absence of an [elected] government, 
when we needed something, Section 44 provided a convenience for us. It makes 
things easier for us. It’s convenient. In the past, we had to get approval from the 
provincial governor or district chief officer. Section 44 can order and terminate 
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the inconvenient issues or the limitations of those regulations in order to facilitate 
our work when we want to assist people.” (Vice mayor, personal communication, 
August 25, 2016)     
   
“When the current military-installed government invoked Section 44, the 
administrative system moved very fast. People were satisfied on this point. They 
like this pattern. Regarding economics, I agree that the military-installed 
government was incapable of handling it like the general investors. For the 
governmental administration, the military government performed well.” (Local 
resident, personal communication, August 30, 2016)     
 
According to the participants, the positive impacts of political crisis resulted not 
only in reducing approvals within conventional bureaucratic procedures, but also 
establishing formal institutional channel to receive feedback from local citizens.  
Damrongdharma Centers Providing an Outlet for Local Voices  
After Thailand’s 2014 military coup, NCPO established nationwide government 
centers called Damrongdharma Centers 13 as a channel to receive citizens’ complaints, 
handle civil conflict, and manage public interests. These centers had an impact on local 
governments. For example, if local feedback has been given but the municipalities have 
not reacted to it in a timely or appropriate fashion, citizens can then send their complaints 
through the Damrongdharma Center located in provincial hall. At the provincial level, the 
military authority can intervene and immediately respond to citizen feedback. On one 
hand, military action may harm local government performance and credibility in terms of 
                                                          
13 The Damrongdharma Center was established by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). The 
center is national wide governmental organizations. It is located in each province in Thailand and is 
responsible to the Ministry of Interior. The aims of this center are to represent NCPO for responding to 
citizen complaints on governmental services, facilitate conflict resolutions, and protect public interests 
(Links: http://www.mea.or.th/moi/pomc/doc/ncpo96.pdf and 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/national/aec/30243281).  
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problem-solving capacity and responsiveness. On the other, having this center at the 
provincial level increased local influence on public concerns. Importantly, military 
authority became one of the vital mechanisms that helped stimulate local governments to 
react to local problems and expand space for public participation. Some views gained 
from participants were:  
“Since the Damrongdharma Center was established, people thought it helped 
them faster, so they just skipped the municipal process and sent their complaints 
to this center. Then, the center ordered us [the municipality] to respond to 
people’s complaints. It created a bypass and broke the line.” (Municipal 
councilor, personal communication, August 25, 2016)      
 
“Yes, having this center [the Damrongdharma Center] made them [the local 
people] feel safe like they had the Prime Minister from military. They were 
courageous to speak out and present their opinions.”  (Municipal official, 
interpersonal communication, August 31, 2016)      
 
Even though these centers are seen as political instruments of the central 
authorities in Bangkok, the end results satisfied local residents. Importantly, local voices 
were heard and responded to through this channel.  
PAO-Local Institution Capacity  
Since the beginning of the political crisis in 2006, many local governments lacked 
resources, especially money, and experienced a growing lack of autonomy. To respond to 
the needs of their local residents and to maintain effective local service delivery, 
municipal leaders coordinated with both lower and upper levels of local government as 
well as governmental agencies, especially the PAO. 
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 The national political restraints created a positive impact for building local 
institutional capacity. It was not necessary for local governments to wait for help from 
the national government. At this point, the PAO, as an upper level of local government, 
played an important role in assisting municipalities to maintain the quality of public 
service. Participants discussed this issue:  
“The sun never sets [for our local network]. The sub-district administration 
organizations and the provincial administrative organization (PAO) are always 
welcoming us. We can coordinate with them anytime. We, the local government, 
surely can take care of each other. (Municipal councilor, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016)     
 
“The PAO’s legislators always contacted us. They tried to provide as much 
assistance as they could. We asked for help through the PAO’s legislators. 
(Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 30, 2016)  
 
“For educational affairs, the mayor provided a budget for taking care of children. 
The budget provided only for buying a small playground. Recently, the mayor 
asked for financial support from the PAO in order to improve and develop a 
bigger playground. Actually, we just signed the MOU with the PAO for childcare 
development. (Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 30, 2016)    
 
Civic Engagement 
The literature on civic engagement argues that civic engagement in democratic 
society can be seen in two forms. The first is formal civic engagement. This form 
emphasizes the traditional, formal political participation that involves formal institutional 
processes and structures such as voting, advocacy by political parties, political 
candidates, etc. The second form is informal civic engagement, which is more flexible. 
This informal form focuses on volunteer activities, cultural and religious activities, and 
social movements (Pahad, 2005).  
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In addition, civic engagement is a positive source for enhancing democracy and 
effective public policy process at both national and local levels. In civic community, 
citizens are the main players in forming policy and designing public service (Holmes, 
2011; McLaverty, 2011; Michels & Graaf, 2010). Nevertheless, the pattern of civic 
engagement is seen through the status of the political institutions, especially change in 
political institutions. Institutional change affects suspension of electoral mechanisms and 
political activities. These factors influence the pattern and form of civic engagement 
(Dalpino, 2012; Waitoolkiata & Chambers, 2015). Moreover, when a political institution 
is weak and faced with difficulties, it is not necessarily bad news for civic engagement. In 
this sense, Börzel and Risse (2015) argue that strong collective actions help strengthen 
local governance and increase trust in government.      
Although citizens’ political engagement with national institutions and affairs in 
local communities declined during the political crisis, the tightening relationship between 
local governments and local citizens induced some degrees of progress in civic 
engagement at the local level. Clearly, we have found an interesting phenomenon of two 
contrasting social milieu where there is decline in civic participation in political affairs at 
the national level, but at the same time a more active participation at the local level. 
As a moderating variable, the effects of civic engagement resulted in improving 
local service delivery. The study found four themes in this mechanism: Increased trust in 
local government; increased formal (council) participation; increased informal (vocal) 
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participation; and increased community building. These themes are summarized in Table 
5.2. 
Table 5.2 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Civic Engagement  
Themes Samples of Key Responses  
 Increased trust in local government  
 
 Increased formal (council) 
participation  
 
 
 Increased informal (vocal) 
participation  
 Increased community building  
     “Local people realized that local government is involved 
in their life from birth to death. Local government is very 
important to us.” 
 
     “For the council meeting, when we [the municipal 
legislators] debated budget cuts, local people came to listen 
to us in order to ensure that this was not only a one-way 
communication.”  
    
  “When local citizens attended the town hall meeting, they 
were not afraid to speak out or perform their reactions.” 
 
 
   “When our municipality held activities that are involved 
in local tradition and culture, most civil organizations, local 
people, youth, local leaders, monks and other religious 
leaders actively engaged in our activities.”  
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.  
 
Increased Trust in Local Government  
In times of national political crisis, political institutional breakdown created 
uncertainties and threats to local governments and local citizens. Conversely, a crisis is 
an opportunity for local governments to work closely with their local residents in order to 
build trust in local government. Political fears and uncertainties caused by the national 
political crisis made local residents count on the local governments and vice-versa. As a 
result, local residents felt a greater degree of safety and comfort because local 
governments and local legislators stood beside them. The decline of responsiveness of the 
national government during the political crisis caused many local residents to increase 
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their trust in the ability of local government to address problems. One of the participants 
stressed that:  
“Local government is always beside local citizens. If they [local people] report to 
us about the waterworks getting stuck, we have to take care of that by 
coordinating with the provincial waterworks authority [not a local duty]. If a 
power outage occurs, we have to fix it for our people [actually, it is not a local 
duty].” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 
2016)     
Local residents perceived that the national government, especially the military-
installed government, was far away from them. The local governments were seen by the 
local citizens as even more easily reachable and closer than the national government. The 
more local residents got closer to their local government, the more trust between local 
citizens and local government developed. Having a high level of trust in local 
government induces civic participation and also increases effective engagement in local 
public service. Regarding this issue, the participants provided some examples: 
“The local government is more functional and practical because local 
administrators and local legislators live within the community. They know what is 
going on in their community and react immediately in order to respond to the 
needs of local residents. The responsiveness is faster than the central government. 
Nowadays, if the central government or district remained responsible for local 
duties, it would take longer for obtaining each road…This is reflecting that if they 
[local residents] cannot get what they need rapidly, they will report to the top 
administrator…Nowadays, for every issue including, raining, flooding, stuck 
toilets, etc., people report to the municipality…” (Municipal officer, interpersonal 
communication, August 25, 2016)       
 
 “We designed and framed our policy such as infrastructure development or 
living improvements. We work closely with local people that we should not 
depend on anyone else. Whoever comes to help us, we should be flexible with 
them. When the municipality conducts business, we always inform people that we 
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are volunteering to help. You may see before deciding to do something in our 
local community, we are open for civic engagement. We open the stage for 
everyone to share and propose their ideas. We then use these inputs to create the 
municipal strategic plan so that we don’t encounter as many problems.”               
(Vice mayor, personal communication, August 25, 2016)   
“From my point of view, when we consider the closeness to the people of local 
and central political institutions, we are closer to our local government than the 
central government. They [local residents] said they have never even seen their 
faces [central legislators]. We met the central legislators only once during election 
season. How close are they? How can they know about local problems? But local 
governments are more approachable. Local people can come to the mayor 
directly. Even though some duties do not belong to us, for example, when the 
water system had problems, people thought of us and came to us. Actually, the 
provincial waterworks authority is not our duty.” (Mayor, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016)     
 The closer relationship between local governments and local citizens in the midst 
of the political crisis is not only advantageous for strengthening local political 
institutional interactions but also increases trust in local governments. This change made 
local citizens learn about and understand the role and importance of local governments, 
especially the role of local government as a major public service provider within their 
community. Local government was vitally involved in their everyday lives from birth to 
death. As some participants said: 
“Local people realized that local government is involved in their life from birth to 
death. Local government is very important to us.” (Member of municipal council, 
personal communication, August 24, 2016)          
“Compared to the past, local citizens are more interested in local politics and 
local government…Nowadays, they are eager to ask questions when we have 
local political campaigns or when we meet with them in public. They request their 
rights. Sometimes, they ask us that what we can do for them if they elect us as 
local councilors.” (Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 25, 
2016) 
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“People mostly think of their municipality. They primarily think of local 
government—i.e. local councilors or mayors. In … Municipality, the relationship 
between our community and central legislators is quite low.” (Municipal 
councilor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)  
 
In addition, the norms of local citizens tended to change for the better when local 
government played a vital role in and became a part of their everyday lives. They thought 
of local government first when they had problems within their communities. Citizens 
perceive that local government could help address their needs better than other public 
institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Citizens realized that local government and local 
legislators are closer to them and respond to their needs faster than central political 
institutions, and that they can conveniently approach local legislators and local services. 
In addition, local governments tended to value the voices and power of local citizens as 
input for policy design and collective decision-making. Citizens became key stakeholders 
in policy processes and public service provisions. Regarding this point, some participants 
share their experiences:         
 “…We are never far away from the municipality. They are close to us. Currently, 
there are two types of political characteristics in Thailand, i.e. vertical and 
horizontal. People now are interested in the horizontal form that is closer to them, 
for example, mayors and local councilors. But the role of the vertical form is to 
give order to the lower levels. Hence, the relationship is quite estranged.” (Local 
resident, interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016)    
 “When they [local residents] have problems, they come to the municipality. They 
don’t go to see politicians [central legislators]. They come directly to us or 
sometimes they call directly to the mayor or the head of a department. They 
report problems to us directly by giving us a call.” (Municipal official, 
interpersonal communication, August 24, 2016) 
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“If someone’s roof has holes, they come to the municipality. For flooding in our 
community, we need help from the municipality to provide a drainage pump. We 
come to municipality to report our problems. If we have wedding parties, we 
invite the mayor and the councilors. Everything is here. I feel like the municipality 
is like our parents, we depend on it.” (Local resident, interpersonal 
communication, August 30, 2016) 
 “We can meet with the mayor directly whenever we have problems. Sometimes, 
those problems are not municipal duties. For example, the provincial waterworks 
authority is not under local jurisdiction. It is responsible to the provincial 
administration, but local people primarily think of us. They call us when there is 
an electric outage within their communities. We have to react and respond to 
these problems because they call us, even though those duties are not our 
responsibility…” (Mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)         
 A political crisis does not always result in a negative change in local political 
institutions; it can also have a positive impact on local development. The relationship 
between local citizens and local governments is more tightly constructed. Local citizens 
understand the role of local governments, while local governments prominently value and 
prioritize the interests and the needs of local citizens. A crisis also triggers positive 
change in political norms and the political value of local citizens as well as municipal 
officers.  
Moreover, the positive impact gained from the political crisis created 
opportunities for local government to build local awareness and a sense of local 
citizenship. Local citizens increasingly cared about and were concerned with problems 
occurring in their communities. They attentively reacted to the issues that affected not 
only their individual lives but also their local society. Because of local trust, the feedback 
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and concerns were frequently directed to municipalities for further improvement. Some 
participants addressed this issue:  
“Local people are increasingly engaged in municipal activities. They were also 
interested in joining the activities that were organized by the municipality.” 
(Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 31, 2016) 
 
“People saw the progress of their community, so that they were more concerned 
[about it]. For example, a mayor has worked almost four years, what about his 
performance? The municipality always gained the grant, but we didn’t see any 
output. They compared the performance of this mayor to the previous mayor.” 
(Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016)  
 
Civic engagement became a mechanism to generate robust dialogue between 
citizens and local governments, especially in times of political instability. Outwardly, the 
political crisis eroded the progress of political engagement. However, local governments 
were capable of maintaining non-political engagement and encouraging local citizens to 
participate in collective decision-making. Political instability stimulated local 
governments to provide space for gaining feedback from citizens. As this study observed, 
it created an opportunity for local citizens to build local awareness and improve their 
sense of citizenship. The following section explains how national political crisis 
increased formal institutional participation.  
Increased Formal (Council) Participation  
Participants saw the national political crisis as an opportunity for local 
government to attentively engage local citizens in the municipal council meetings. 
According to the public participation spectrum, municipal and local leaders informed 
local citizens that they could attend the council meeting that were routinely held in the 
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municipal office. Their attendance at the council meetings suggested that they were 
becoming involved in decision-making processes.  
Yet, based on council regulations, local citizens were not allowed to express any 
comments while attending the meeting. They were simply observers. This process of 
engagement guaranteed the citizens’ right to have at least some participation in the 
decision-making of municipal administrative and legislative bodies. It also allowed 
citizens to see how their local legislators performed during the meeting sessions. These 
activities helped increase not only civic engagement, but also accountability and 
transparency in local administration. Regarding this point, some participants indicated 
that:       
“Our municipality sent out a letter to the community committee and the 
community leaders in order to ask them to announce the council meeting 
schedule. If local residents want to attend the council meeting, they need to bring 
a copy of the house registration or a copy of their identification card to show 
municipal staff prior to the council meeting. We also explained the rules of the 
council meeting to the citizens, namely that they cannot debate or express any 
voice while attending the meeting.” (Member of municipal council, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016)   
 
“We were invited to attend the council meeting. We also helped them to spread 
the word to other local citizens that if anyone would like to attend the council 
meeting, they were welcome. They [the municipality] invited local citizens in each 
community to attend the council meetings. If council members ask us something, 
then we are allowed to speak out. We cannot vote in this meeting but we come to 
listen to them.”  (Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 24, 2016) 
 
“For the council meeting, when we [the municipal legislators] debated budget 
cuts, local people came to listen to us in order to ensure that this was not just a 
one-way communication. We wanted them to know and see what happened in the 
council meeting. If local people do not know anything about local administration, 
 
167 
 
we cannot work effectively.” (Vice mayor, personal communication, August 25, 
2016)    
 
 Moreover, local civic engagement seemingly advanced to higher levels when 
local governments provided space for local citizens to give feedback and become 
involved in municipal decision-making. In some municipalities, local citizens were 
invited to serve as committee members or as members of the municipal operations team. 
At this stage, local citizens can express their opinions, provide feedback, and even make 
decisions on municipal development projects. This is not only to encourage local people 
to get engaged in collective decision-making but also to build trust in local governments. 
Participants provided their experiences regarding this point:    
“When we had a town hall meeting, local citizens were actively engaged in the 
meeting. They shared their thoughts on development projects.” (Municipal 
official, interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016)     
 
“For my duties—i.e. an employee of a municipal department, if citizens propose 
the projects, they will be appointed to… [To be a committee member] … They 
seem to be happy working with us. But if they did not know about the project or 
were not involved, it was useless. It’s not useful and it wastes money. But if we 
provide projects they need, such as the debris management project, people were 
ready to work with us. If they don’t want it, it won’t happen.” (Municipal official, 
interpersonal communication, August 24, 2016)     
 
“People increasingly scrutinized our work. The past 10 years is totally different 
from the time before. When we were the Tambon Administration Organization, 
people were afraid of checking [the work of government]. Nowadays, people 
actively check government work. They know their roles very well.” (Municipal 
official, interpersonal communication, August 31, 2016)    
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Increased Informal (Vocal) Participation  
The political crisis triggered opportunities that resulted in not only the 
improvement of formal civic engagement, but also the increase of engaging space, as 
informal participation, for citizen feedback and accessibility in their local community. 
Local people were eager to speak out in order to provide recommendations to the 
municipalities for improving services. Local people routinely addressed feedback to their 
local legislators or even came to the municipalities directly.  
Some participants noted that changes in politics may not affect citizen 
engagement, but civic engagement may be created from the understanding and awareness 
that they’ve learned from politics. Participants provided their thoughts on this point:  
“Civic engagement in the … Municipality is very good. When we hold municipal 
plan meetings, they [citizens] usually bring public issues to the meeting. They 
engage with us very well. They like to suggest how to solve problems in the 
community. It seems like we receive more feedback from them.” (Municipal 
official, interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016) 
 
“When local citizens attended the town hall meeting, they were not afraid to 
speak out or voice their reactions.” (Municipal official, communication, August 
31, 2016)  
 
“In the past 10 years, local people are increasingly willing to speak out and 
reflect their opinions.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, 
August 25, 2016)    
 
The channel to increase opportunities for civic engagement between local citizens 
and their governments has widened from classical approaches such as face-to-face 
interaction to include modern digital interaction. In the digital era, local governments 
employ various forms of social media to interact and engage with citizens, such as 
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websites, Facebook, Line, etc. Social media has become a vital instrument for local 
governments to communicate with and engage citizens in times of political crisis. 
Important information and some municipal resources were made available to the public 
through municipal websites and Facebook in order to build trust and accountability. At 
the same time, local citizens use social media as a channel to provide feedback and 
follow the activities of local governments. Facebook became a practical and accessible 
source for maintaining civic engagement in local communities. Regarding this point, 
some participants indicated that:  
“It is different from the past. It is related to advanced technology. This factor 
encouraged people to express their voices, not just stay still and keep quiet.” 
(Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016) 
 
“In my opinion, local people actively engaged with local governments and they 
courageously expressed their views. They received news and information very 
fast. They also reacted to problems very quickly. Whenever they had problems, 
they came to see us immediately.” (Municipal official, interpersonal 
communication, August 25, 2016) 
 
“Local people actively engaged in local activities. When our kindergarten center 
held some activities, we always invited parents to join us. Parents also followed 
news and information from our Facebook page. In addition, if they know we 
punish their kids, they will call directly and send complaints to the mayor.” 
(Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 30, 2016)    
 
“The impact of current mass media and social media encourages local people to 
quickly post and share their complaints on social media space. It spreads widely 
…” (Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 31, 2016)  
Increased Community Building  
The participants indicated that local residents were active in formal civic 
engagement and politically-related activities. During the time of the elected government, 
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the central government and central legislators remained a democratic regime. Later, these 
political institutions were removed and replaced by the military-installed authorities, and 
the political sphere became tumultuous, creating fears and uncertainty for local people. 
Consequently, local people lacked a means of engagement in formal political activities. 
However, they were apparently comfortable involving themselves in non-formal civic 
engagement and non-political activities rather than formal civic engagement. Most 
activities were organized by municipalities, e.g., local festivals, traditional activities, 
religious activities, and town hall meetings.  
Even though the political crisis remains unsettled, local residents in some 
municipalities were motivated to engage in local political activities such as attending 
council meetings or volunteering on municipal committees. Local citizens felt 
comfortable getting involved in such local activities. They engaged in local activities by 
ignoring political identity and political conflict—i.e. yellow and red identities. Hence, the 
municipalities utilized these opportunities to increase community-building by stimulating 
local civic engagement. The strong civic community helped enhance co-production in 
local public services. Concerning this point, some participants said:         
“According to the duty and structure of the municipality, the municipal office is 
normally responsible for education, religion, and culture. When our municipality 
held activities that involve local tradition and culture, most civil organizations, 
local people, youth, local leaders, monks and other religious leaders actively 
participate in our activities. (Municipal official, interpersonal communication, 
August 25, 2016.  
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“Local people mostly liked engaging in making merit, traditional activities, and 
religious activities.” (Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 31, 
2016)    
 
“When our municipality held local activities that were related to local 
development, sports, education, or public health, local people frequently 
participated in our activities. They also helped us to create and develop those 
activities. (Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 24, 2016)   
 
 The effects of national political crisis induced not only positive impacts to civic 
engagement at the local level in both formal and informal ways, but also improved the 
capacity of political leadership.  
Political Leadership 
Most of the literature on leadership argues that leaders with high leadership 
capacity help increase effectiveness and efficiency in public services (Wart, 2003). In 
addition, difficult and challenging situations require leaders who can provide vision and 
use their own problem-solving skills to make appropriate decisions on public service 
management (Fiedler, 1996; Wart, 2003). For contingency leadership, task motivated 
leadership style is necessary for leaders who wish to succeed in their goals, especially in 
difficult situations (Fiedler, 1971; Northhouse, 2010).  
In crisis situations, Boin et al. (2017) argue that strategic crisis leadership should 
include the capacity to estimate and understand the qualities of a situation. The leaders 
can then make decisions and use appropriate tools in response to each crisis. In addition, 
leaders should have good communication skills in order to give a clear explanation and 
provide an understanding to their followers and associates. Importantly, crisis is not 
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always a bad thing; it is embedded with opportunities. In the midst of a crisis, people 
expect that public leaders need to do something that can maintain public services and 
bring back normalcy. Once the crisis situation and the people’s concerns are effectively 
managed and eased by leaders, this leadership achievement can elevate leaders to be 
heroes or “statesmen” (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003, p. 544). So, political crisis is not always bad 
news for leadership. Even though crisis causes change in governmental administration 
and policy, this sort of change creates windows of opportunity that open for revising (or 
even removing) policies and rearranging political institutions (Kingdon, 2003).  
In the midst of political crisis, there is ultimately a political leadership opportunity 
for local leaders and they need to identify and respond to these opportunities. Local 
government leaders require leadership to mitigate and cope with political fears and 
uncertainties that undermined local service delivery. In this study, political leadership 
emphasizes municipal administrators. National political crisis creates leadership 
opportunities for local leaders. Its effects result in elevating the role of mayors to respond 
the needs of local residents. These findings are summarized in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Political Leadership   
Themes Samples of Key Responses  
 Elevated role of mayors       “I don’t know about the mayors in other places, but our 
mayor went everywhere whenever he knew there was a 
problem, responding to the requests of local citizens. At 
least, he can help coordinate and provide some basic help. 
He is concerned about the community’s needs and never 
ignored what we needed.” 
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews. 
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Elevated Role of Mayors  
 
  Even though the political crisis followed by the coup d’état has suppressed the 
autonomy of local leaders, it also provides an opportunity for the mayors to demonstrate 
their leadership qualities. This may have been driven by their desire to be recognized 
within their own constituency; to be ready when the future election comes. They were 
afraid that by doing business as usual, they would be relegated to obscurity.  
Prior to the coups, national government and legislators asserted strong influence 
over the municipal mayors in some types of public service. Since Thailand’s post-2006 
national political crisis, there were frequent changes in the central government and their 
policies. These changes created uncertainty that impacted local public services. However, 
the effects of these crises stimulated municipal mayors to be more responsive to local 
needs and solve local problems.  
In addition, local citizens realized the role of local leaders who worked closely 
with them and knew what their citizens needed. Therefore, the leadership opportunity 
gained from the national political crisis elevated the roles of mayors in improving local 
public services. Many participants also mentioned that mayors not only had a responsive 
style, but also a capacity to coordinate with entities outside their jurisdiction in order to 
serve basic needs of local citizens. This kind of leadership was not the same in all places 
but depended on leaders’ capacity in serving various needs. Regarding this point, some 
participants stated that:      
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“The mayor has to be actively responsive to all local citizens and respond to what 
they need. For example, if people do not have a car [for facilitating individual or 
family activities], the municipality will provide a car for them. Whenever anyone 
in our community passes away, we help their families to set up the tents and 
provide utensils—plates and bowls [for the funeral service]. This role of the 
mayor is a complete change. It depended on local administrators’ policies that 
were designed in pursuit of accommodating local citizens. I think it’s likely good. 
It’s not like it was with the central legislators.” (Municipal official, interpersonal 
communication, August 25, 2016)      
 
 “Even though the central government allocated a budget for improving public 
services, the technical problem still exists. We still have conflicts about service 
boundaries and jurisdiction. It doesn’t involve only the Royal Highway 
Department because the service boundary connects to other judicial boundaries. 
It’s hard to coordinate. I don’t know about the mayors in other places, but our 
mayor went wherever he knew there was a problem, responding to the requests of 
local citizens. At least, he can help coordinate and provide some basic assistance. 
He is concerned about the community’s needs and never ignored what we needed. 
(Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 2016)   
  
Governance 
 The literature on governance reports that the new governing process of public 
organizations values networks and power sharing among multiple actors. In this sense, 
government is no longer the key player in policy process and public service provision 
(Enroth, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Renn, Klinke, & Asselt, 2011). Public service 
delivery process is implemented by multiple actors and networks rather than a single 
actor and centralized decision makers. Those involved are diverse and work together 
across boundaries (Peters, 2011). In addition, non-hierarchical and bottom-up 
administrative style replaces traditional hierarchical pattern that emphasizes command 
and control administration. This new pattern of governing process values horizontal 
collective action rather than state-centered administration (Kickert, 1997).  
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Importantly, new public governance aims to enhance the quality and effective 
public service provisions and to accommodate collective goals by stimulating 
collaboration in decision making among various contributors within government 
networks and with other societal actors. Moreover, collaboration among multiple sectors 
opens up opportunities in which different institutional settings can share resources and 
work together as a strategic partnership in order to provide effective public service 
(Bevir, 2011; Bingham, 2011). Börzel and Risse (2015) support the findings of this report 
that political institutional breakdown is not always harmful for governance at local level. 
It is an opportunity for local governments to work with various groups and sectors 
collectively and also collaborate across boundaries to achieve a high degree of 
governance. This helps improve trust with their local communities and safeguard 
governance from the effects of dysfunctional institutions.          
According to participants, Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis created 
particular opportunities for governance as a moderating variable to local service delivery 
in four traits: Lessening of central mandates, end of partisan gridlock, increased local 
responsiveness, and increased intergovernmental collaboration. These themes are 
summarized in Table 5.4 
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Table 5.4 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Governance  
Themes Samples of Key Responses  
 Lessening of central 
mandates  
 
 
 
 End of partisan gridlock  
 
 
 Increased local 
responsiveness 
 
 
 Increased 
intergovernmental 
collaboration 
     “In the past, the central legislators and even the upper 
level-local legislators tried to expand their political 
influence. Nowadays, nothing happens. The military 
installed legislators and members of the National Council 
for Peace and Order apparently do not interrupt us. They 
just look at national policy level.” 
 
     “Our… municipality is lucky because we don’t involve 
ourselves much in political protest. As I mentioned, I am 
from local level and work for a local community. I don’t rely 
on national politics.” 
 
      “Local people complained directly on social media or 
by calling us. Then, we responded and solved that problem 
right away. If it happens during the long holiday, we will 
arrange and appoint our staff to stand by and respond to 
emergency situations such as disease transmission.” 
 
    “We have collaborated with and sometimes requested 
assistance from them [the district]. In the meantime, when 
they wanted us to do something for them, we definitely 
facilitated them. On some occasions, we needed some 
support from them.” 
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews. 
 
Lessening of Central Mandates  
While there was less autonomy in local governance, the military government was 
preoccupied with many other national issues, some of which were to further their own 
popularity. The effect was that the military government did not have much incentive to be 
mindful of what they saw as minor local issues. The net result was that local governments 
felt less of a mandate to serve the military government’s agenda.  Therefore, local 
governments had a greater degree of freedom to make their decisions on local affairs and 
perform their assigned duties with less intervention from central political influences than 
in the past. Participants expressed their perspectives on this point:  
 
177 
 
“In the past, the central legislators and even the upper level-local legislators tried 
to expand their political influence. Nowadays, nothing happens [with the central 
government]. The military-installed legislators and members of the National 
Council for Peace and Order do not bother us. They just look at the national 
policy level.” (Vice mayor, personal communication, August 25, 2016) 
 
“Yes, we have freedom within the municipal council. Anyone here can freely 
express their thoughts without any intervention from others.” (Municipal 
councilor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)    
 
Some local governments turned these political threats into administrative 
opportunities. In the midst of political crisis, the prior elected national government and 
legislators were overwhelmed with political turmoil at the national level. It seemed like 
they isolated local governments and local communities. When the military-installed 
government took power, they were more concerned about national political issues than 
local issues. The national political isolation created an opportunity for local governments 
and local communities. They could freely operate public services with the lessening of 
central mandates.  Regarding this point, participants described their experiences:         
“I think we were lightly detached, but local government has to take action as the 
front-line operator. The central legislators merely talked to us once or twice a 
year.” (Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 31, 2016) 
 
“Especially in the … area, the national senators and national representatives 
rarely looked after their constituents.” (Municipal councilor, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016)     
 
“I feel like they [central legislators] have not coordinated with us much.” 
(Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 25, 2016)      
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End of Partisan Gridlock  
Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis induced political gridlock, especially 
after the 2014 military coup. The NCPO took power away from the elected government 
and appointed the military government. Its effects brought about a suspension of political 
institutions such as the constitution, legislators, political parties, and elections. These 
political institutions have been frozen in pursuit of reducing the political pressures caused 
by the prolonged political crises. On the positive side, the national political crisis ended 
partisan gridlock. Its effects mitigated the barriers for local development and decreased 
political conflicts between Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts. In addition, local administrators 
seemed to take a more politically neutral and flexible stance.  
In order to maintain and improve local service delivery, local government could 
work with every political sector and with anyone who may have a different political 
stance. Moreover, it appeared that some local communities benefited from state-led 
development projects when the military-installed government transferred the grants 
directly to local communities without moderating actors—e.g., legislators, cabinet 
members, political parties, and other political interest groups. In the past, these 
moderating parties could intervene and influence the grant allocation process before those 
grants were transferred to local communities. Regarding this point, participants shared 
their experiences:        
“For the … Municipality, national politics doesn’t affect us too much. Neither 
central representatives nor senators influenced us”. (Member of municipal 
council, personal communication, August 30, 2016)    
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“… Municipality is lucky because we don’t involve ourselves much in political 
protest. As I mentioned, I am from the local level and work for a local community. 
I don’t rely on national politics.” (Mayor, personal communication, August 24, 
2016)  
 
Increased Local Responsiveness  
Even though some local governments were undermined by political fears and 
uncertainties in times of national political crises, these threats positively encouraged local 
administrators to increase local responsiveness in local service delivery. Officials 
changed their attitudes about responsiveness to citizens. They respected local residents as 
guides rather than just service recipients. A change in the mindset of local officials 
inspired by national political constraints helped enhance local responsiveness in service 
delivery. Regarding this issue, some participants expressed that:        
“When local citizens came to see us in our municipal office, we treated and 
facilitated them respectfully. We are happy to serve people. We always ask, what 
can we help you with today? Suffice to say, the municipal officials are here for 
serving people.” (Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 24, 
2016) 
 
“The municipal officials in the … municipality changed their attitude about the 
citizens. In the past, they viewed local citizens as service recipients. Nowadays, 
they view citizens as guides. The municipal officials performed as the 
implementers, following guidance from the citizens.” (Municipal official, 
interpersonal communication, August 24, 2016) 
 
“It [the effects] contains both positive and negative impacts. The positive impact 
helped improve the behavior of local administrators.” (Mayor, personal 
communication, August 30, 2016)  
 
Moreover, local leaders and officials were more responsive to solving problems 
regarding public services occurring in local communities, such as road repair, 
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waterworks, electricity, sanitary systems, and other environmental concerns. In fact, 
some public works—i.e. highways, waterworks, electricity—were not the responsibility 
of municipalities, but local residents perceived that local government was responsible for 
these duties. Unavoidably, local leaders had to react to these problems because they 
affected the lives of their local residents. To find a primary solution, local leaders 
coordinated with the governmental departments that were responsible for those duties and 
requested that they solve these problems. On this point, some participants indicated that:    
“Local governments expanded very fast in order to respond to the developments. 
We are with local citizens every day. If people complain about the bad roads in 
our community, we have to provide budget in order to respond to that problem 
immediately. In the past, it took more than ten years to get a gravel road, but 
nowadays it is very fast.” (Member of municipal council, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016) 
 
“If people complain about local problems via the municipal Facebook page, the 
municipal officials will reply to them and react to the survey and solve that issue 
immediately.” (Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 30, 
2016)  
 
“Local people complained directly on social media or by calling us. Then, we 
responded and solved that problem right away. If it happens during a long 
holiday, we will arrange for our staff to stand by and respond to emergency 
situations such as disease transmission. We just call our appointed staff to 
respond to the incident immediately.” (Municipal official, interpersonal 
communication, August 30, 2016)  
 
Some participants noted that local governments were responsive to financial 
shortages whenever the national government’s fiscal transfer was delayed. Even though 
the municipality did not have the autonomy or capacity to undertake the big tasks such as 
the electric system or waterworks, local leaders and local legislators helped each other to 
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figure out an appropriate solution by deciding to use existing funds while waiting for 
fiscal transfer from the national government. In this political situation, local government 
determined a fast and effective solution for helping local people. Sometimes, they 
coordinated with the provincial administration in order to solve their local problems. 
Regarding this point, participants shared their experiences:     
“When the central government delayed the transfer of monthly subsidies for 
elderly people, we solved this problem by using funds from other existing 
municipal budgets.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, 
August 25, 2106)    
 
“For the local government, you can come and see the mayor directly, even though 
that duty is not the mayor’s responsibility. For example, [the people informed] the 
mayor that the waterworks broke, but the waterworks authority is not the mayor’s 
duty. People thought of us. The Provincial Electricity Authority should be 
responsible for the electrical outage, but people called us. Eventually, I helped 
coordinate with those authorities for solving the problem. This is the only thing I 
can do under my authority. At least they called us, even though some duties are 
beyond our control.” (Mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)  
 
Increased Intergovernmental Collaboration  
In the midst of national political crisis, local government suffers from 
administrative inconvenience and concern about the influence of the military-installed 
government. Being wary of the hierarchical structure and the strong power of the central 
government, local governments attempted to insulate themselves by collaborating more 
closely with other local governments.  As an indirect effect of this greater collaboration, 
the quality of public service at the local level somewhat improved. This fact was borne 
out several times during the interviews. 
 
182 
 
The municipalities collaborated with the provincial administrative authorities—
e.g. the chief district officers, the village headmen, and the village health volunteers—in 
pursuit of sharing power and resources in providing public services. Regarding this point, 
participants mentioned that:  
“They [the municipality] collaborated with the village health volunteers very well 
because they thought we worked closely with the community. When there was a 
disease spreading in the community, they normally would inform us and would 
also report to the hospital. This is the way we built our collaboration. We work 
closely with local citizens.” (Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 
24, 2016)   
 
“We have collaborated with and sometimes requested assistance from them [the 
district]. In the meantime, when they wanted us to do something for them, we 
definitely facilitated them. On some occasions, we needed some support from 
them. We normally assisted each other. It looks like the urban community 
normally helps the rural community. We always supported each other.” 
(Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 30, 2016)    
 
In addition, some municipalities tried to enhance collaborative governance across 
jurisdictions and build networks with non-governmental sectors. For example, the mayor 
of one municipality signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with a neighboring 
municipality in order to mutually manage a joint sanitary and garbage incinerator.  
Moreover, the municipalities created a collaborative network through the National 
Municipal League of Thailand. This organization functions as a union of Thai 
municipalities. The municipalities use this network to share resources, both tangible and 
intangible. This collaboration became a vital mechanism to balance and coordinate the 
power of local governments and the power of the national government. In this regard, the 
participants noted that:   
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“Once the mayor was elected, he requested a neighboring mayor to sign the 
MOU. We have maintained this collaboration more than 10 years.” (Member of 
municipal council, personal communication, August 31, 2016) 
 
“It is good for reform. Local governments tended to build collaboration. 
Nowadays, this collaboration became the National Municipal League of 
Thailand. The chairman of this organization agreed to fight for local 
governments. Currently, we are working on it.” (Mayor, personal communication, 
August 24, 2016)   
 
Political Economy  
 The literature on political economy notes that polity and economy are dissimilar 
but interdependent. Each variable influences the other via interactive processes (Arndt, 
1983; Stern & Reve, 1980). In policy perspective, political economy refers to policy 
options that government provides to efficiently benefit everyone in the society (Wamsley 
& Zald, 1973). In politically turbulent situations, the decline of political economy is 
negatively impacted by political crisis. Its effects drive government failure to provide 
basic services due to lack of resources and fiscal capacity (Menkhaus, 2007; Musekiwa & 
Chatiza, 2015).  
Although the threats caused by the national political crisis are not only a source 
for the decline of political economy at the local level, they also can be conditions for 
opportunities for improving political economy. These effects can have a positive impact 
on local service delivery. The data analysis shows that the national political crisis created 
opportunities for political economy in two ways; improved fiscal management and 
central development support. These findings are also presented and summarized in Table 
5.5. 
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Table 5.5 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Political Economy   
Themes Samples of Key Responses  
 Improved fiscal management 
 
 
 
 
 Central development support. 
     “The national economy got sick, while our local 
government felt a smaller effect. But I will make it [the 
economy] stronger by boosting some parts in order to move 
our local economies forward.” 
    “…it is convenient and easy for municipal officers to 
build a relationship with local people when they went out to 
provide tax collection services. They’re familiar with the tax 
payers.” 
 
       “The current state-led development policy was designed 
and directed by the central government. They allocated the 
grant (about 200,000 or 500,000 THB) directly to local 
residents.” 
      “It took just two months. It [the state-led development 
project] apparently helped stimulate local economies. Local 
people have money to spend in the market.” 
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews. 
 
Improved Fiscal Management  
Although the effects of the political crisis led to political economy crises at both 
the national and local levels as described in Chapter 4, the political crisis created the 
conditions for opportunities to political economy. In the midst of political crisis, some 
municipalities were able to improve fiscal management by boosting their revenues. Based 
on the interviews, boosting revenues in the municipalities can be described in two 
characteristic forms. First, by promoting local economic activities; second, by improving 
the efficiency of revenue collection.  
 When some municipalities encountered an economic downturn, local people 
resisted expanding investments and lacked confidence in the economic policies of the 
national government. At the same time, some municipalities were able to boost local 
revenues by stimulating local economic activities, with the aim of increasing the income 
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of local citizens and urging local entrepreneurship. Local governmental leaders took this 
opportunity to encourage basic economic activities by inviting investors from outside to 
open department stores. Municipalities also provided space for expanding the local 
market. It created another option for small investors in the community to begin new 
businesses or renovate their existing businesses. In addition, one municipality helped 
small and medium investors who did not have enough capital to invest in their businesses 
by coordinating with financial institutions for providing the loans. Regarding this point, 
the participants suggested that:  
“The national economy got sick, while our local government felt a smaller effect. 
But we will make it stronger by boosting some sectors in order to move our local 
economies forward. We are a tiny mechanism within the big system; we cannot 
make it stronger immediately but at least we started to do that. We began doing 
this in terms of basic infrastructure and encouraging big department stores to 
open their businesses in our area. In the meantime, we provided spaces as an 
option for a local market.” (Mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)  
         
“In [our] municipality, most areas are agricultural. People understood and tried 
to adjust themselves to current conditions. Our municipality helped them by 
creating a market space. We also allowed them a few months to farm on the 
municipal land. For people who don’t want to do farming, we provide them 
spaces for building a local market. There are two locations that we arranged for 
them. Our aim is to create jobs for people and to boost their revenues from those 
business activities. We provide them space for investment but they also have to 
take some responsibilities, too. If they don’t have capital, we try to coordinate 
with the banks and look for a low interest loan. Approval depends on the 
consideration of each bank and their credit and we cannot guarantee that. We’ve 
tried to assist them in this dimension.” (Mayor, personal communication, August 
24, 2016)  
 
Additionally, some municipalities faced the difficulty in collecting revenues from 
local citizens due to the consequences of the national economic downturn and political 
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uncertainty. Nevertheless, some participants indicated that the increase in local, self-
collected revenues depended not only the economic downturn and political instability, but 
also the capacity for revenue collection in each municipality. In times of political crisis, 
municipalities took this opportunity to boost self-collected revenue by improving tax 
data, tax maps, and tax collection strategies. In addition, municipalities tried to 
communicate with local citizens and build awareness concerning the outputs and 
outcomes of tax collection and the consequences of tax compliance. Regarding this point, 
the participants shared their experiences:  
“Tax [collection] depends on the capacity of local governments. Can you collect 
the tax effectively, such as the Department of Finance? It also depends on the 
competency of tax collectors. Are you able to get information on the 3.7 sq. km. of 
[this] municipal jurisdiction? How many rental homes do you have? Do you 
entirely estimate the property tax? Tax collection depended not only on the 
central government, but also the tax collectors at the local level. Can you 
encourage people to pay their taxes? If people don’t pay their taxes, what strategy 
do you employ to enforce the law?” (Member of municipal council, personal 
communication, August 24, 2016)    
 
“We tried to explain to and communicate with people about the regulations, laws, 
and consequences of non-compliance. It is the duty of municipal officers to press 
for payment and follow up. Our municipal jurisdiction is very small, so it is 
convenient and easy for municipal officers to build a relationship with local 
people when they went out to provide tax collection services. They’re familiar 
with the taxpayers. They even know the houses of each taxpayer. If local people 
don’t come to the municipality, we will go out and visit them on site. Sometimes, 
local administrators helped us to communicate with their constituents. The local 
administrators can help encourage them to pay their tax; they also explain the 
impact of tax payments. For example, if people do not pay taxes, they won’t have 
good roads. We won’t have the budget to repair roads. We won’t have beautiful 
flowers and trees to decorate our local roads.” (Municipal official, interpersonal 
communication, August 25, 2016) 
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Central Development Support  
The political economic disruption and slowdown that usually follows the seizure 
of power by the military warrants the necessity of the national government to allocate 
more economic stimulus packages for local entities, especially state-led development 
projects. In times of national political crisis, the role of the national government 
increases. When the private sector is less active, the government can become more active, 
rebuilding and using that value. Most development projects and assistance grants at the 
local level are subsidized directly by the central government.  
The pattern of state-led development initiated by the current military government 
looked different from the development projects undertaken by the previous elected 
governments. The current military-installed government provided grants directly to local 
communities instead of local governments. This created an opportunity for development 
in local communities.  
In addition, state-led development projects helped boost economic activities and 
generated income for local citizens. For some infrastructure projects, local communities 
hired laborers from the local citizenry to take on projects such as roads, drainage systems, 
community halls, community waterworks, etc. These projects created jobs within the 
community, resulting in income for local citizens that they could spend in boosting the 
local economy. Having a vibrant local economy allows the local people to pay their taxes, 
thus improving the quality of public service delivery. The business sector can also expand 
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their investments. Eventually, local governments utilized those revenues to improve local 
service delivery. Regarding this point, participants explained that:    
“The current state-led development policy was designed and directed by the 
central government. They allocated the grant (about 200,000 to 500,000 THB) 
directly to local residents.” (Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 
25, 2016)  
 
“Currently, our economic status is gradually recovering because the military-
installed government has boosted the local economy through the provincial 
administration. Local people can earn income of about 300 THB per day. It took 
just two months. It [the state-led development project] helped stimulate local 
economies. Local people have money to spend in the market.” (Local resident, 
interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016)  
 
“The economic downturn, right? They [the military-installed government] tried to 
look for a strategy in order to generate money for grassroots people. They 
believed that after money was received by the local community and circulated 
within the local market, that 6-7 households would indirectly gain income from 
the central government. Eventually that money will be circulated and will flow 
within the markets.” (Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 25, 
2016)  
 
 It is important to emphasize that some local governments still have organizational 
strategies to recover and boost the local economy, even though those central interventions 
undermined their local autonomy. Some local governments maintain intergovernmental 
relationships and adapt themselves to changes in central politics and policies in order to 
attract state-led development into their local communities. As we will see in the next 
section, case performance analysis provides an explanation of how high- and low-
performance cases work with the opportunities resulting from the national political crisis.   
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Comparison of the High- and Low-Performance Cases in Dealing with the 
Opportunities Resulting from the National Political Crisis 
 
Case performance analysis provides an explanation of how the four selected cases 
are important in this study. This analytical approach is similar to the case performance 
analysis initially described in Chapter 4. However, the focal points of the analysis are 
different. For the high-performance cases, this analysis explores how characteristics of 
their performance gain advantages from these opportunities. Conversely, investigation of 
the low-performance cases shows their characteristics and their inability to take 
advantage of these opportunities. Comparing those characteristics helps answer the 
question concerning how each of the performance cases studied fared with respect to the 
others. 
In Table 5.6, the key findings are summarized in order to illustrate the 
characteristics of each group. Then, the analysis provides some explanation on the 
similarities and differences between high- and low-performance cases through each 
analytical dimension.   
   Table 5.6 Case Performance Analysis (Opportunities) 
Moderating 
Variables  
High Performance  
(What characteristics of 
high-performance cases 
gain advantage from this 
opportunity?)  
Low Performance  
(What characteristics of 
low-performance cases lead 
to the inability to gain from 
this opportunity?) 
Same/Different  
Political 
Institutions  
Same Characteristics  
 Improve local 
institutional capacity  
 Improve institutional 
performance  
Same Level but Different 
Characteristic  
Same Characteristics  
 Improve local 
institutional capacity  
 Improve institutional 
performance  
Same Level but Different 
Characteristic  
Same  
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 Increase institutional 
inputs from local voice  
 Increase institutional 
trust  
 Improve institutional 
facilitation  
 
Civic 
Engagement  
Same Characteristics  
 More reactive to 
feedback  
 Boost local 
voluntarism   
 Open public spaces for 
receiving local 
feedback  
 Increase transparent 
action 
 Enhance local trust  
Same Level but Different 
Characteristics  
 Enhance co-production 
between local 
government and 
citizens  
Same Characteristics 
 More reactive to 
feedback  
 Boost local voluntarism  
 Open public spaces for 
receiving local feedback 
 Increase transparent 
action  
 Enhance local trust  
 
Same  
Political 
Leadership  
Same Characteristics  
 Improve 
responsiveness 
 Enhance coordination 
across boundaries   
Same Characteristics  
 Improve 
Responsiveness  
 Enhance coordination 
across boundaries   
Same  
 
Governance  Same Characteristics  
 Collaborate across 
boundaries  
 Improve local 
decision-making 
autonomy  
 Enhance local-citizen 
collaboration  
 
 
Same Characteristics  
 Collaborate across 
boundaries  
 Improve local decision-
making autonomy  
 Improve responsiveness  
 Improve problem 
solving capacity  
Same Level but Different 
Characteristics  
 Improve local 
administrative behavior  
Same  
Political 
Economy  
Same Characteristics  
 Have proactive 
economic solutions  
 Inspire local 
entrepreneurship  
 Improve fiscal 
performance   
Same Characteristics but 
Different Characteristics 
 Inspire local awareness 
on tax collection   
Same 
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Table 5.6 provides an explanation of characteristics found in both high- and low-
performances cases. The prominent characteristics are identified and summarized through 
five analytical dimensions. The case performance analysis in this study can be explained 
as follows:    
Political Institutions. Even though the case performance analysis on institutional 
dimensions in Chapter 4 indicated different characteristics between high- and low-
performance cases in dealing with political threats, it is important to address the issue that 
both high- and low-performance cases were able to take advantage of opportunities 
generated by the political crisis. In this analysis, both groups showed the same 
characteristics.  
Since local governments gained a degree of freedom from the central government 
and the central ministries, local governments took this opportunity to improve local 
institutional capacity and performance. Citizens perceived that local governments played 
important roles as the political institutions and public service providers that are closest to 
them. In addition, this helped local governments to increase institutional trust and 
relationships with local citizens. This degree of freedom from central authority also made 
local governments more adaptive to changes in politics and policy. For example, Section 
44 often helped turn administrative constraints into administrative opportunities. Local 
governments took advantage of the military laws to solve complicated issues within local 
administration such as the patronage system and corruption within local personnel 
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management, suspension and removal of corrupted mayors, local councilors, and local 
officers.     
Furthermore, the analysis of the high-performance cases showed that the political 
crisis increased institutional inputs from local voices through national government offices 
called Damrongdharma Centers. These became positive inputs for policy-making 
processes and the improvement of public service provisions. The characteristics as 
explained above indicated that the low-performance cases were capable of taking 
advantage of an opportunity as much as were high-performance cases.    
Civic Engagement. Based on case performance analysis, high-performance and 
low-performance cases within the civic engagement dimension exhibited the same 
characteristics. Low-performance cases were able to take advantage of this opportunity as 
much as high-performance cases. Although the characteristics of civic engagement within 
local governments as discussed in Chapter 4 seemed to be beyond local government’s 
capacity to address political threats, the non-formal engagement and non-political 
activities helped local governments from both groups to be more responsive to citizen 
feedback. In addition, both groups were able to take advantage of these opportunities on 
the same level.  
 For the high-performance cases, political threats impeded civic engagement in 
local communities, especially political civic engagement. At the same time, these same 
threats triggered opportunities for local governments to boost local voluntarism through 
non-formal and non-political engagements, such as social, traditional, sporting, and 
 
193 
 
religious activities. Consequently, these activities became a starting point to enhance co-
production between local government and citizens. Local governments utilized these 
opportunities to open public spaces for local people to provide feedback and even work 
together. Moreover, when local people became more closely engaged with local 
governments, transparency and trust increased within local administrations.   
 The low-performance cases used this advantage to open public spaces for 
enabling citizens to voice their concerns, as did the high-performance cases noted above. 
Local residents felt more comfortable engaging with their municipal governments. In 
addition, local governments tended to value citizen voices as a legitimate source of input 
for improving services and local policies, while local people were eager to provide 
feedback to local governments.  
Political Leadership. Case performance analysis indicated that both high- and 
low-performance cases were similar in their ability to take advantage of the opportunities 
created by political crisis. It should be noted that the low-performance cases had as much 
capacity to take advantage of these opportunities as the high-performance cases. Both 
high- and low-performance cases appeared to be actively responsive to problems and 
concerns within the local community. When local governments did not have enough 
capacity to cope with certain problems, they used this opportunity to identify their true 
capacity to coordinate with other public organizations that were beyond their autonomous 
boundary. This coordination was a vital mechanism to help local governments resolve 
their problems.  
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Additionally, the uncertain political situation stimulated both groups to increase 
their capacity for dealing with emerging issues that arise in times of political crisis such 
as natural disasters, diseases, fire, and economic downturns. Moreover, it provided an 
opportunity for both groups to maintain their horizontal networks with all levels of local 
governments.  
Governance. All cases shared this characteristic. They were able to take 
advantage of the opportunities created from the political crisis to collaborate with 
multiple sectors across jurisdictional boundaries. They also exchanged resources with the 
upper levels of central government agencies. For example, the low-performance cases 
provided assistance grants to local governments to support a sports activity organized by 
the district—i.e. a provincial administrative agency. In addition, the low-performance 
cases shared the same level of performance but with different characteristics. For low-
performance cases, local government administrators used this opportunity to improve the 
behavior of local administrators. Local administrators and local officials should not be 
influenced by specific political advocacy or interest groups. Due to the new legal 
constraints, local governments are more cautious regarding local administration and 
decision-making.          
Political Economy. Case performance analysis indicated that both high- and low-
performance cases were capable of taking advantage of the opportunities created by the 
political crisis. Specifically, the economic downturn created an opportunity to inspire 
local government leaders to be more proactive with regard to economic solutions. For the 
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high-performance cases, local governments tried to help local people to improve business 
activities in order to boost local revenue. Local governments encouraged external 
business sectors to expand and invest in their local areas, such as bringing in department 
stores.  
In addition, local governments utilized this opportunity to improve fiscal 
performance by boosting self-collected revenues. The most efficient way that high-
performance cases employed was to improve the tax database and tax collection 
strategies. Local councilors and local officers helped each other communicate with local 
people and motivate them to pay their taxes. The low-performance cases were similar to 
the high-performance cases but with different characteristics. Specifically, the low 
performance cases took this opportunity to improve revenue collection by enhancing their 
local residents’ awareness of tax collection.     
Summary  
In conclusion, this chapter described the effects of Thailand’s post-2006 national 
political crisis and the resulting opportunities for local government service delivery. The 
key findings gained from the participants across four municipalities were presented 
through five moderating variables, as shown in “Graphical Representation of Findings: 
How National Political Crisis Creates Opportunities to Local Government Service 
Delivery” (see Appendix B).   
First, political institutional failure created particular opportunities for local 
government service delivery. To solve legal limitations and find the way out of political 
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gridlock, the military-installed government used Section 44 of the 2014 Interim 
Constitution to lessen some complicated administrative procedures. They also provided a 
fast-track channel through the office called Damrongdharma Centers in order to receive 
citizens’ complaints regarding public services directly from local citizens. In addition, 
political crisis encouraged local institutional capacity. Local governments used 
institutional connections to share resources and build collaboration for improving public 
services.  
Next, the national political crisis created opportunities for improving civic 
engagement at local level. Local residents felt comfortable with helping and working 
together with their local governments. This helped increase trust between local 
governments and their constituents. Due to local trust, residents were eager to participate 
in the council and town hall meetings and shared their thoughts regarding public service 
improvement and other local development issues. Meanwhile, local residents were 
comfortable in sharing their thoughts with local leaders and also working together with 
local governments in pursuit of increasing community building.  
Third, as a way to appease their own constituency, many local mayors acted more 
swiftly, thus emphasizing their leadership. Fourth, the national political crisis resulted in 
a decline of central mandates. Its effects mitigated the political tensions or even ended 
partisan gridlock in local communities. Moreover, the political crisis stimulated local 
responsiveness and intergovernmental collaboration in order to serve the needs of local 
residents and maintain quality of public services. Finally, from the political economy 
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point of view, the economic disruption that usually follows a seizure of power by the 
military warrants the necessity of the national government to allocate more economic 
stimulus packages to local entities. It was an opportunity for local governments to 
improve fiscal management. Importantly, the effects of national political crisis mediated 
by political economy directly affected local government service delivery performance.    
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Discussion   
 
Summary of Findings  
Thailand’s local government service delivery has had to confront challenges 
because of national political crises, especially a prolonged crisis that began in 2006. The 
effects of these crises led to institutional breakdown and economic decline (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016; Sussangkarn & Nikomborirak, 2016; United Nations, 2016). 
Conventional scholarship generally accepts that political crisis will, as a rule, create 
considerably more harm than good for local service delivery. Importantly, most literature 
on the effects of political crises found that political crises create negative impacts for 
local autonomy, civic capacity and engagement, local economy, and quality of local 
public service provision (Bland, 2011; Menkhaus, 2007; Muchadenyika, 2017; Musekiwa 
& Chantiza, 2015). Very few have shown positive effects, notably Börzel and Risse 
(2015). These previous studies did not highlight the important moderating variables 
(political institutions, civic engagement, political leadership, governance, and political 
economy) that are influential to local service delivery (Batonon, 2015; Curristine, Lonti, 
& Joumard, 2007; UNDP, 2016).  
To answer whether Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis affected local 
government service delivery, the data analyzed in this study were derived from primary 
sources that included semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions. 
Four municipalities located in Khon Kaen province were logically selected as the 
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research sites. The interviews were conducted with key informants (mayors, chairpersons 
of municipal councils, and municipal councilors) and focus group participants (heads of 
municipal departments, community leaders, and local residents). The interview data were 
transcribed and thematically analyzed, and some appropriate comments were selected and 
translated from Thai to English. These direct quotes were brought into the relevant 
theme.  
Political crises have generally been seen or assumed as having negative impacts 
on local service delivery, but this study shows that this depends on how it filters down to 
the local level through the five moderating variables. According to the analysis of data in 
this study, Thailand’s post-2006 national political turmoil created both threats and 
opportunities for local service delivery performance through these five moderating 
variables. The threats resulted in political institutional breakdown of local governments 
weakened electoral mechanisms and caused the suspension of local authority. Political 
fears and uncertainties reduced civic participation and weakened policy networks in local 
communities. In addition, political crises reduced autonomy and increased civil conflict 
and risks for local leaders. In addition, trust and communication between central and 
local governments were decreased, resulting in a reversal of decentralization and 
declining accountability. Also, hierarchical interactions in internal governance settings 
were increased. Moreover, political turmoil induced negative impacts for political 
economy. This caused local economic output declines, revenue declines within local 
business sectors, and personal and household financial weakening. 
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Conversely, political institutional breakdown enabled particular opportunities for 
local service delivery. To solve legal limitations and find ways out of political gridlock, 
the military-installed government used Section 44 of the 2014 Interim Constitution to 
lessen some complicated administrative procedures. The government also provided a 
fast-track channel called Damrongdharma Centers in order to receive citizens’ complaints 
regarding public services. Furthermore, the political crisis encouraged local institutional 
capacity, with local governments using institutional connections to share resources and 
build collaborations for improving public services. Local residents felt comfortable in 
engaging with their local governments, which helped to increase trust between local 
governments and their residents. This resulted in increased trust, residents were eager to 
participate in council and town hall meetings, and they were comfortable sharing their 
thoughts regarding public service improvement. This helped increase community 
building.  
Moreover, as a way to appease their own constituency, many local mayors acted 
more swiftly, thus accentuating their leadership abilities. These factors mitigated central 
mandates and political tensions and even ended partisan gridlock in local communities. 
Political crisis helped stimulate local responsiveness and intergovernmental collaboration 
in order to maintain the quality of public services. Crucially, it was an opportunity for 
local governments to improve fiscal management and boost local economic activities that 
helped enhance local fiscal capacity to provide effective service.   
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Discussion and Conclusion 
According to the findings of the study, the threats caused by the national political 
crisis in Thailand since 2006 are in accordance with conventional wisdom and in line 
with the literature addressed in this study. Crisis is generally seen as causing a negative 
effect on local government, while the opportunities gained from political crises have been 
under-recognized. Hence, this study sought to examine the opportunities embedded 
within national political crises.  
The findings challenge the notion of Kurlantzick (2011), who argues that political 
crisis caused government breakdown and undermined the development of democratic 
activities. Even though Thailand’s national political crisis did undermine democratic 
progress, there are some means by which local residents were able to provide feedback as 
information to the central government. For example, the Damrongdharma Centers 
provided an outlet for local people to send their complaints concerning local public 
services and social problems through to the central government and there were positive 
impacts on local institutional capacity through local partnerships. Moreover, this study 
found that the continuing political crisis following the 2014 military coup reduced the 
complicated approval processes due to the impacts of Section 44 of the 2014 interim 
Constitution.  
In addition, an issue of local institutional capacity found in this study is different 
from a case in Zimbabwe studied by Musekiwa and Chatiza (2015). Their study found 
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that in the midst of political crisis, local residents tried to establish citizen-led 
organizations in order to help local governments provide some types of public service 
when local authorities were incapable or had insufficient management capacity to address 
the requirements of local residents. In the case of Thailand, although political crisis 
triggered negative impacts to local government, local institutional capacity, especially 
resource sharing among local governments, remained functional.  
There were also some opportunities for civic engagement concealed within the 
political crises. Local government and citizens increasingly worked together in local 
affairs, especially in non-political activity. Residents trusted their local governments in 
terms of responsiveness and local service delivery more than national government. They 
were eager to be involved in formal policy decision-making processes organized by local 
governments. Local residents were not hesitant to express their views regarding public 
concerns and they attended public meetings and volunteering activities by overlooking 
differences in political belief, i.e. Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts.  
The findings in this study also differ from a study by Musekita and Chatiza 
(2015). Their study found that a political crisis created political unification between 
central and local government simply because, in the study they conducted, both the 
central and local governments were from the same party. While that seemed to be 
positive, it led to local governments not bothering with encouraging public participation 
in local activities.  
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Furthermore, the role of some mayors has been elevated after political 
institutional breakdown, while the role of national legislators and their influence on local 
leaders declined. Residents increasingly recognized the capacity of mayors who stayed 
close to them and successfully responded their needs. The mayors were more proactive to 
local concerns and problem solving. This finding supports the opinions of Fiedler (1996) 
and Wart (2003) that effective public leaders should have personal skills and capacity to 
serve the needs of citizens and to make decisions on service provision. Similarly, Boin 
and ‘t Hart (2003) demonstrated that leaders are elevated to be “heroes” once they 
successfully used their capacity and skills to cope with and diminish people’s concerns.            
Thailand’s political unrest allowed local governments to gain some degree of 
freedom from central mandates on local affairs because central government was 
overwhelmed with political conflict at the national level. These impacts reduced political 
pressures on local government and eased local civil conflicts. This helped local 
governments to provide local services more easily than in the past, while 
intergovernmental collaboration was improved. The current findings also contrast with a 
study conducted by Muchadenyika (2015). He found that prolonged political crisis in 
Zimbabwe induced central government interference in local affairs by bringing back 
some local services to central authority. However, the current findings do support the 
argument addressed by Börzel and Risse (2016), who argue that dysfunctional political 
institutions are not always bad thing for governance. The institutional breakdown 
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maintains the degree of governance at local level because local governments build trust 
within local communities by coordinating with other partnerships across boundaries.         
Finally, the effects of national political crises improved political economy. Some 
local governments were able to boost local revenues by encouraging economic activities 
and by enhancing the efficiency of revenue collection. State-led development projects 
were initially perceived as threats to local governments in terms of interference and 
recentralization, but they can be a vital source for enhancing local economy and 
improving local service delivery.  
There is also a conflict between the findings of this study and those of Menkhaus 
(2007) and Musekiwa and Chatiza (2015), who argue that government collapse due to 
political instability led to insufficient resources and fiscal restraints at local levels. In 
addition, Sussangkarn and Nikomborirak (2016) asserted that Thailand’s political crisis 
created negative impacts on the Thai economy as a whole and also triggered uncertainty 
for foreign investment. Their findings are similar to what this study found under the 
dimension of threats. Nevertheless, their work did not mention any opportunities 
concealed within political crisis.  
 In conclusion, this study found that through the five moderating variables, 
national political crisis in Thailand has had both positive and negative impacts on local 
government service delivery. The findings in this study deviate from the conventional 
wisdom that associates crisis only with threats while ignoring new opportunities.  
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Another interesting point discovered in this study is that threats and opportunities coexist 
side-by-side in both the cases of high-performing and low-performing local governments. 
This makes it more encouraging that, while political crisis usually is a cause for concern, 
there is also potential for rectification of existing problems. It is important, therefore, to 
highlight that one of the explanations for the existence of both threats and opportunities 
can be provided through the logic of action and reaction concept. Initially, national 
political turmoil would create threats that influence local service delivery as negative 
forces. These effects induce local governments to respond, as a reaction, to this crisis in 
order to maintain quality or effectiveness of public service delivery. This reaction is seen 
as a positive force or opportunity for maintaining or improving local service delivery.  
 With these findings, it is important to mention that with the qualitative research 
design, we cannot evaluate the statistical interaction among the five moderating variables.  
The uniformity of both threats and opportunities may be an artifact of the interaction of 
the five moderating variables. There was evidence, as mentioned before, that the 
suspension of political institutions affects political participation and civic engagement 
which is also related to autonomy of the leaders, collaboration, and ultimately political 
economy. At the outset, the author was able to observe the consequences of political 
institutions on other moderating variables. This is analogous to the existence of the 
problem of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in quantitative research.  
With this potential methodological query posing a challenge, the interpretation of the 
results in this study should be done with caution, and the results should be taken as a 
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preliminary.  In part, it is because the data used in this research were collected from 
individuals, which may entail subjective opinion, rather than objective performance 
indicators of local governments  
Implications  
It is of particular interest to ask whether the opportunities embedded in the 
political crises mentioned in Chapter 5 are specific to the current situation or can be 
maintained over time. Only time and future research can provide an answer. The long-
term implication is that if Thai local governments are not granted greater management 
autonomy when the country returns to more democratic principles and when there is no 
single person with the absolute power endowed by Section 44 to guide or shield the local 
government, the central bureaucratic power may relentlessly exert a strong influence on 
local governments again.  With that scenario, Thailand is again threatened by the 
prospect of highly centralized management.  
As Fry (2014) noted, crises often conceal particular opportunities, especially for 
political institutional rearrangement. In the optimistic implications of this study, a crisis 
may provide opportunities for institutional transformation towards decentralized 
governance. This could happen if local governments can unite in their interests under the 
bargaining power of the National Municipal League of Thailand. The League can help 
diverse local governments in developing and uniting them in promoting decentralization. 
In addition, when general elections are again permitted, local governments could even 
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propose and negotiate a policy mandate to all parties that commits to adopt 
decentralization as a high-priority policy agenda. This strategy may attract more interest 
among local voters. If the crisis does lead to this improvement, then over the long term 
the benefits will certainly outweigh the price paid.  In any event, whether it is a 
centralized or decentralized system, local governments cannot function without strong 
policy support from the central government. 
The results of this study also provide a basis for advancing or revising the concept 
of new public service under the stress of political crisis. As described earlier, crisis theory 
generally explains that crises normally have negative effects on local government service 
delivery. We found that some sorts of crises, such as political crises, are useful as 
opportunities for institutional rearrangement, improving the role of public leadership, 
opening a window of opportunity for policy or organizational change, and improving 
strategy for management of future crises.   
Policy Recommendations   
It is notable that while we see windows of opportunity for social transformation, 
we do not see any clear initiative by the NCPO to usher the country toward decentralized 
management. Based on the political history of Thailand and its experience with 19 coups, 
all had the hidden agenda of protecting the interests of the bureaucracy and the ruling 
elites. Although all coups cited the public interest as a justification for staging the coup, 
no coup endowed more self-governing power to people. In all likelihood, the next general 
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election will be the beginning of a new political crisis. The sustainable solution to 
avoiding political crises in Thailand lies in granting more management autonomy to local 
government through fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization, and political 
decentralization. At present, the powers in Thailand do not seem be interested in any of 
these.  
Limitations 
This study encompasses two major uncertainties, a data validity problem and a 
reliability problem. The data validity problem arises in that some questions may be raised 
whether the municipalities are representative of Khon Kaen province, and whether the 
interviewees were honest in their answers or personal experiences or did political 
perception discourage them in giving direct answers. In addition, this study used specific 
cases for data collection and purposively recruited the interview participants by setting 
the criteria that were influenced and set by the researcher. The opinions they provided 
during the interviews were based on their personal experiences and perceptions. Both the 
research sites and interview participants were considered as non-representative. This 
could lead to influence by the researcher and biased data. 
Regarding reliability, the confidence of any researcher in the social science field 
is somewhat limited by the concern over whether data is reliable over time or if it is 
unique to a very narrow period, in this case 2016. While the pattern of this particular 
political crisis seems to be the same and will continue to be in this form, the nature and 
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patterns of the political situation in Thailand 10 years from now might have changed. 
When the situation changes, it affects people's perceptions. If this study had been 
conducted in 2010 or in 2012, we may have produced a very different result. The concern 
here is that the reliability of data collected in this study may be affected by effects 
associated with the time and place when this research was conducted. It is important, 
therefore, to note that time and the environment of the interviews may have influenced 
the reliability. In the context of this study, the ongoing national political crisis may have 
created apprehension among the participants about military investigation because the 
research topic under study is related to politics and government performance. As a result, 
the participants might have felt reluctant to be completely honest or open in discussing 
issues related to the current political crisis in Thailand.   
Future Research 
 As the results from this study are preliminary, future research is recommended. 
The scope of the future research could be broadened to test the sustainability of 
opportunity as well as to ensure a representative study population. An additional area of 
research would be to focus on a better understanding of the impact of political crisis on 
the cultural and behavioral aspects of society at large. Moreover, this research could be 
conducted as a comparative case study using different regions in Thailand.  
 As a follow-up to this work, there are several tasks that should be carried out. For 
example, based on inductive approach the author will develop an article to submit to a 
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peer-reviewed journal. The paper will present an analytical framework to test the impact 
of political crisis on local government service delivery. In short, the author is arguing 
against the common belief that political crisis always undermines or disrupts the service 
delivery system. The general framework will argue that when we want to assess the 
impact of political crisis we need to look at both the negative and positive sides‒ threats 
and opportunities. The working title of this article is, “Political Crisis and Local Service 
Delivery: A Framework for Analysis.”  
Additionally, the author proposes that, when the political situation returns to 
normal, or at least after the next general election, research should be conducted to 
evaluate the sustainability of the opportunities revealed in this study. Moreover, this 
research should be carried out using a more representative sample of the population of 
Khon Kaen Province, or even drawing on a representative sample of other provinces in 
northeastern Thailand. In addition, this future study should investigate the scoped 
conditions before 2006 to see how political crisis created negative or positive events in 
that period of time. This research should add more understanding about the history of 
political crisis and its course for the future.  This study should provide a better 
understanding of the impact of national political crisis on cultural and behavioral aspects 
in Thai society.  
Finally, the author is looking for an opportunity to conduct a comparative case 
study, comparing Thailand with other countries that have prolonged national political 
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crisis and military interventions such as Turkey or some countries in Africa, using the 
framework developed in this study.   
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Appendix A 
Graphical Representation of Findings: How National Political Crisis Creates Threats to 
Local Government Service Delivery 
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Appendix B 
Graphical Representation of Findings: How National Political Crisis Creates 
Opportunities to Local Government Service Delivery 
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Appendix C 
Interview Guide  
A: Face-to Face, In-depth Interview Guide  
 
Part I: Introduction 
 Introduce myself, educational background, and research objective. 
 Introduction of key informant, position, and job responsibilities.  
 Explain informed consent, ask them to sign the form, and ask for a permission 
to record the interview.     
 
Part II: Questions regarding general information and political and administrative 
background of the participant [10 minutes]   
 “Please tell me about your administrative and political experience.”  
 “How long have you serve in this position?”  
 “What are your political and administrative experiences since 2006?”  
 
Part III: Questions regarding the effects of national political crises, mediated by five 
mechanisms, on local government service delivery [30 minutes]  
Questions regarding political institutions:   
 “Could you please describe to me the relationship and influence of political 
institutions (e.g. constitution, laws, election, and political parties) and your 
local government and local community since 2006?” 
 “How do you see political crisis in Thailand since 2006 (change in national 
politics and national policies) affecting local government service delivery and 
your local community? Any example? Can you tell me the reasons why?” 
Questions regarding civic engagement: 
 Could you share with me about civic engagement in your local government 
and your local community since 2006? 
 How do you see Thailand’s post-2006 political turmoil affects civic 
engagement, thus resulting effective or ineffective local service delivery? Any 
example? Can you tell me the reasons why?  
Questions regarding political leadership:  
 Can you share with me your thoughts about how the mayor and local officers 
responded to the national political crisis in order to maintain local service 
delivery? 
 How do you see Thailand’s post-2006 national political crises affecting local 
political leadership in your local government and community? Any example?  
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Questions regarding governance: 
 “Please talk about your perceptions about current governing process of local 
government and how does local government build collaboration and network 
in the midst of crisis in order to maintain quality of public service.”  
 “How do you see the national political crisis since 2006 affecting 
collaboration and intergovernmental relationship within your local 
governments? Any example? Can you tell me the reasons why?”  
Questions regarding political economy: 
 “Can you share with me your thoughts on the economic status of your local 
community since 2006?” How about   
 “How do you see the ongoing national political crisis becoming a factor that 
may impact economy in your local community? And how its effects induce 
effective or ineffective of local service delivery? Any examples? Can you tell 
me the reasons why?”  
 
Part IV: Wrap up [10] 
 “Could you please tell me any points we have not discussed that you think are 
important?”  
 “Thank you for participating this interview.”  
 Check the audio recorder and verify the completed consent form.  
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B: Focus Group Discussion Guide [Heads of Municipal Department]  
 
Part I: Introduction 
 Introduce myself, educational background, and research objective. 
 Introduction of participants, positions, and job responsibilities.  
 Explain informed consent, ask them to sign the form, and ask for a permission 
to record the interview.     
 
Part II: Discussions  
 
1. [5 minutes] You play an important role in local government as the 
government officials. The political crisis since 2006 that has occurred at the 
national level might affect your organization and local public service 
delivery. So, I would like to hear some stories that you perceived from the 
media and the actual situation.  
 
 We will start sharing about the general issues regarding the crisis, however 
if you can specify the issue that is related to local government and you 
frequently hear or watch the news from the medias. I provide you a card; 
you can write those issues down on that card. After that I will allow each 
of you to share your story.      
  
1a. [5 minutes] Have you followed the national political crisis? Let’s share 
your stories.  
 
2. [10 minutes] This is a good start. We learn from the stories that you share, 
especially the issues that impact local government administration and local 
public service delivery. Let’s talk more about the effect of prolonged national 
political crisis on local public service delivery through process of local 
governance since 2006. Do you think the crisis affects the structure, function, 
six major duties of local government? Please specify the occurrences during 
2006-present. 
 
 Please feel free to share your thoughts. You may talk about the structure 
first and then talk about the function later. Feel free to share as much as 
you can, especially the issues that have had a direct impact on your local 
government and your responsibilities.   
 
2a. [10 minutes] Do you see yourself as key player in the local government 
operation. During the prolonged political crisis, do you think local 
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government can provide continue to provide the services during the midst of 
the crisis? Why or why not?  
 
2b. [5 minutes] I would like to know the impact of the crisis on your duties. 
Do you think your duties are affected from the crisis? How?  
 
2c. [10 minutes] there are several governing factors that can be affected by 
the crisis, for example, political institutions, leadership, civic engagement, 
collaboration and network, and fiscal management. Do you think the 
political crisis at the national level impacts these governing factors? Do you 
think these governing factors affect local public service delivery and how?        
 
2d. [5 minutes] Do you think the political crisis is considered a positive or 
negative influence on local government management and public service 
delivery? Why?  
 
3. [5 minutes] Crisis management strategy is also a governing tool in the 
modern organization. How does local government respond crisis?  
 Let’s share your experience about the crisis management strategies that 
you employ to deal with the political crisis. You can also mention about its 
outcome and the way to improve that strategy.  
4. [5 minutes] In ending, could you please tell me any points we have not 
discussed that you think are important. Take a moment and I would like to 
hear from each of you by going around the table.     
 
 Thank you for participating this focus group interview.  
 Check the audio recorder and consent form  
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C: Focus Group Discussion Guide [Local Resident and Community Leader] 
 
Part I: Introduction 
 The moderator commences an interview by introducing name, background, 
and research objective, and then allows each participant to introduce selves by 
first name, position, and role in community.   
 Explain the informed consent to the participants and ask them to sign the 
form.    
 
Part II: Discussions  
 
1. [5 minutes] You play an important role as the stakeholders in local 
government, the political crisis that currently occurs at the national level 
since 2006 might affect your everyday life and public service delivery from 
local government. So, I would like to hear some stories that you perceived 
from the media and the actual situation.  
 
 We will start sharing about the general issues regarding the crisis, however 
if you can specify the issue that is related to your own experience on local 
government and you frequently hear or watch the news from the medias. I 
provide you a card, you can write those issues down on that card. After 
that I will allow each of you to share your story.      
  
1a. [5 minutes] Do you follow the national political crisis? Let’s share about 
your story.  
 
2. [10 minutes] This is a good start. We learn from the stories that you share, 
especially the issues that impact your community and local public service 
delivery. Do you think the political crisis affects your community and local 
public services? Please specify the occurrences during 2006-present.  
 
 Please feel free to share your experiences. Feel free to share as much as 
you can, especially the issue that has a direct impact on your community 
and local public service delivery.   
 
2a. [10 minutes] You are the key stakeholders in local government. During 
the prolonged crisis, do you think local government can provide you the 
services as usual during the midst of the crisis? Why?  
 
2b. [5 minutes] There are several governing factors that can be affected by 
the crisis, for example, leadership, public engagement, and network. Do you 
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think during the national political crisis the local government has a crisis in 
these factors?       
 
2c. [10 minutes] Do you think the political crisis is considered a positive or 
negative effect on local governance and your community? Why?  
 
3. [10 minutes] I think the crisis management strategy is also the governing tool 
in modern organization. I would like to hear from you that do you know how 
local government responds the crisis? And how does your community involve 
in the crisis management process?    
 Let’s share your experience about the crisis management strategies that 
you see the local government use them to deal with the political crisis. 
 You can also mention about its outcome and the way to improve that 
strategy. I also would like to know the level of involvement in crisis 
management process.   
5. [5 minutes] In ending, could you please tell me any points we have not 
discussed that you think are important. Take a moment and I would like to 
hear from each of you by going around the table.     
 
 Thank you for participating this focus group interview.  
 Check the audio recorder and consent form  
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Appendix D 
Interview Guide [In Thai]  
ค ำถำมสัมภำษณ์เดีย่วเชิงลกึ 
ส่วนที ่1: บทน ำ 
 ผมเร่ิมตน้การสมัภาษณ์ดว้ยการแนะน าขอ้มูลของตนเองท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการศึกษา เป้าหมายการวจิยั และ
หลงัจากนั้นก็เปิดโอกาสใหผู้ใ้หส้มัภาษณ์ไดแ้นะน าตวัเองและต าแหน่งหนา้ท่ีรับผดิชอบในทอ้งถ่ิน  
 อธิบายขอ้มูลเก่ียวกบัการกรอกแบบฟอร์มยนิยอมใหส้มัภาษณ์และแจง้ผูใ้หส้มัภาษณ์ลงนามใน
แบบฟอร์มนั้นหากยนิดีร่วมการสมัภาษณ์ นอกจากนั้นขออนุญาตบนัทึกเสียงขณะสมัภาษณ์  
ส่วนที ่2: ข้อมูลทัว่ไปและข้อมูลเกีย่วกบัประสบกำรณ์ทำงกำรเมืองและกำรบริหำรองค์กรปกครองส่วนท้องถิน่ (10 
นำท)ี   
 อยากใหท่้านไดโ้ปรดเล่าถึงประสบการณ์การท างานดา้นการเมืองและการบริหารทอ้งถ่ินครับ  
 ท่านไดท้ างานในต าแหน่งน้ีนานเท่าไหร่แลว้ครับ 
 ท่านมีประสบการณ์การเมืองและการบริหารทอ้งถ่ินนบัตั้งแตปี่ 2549 เป็นอยา่งไรบา้งครับ  
ส่วนที ่3: ผลของสภำวะวกิฤตกิำรเมืองที่ส่งผลต่อปัจจยัแทรกซ้อน 5 ประกำรทีม่ผีลต่อสัมฤทธิผลกำรบริกำร
สำธำรณะขององค์กรปกครองส่วนท้องถิน่ (30 นำท)ี  
สถำบันกำรเมือง:   
 ขอใหท่้านเล่าถึงความสมัพนัธ์และอิทธิพลของสถาบนัทางการเมือง อาทิ รัฐธรรมนูญ กฎหมาย การ
เลือกตั้ง และพรรคการเมือง นบัตั้งแต่ปี 2549 ท่ีมีต่อองคก์รปกครองทอ้งถ่ินของท่านและต่อชุมชนของ
ท่าน  
 ท่านมองวกิฤติการเมืองไทยตั้งแต่ปี 2549 (การเปล่ียนแปลงทางการเมืองและนโยบายระดบัชาติ) ส่งผล
กระทบต่อการบริการสาธารณะขององคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ินและต่อชุมชนทอ้งถ่ินของท่านอยา่งไร
บา้ง ยกตวัอยา่งประกอบไดไ้หมครับ และท่านช่วยใหเ้หตุผลไดไ้หมครับวา่ท าไมถึงเป็นเช่นนั้น  
กำรมส่ีวนร่วมของภำคประชำชน: 
 อยากใหท่้านไดเ้ล่าถึงสภาวะการมีส่วนร่วมของภาคประชาชนในการด าเนินงานของทอ้งถ่ินและการ
บริการสาธารณะ นบัตั้งแต่เกิดวกิฤติการเมือง 2549  
 ท่านคิดวา่วกิฤติการเมือง 2549 จวบจนถึงปัจจุบนัส่งผลต่อการมีส่วนร่วมของภาคประชาชนอยา่งไร
บา้ง และผลดงักล่าวส่งผลต่อการมีประสิทธิภาพหรือไม่มีประสิทธิภาพในการบริการสาธาณะของ
ทอ้งถ่ินอยา่งไรบา้ง ช่วยยกตวัอยา่งไดไ้หมครับ และช่วยบอกไดไ้หมครับวา่ดว้ยเหตใุดจึงเป็นเช่นนั้น  
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ภำวะผู้น ำทำงกำรเมือง:  
 อยากใหท่้านช่วยเล่าถึงความคิดเห็นของท่านเก่ียวกบัวา่ นายกเทศมนตรีและบุคลากรทอ้งถ่ิน 
ตอบสนองหรือรับมือกบัวกิฤติการเมืองอยา่งไร เพ่ือท่ีจะรักษาและยงัคงการใหบ้ริการสาธารณะไว้
ดงัเดิม 
 ท่านคิดวา่วกิฤติการเมืองนบัแตปี่ 2549 ถึงปัจจุบนัส่งผลต่อภาวะผูน้ าทางการเมืองในทอ้งถ่ินและชุมชน
ของท่านอยา่งไร ลองยกตวัอยา่งใหฟั้งไดไ้หมครับ  
กำรบริหำรท้องถิน่: 
 ท่านช่วยเล่าไดไ้หมครับวา่สภาวะการบริหารของทอ้งถ่ินท่านปัจจุบนัเป็นอยา่งไรบา้ง และท่านไดส้ร้าง
การประสานงานร่วมหรือสร้างเครือข่ายเพ่ือท่ีจะช่วยรักษาและคงไวซ่ึ้งการบริการสาธารณะในทอ้งถ่ิน
ของท่านนบัตั้งแต่เกิดวกิฤติการเมือง อยา่งไรบา้ง 
 ท่านคิดวา่วกิฤติการเมืองตั้งแต่ปี 2549 ส่งผลต่อความสมัพนัธ์ภายในโครงสร้างรัฐกบัทอ้งถ่ินของท่าน
อยา่งไรบา้ง พอจะเล่าตวัอยา่งไหมครับ ท่านคิดวา่ท าไมถึงเกิดแบบนั้นข้ึนครับ  
เศรษฐศำสตร์กำรเมือง: 
 ท่านช่วยเล่าไดใ้หฟั้งไดไ้หมครับวา่ ท่านเห็นสภาพเศรษฐกิจในชุมชนทอ้งถ่ินของท่านเป็นอยา่งไรบา้ง
นบัแต่วกิฤติการเมือง 25549 จวบถึงปัจจุบนั  
 ท่านคิดวา่วกิฤติการเมืองท่ีก าลงัเกิดอยูข่ณะน้ีสามารถเป็นปัจจยัท่ีจะส่งผลต่อเศรษฐกิจในชุมชนทอ้งถ่ิน
ของท่านไดอ้ยา่งไร และผลกระทบท่ีเกิดข้ึนจะส่งผลต่อประสิทธิภาพหรือความไม่มีประสิทธิภาพใน
การบริการสาธารณะของทอ้งถ่ินอยา่งไร ลองยกตวัอยา่ง และบอกเหตผุลไดไ้หมครับวา่ท าไมจึงเป็น
เช่นนั้น  
ส่วนที ่4: สรุปปิดท้ำยกำรสัมภำษณ์ (10 นำท)ี 
 ท่านพอจะมีประเด็นอะไรอ่ืนๆ อีกไหมครับท่ีท่านอยากจะแลกเปล่ียนหรือประเดน็ท่ีผมไมไ้ดก้ล่าวถึง
ในคร้ังน้ี ซ่ึงท่านเห็นวา่มีความส าคญั 
 ขอบพระคุณท่านมากนะครับส าหรับการใหส้มัภาษณ์ 
 ตรวจสอบความเรียบร้อยของการบนัทึกเสียงและการกรอกแบบฟอร์มยนิยอมใหส้มัภาษณ์  
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ค ำถำมสัมภำษณ์กำรประชุมกลุ่ม ส ำหรับผู้อ ำนวยกำรกองและหัวหน้ำส่วนงำนในเทศบำล 
ส่วนที ่1: บทน ำ 
 ผมเร่ิมตน้การสมัภาษณ์ดว้ยการแนะน าขอ้มูลของตนเองท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการศึกษา เป้าหมายการวจิยั และ
หลงัจากนั้นก็เปิดโอกาสใหผู้ใ้หส้มัภาษณ์ไดแ้นะน าตวัเองและต าแหน่งหนา้ท่ีรับผดิชอบในทอ้งถ่ิน  
 อธิบายขอ้มูลเก่ียวกบัการกรอกแบบฟอร์มยนิยอมใหส้มัภาษณ์และแจง้ผูใ้หส้มัภาษณ์ลงนามใน
แบบฟอร์มนั้นหากยนิดีร่วมการสมัภาษณ์ นอกจากนั้นขออนุญาตบนัทึกเสียงขณะสมัภาษณ์  
ส่วนที ่2: ค ำถำมสัมภำษณ์   
1. ท่านในฐานะท่ีเป็นขา้ราชการทอ้งถ่ิน ท่านมีบทบาทส าคญัในองคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ิน ซ่ึงผมคิดวา่วกิฤติ
การเมืองท่ีเกิดข้ึนในระดบัชาติลากยาวมาตั้งแต่ปี 2549 อาจจะส่งผลกระทบต่อหน่วยงานของท่านรวมถึง
หนา้ท่ีของท่านดว้ย โดยเฉพาะท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการใหบ้ริการสาธารณะ ดงันั้นผมอยากจะฟังเร่ืองราวต่างๆท่ี
เกิดข้ึนเก่ียวกบัวกิฤติการเมืองไทยและผลกระทบทีเกิดข้ึน ท่ีท่านอาจจะไดรั้บขอ้มูลจากส่ือต่างๆ หรือท่าน
อาจจะประสบดว้ยตนเอง  (5 นาที)  
เราจะเร่ิมการสนทนาโดยใหทุ้กท่านไดแ้ลกเปล่ียนความเห็นเก่ียวกบัสภาวะวกิฤติการเมือง และ
หากท่านสามารถระบุประเดน็ท่ีมีส่วนเก่ียวพนักบัองคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ิน ท่ีท่านเคยไดรั้บรู้มาจาก
แหล่งต่างๆ ไม่วา่จะเป็นจากข่าวหรือส่ือต่างๆ ผมจะแจกแผน่กระดาษโพสอิทใหทุ้กท่านไดเ้ขียนประเด็นท่ี
ท่านรับรู้เก่ียวกบัภาวะวกิฤติการเมืองในทศันะของท่าน ลงในกระดาษ และหลงัจากนั้นผมจะใหแ้ตล่ะท่าน
ไดร่้วมแลกเปล่ียนความเห็น   
1a. ท่านไดติ้ดตามข่าวเก่ียวกบัวฤิติการเมืองไทยบา้งไหมครับ เรามาแลกเปล่ียนกนัในประเด็นน้ี
กนันะครับ (5 นาที)  
2. น่ีเป็นการเร่ิมตน้การสนทนาท่ีดีมากเลยนะครับ พวกเราไดเ้รียนรู้จากเร่ืองราวท่ีเกิดข้ึนท่ีทุกท่านไดร่้วม
แลกเปล่ียน โดยเฉพาะเร่ืองการบริหารงานทอ้งถ่ินและการใหบ้ริการสาธารณะ ต่อไปเรามาคุยลงลึกถึง
ผลกระทบของภาวะวกิฤติการเมืองระดบัชาติท่ีส่งผลต่อการบริการสาธารณะของทอ้งถ่ินกนันะครับ ท่านคิด
วา่วกิฤติการเมืองท่ีเกิดข้ึน ส่งผลกระทบต่อโครงสร้าง การบริหาร และหนา้ท่ีหลกัของทอ้งถ่ินทั้ง 6 ประการ
ไหมครับ อยากใหท่้านไดร้ะบุเป็นชดัๆท่ีเกิดข้ึนในหว้งตั้งแต่ปี 2549 ถึงปัจจุบนัครับ (10 นาที)   
ท่านสามารถแลกเปล่ียนประเดน็ท่ีท่านอยากน าเสนอไดต้ามสะดวกเลยนะครับ ท่านอาจจะพดูถึง
ประเด็นโครงสร้างก่อนหรือการบริหาร หรือหนา้ท่ี ก่อนก็ไดค้รับ รบกวนทุกท่านแลกเปล่ียนและน าเสนอ
ใหไ้ดม้ากท่ีสุดเท่าท่ีท่านตอ้งการครับนะครับ โดยผมเนน้ประเด็นท่ีส่งผลกระทบโดยตรงต่อความรับชอบ
การบริการสาธารณะของทอ้งถ่ิน  
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2a. ท่านเป็นกลไกท่ีส าคญัมากในการบริหารทอ้งถ่ิน ในช่วงท่ีเกิดวกิฤติการเมืองระดบัชาติ ท่าน
คิดวา่ทอ้งถ่ินยงัคงสามารถใหบ้ริการสาธารณะไดเ้ช่นเดิมไหม ท าไมเป็นเช่นนั้นครับ (10 นาที)   
2b. ผมอยากทราบวา่วกิฤติการเมืองส่งผลต่อหนา้ท่ีของท่านในการบริการสาธารณะและของ
ทอ้งถ่ินอยา่งไรบา้ง ท่านคิดวา่หนา้ท่ีของท่านไดรั้บผลกระทบบา้งไหม มีผลอยา่งไรบา้ง (5 นาที)   
2c. มีหลายปัจจยัทางการบริหารท่ีอาจจะไดรั้บผลกระทบจากวกิฤติการเมืองท่ีลากยาว เช่น 
สถาบนัการเมือง ภาวะผูน้ า การมีส่วนร่วมของภาคประชาชน การประสานความร่วมมือและเครือขา่ย การ
บริหารการเงินการคลงั ตลอดจนสภาพเศรษฐกิจ ท่านคิดวา่วกิฤติการเมืองระดบัชาติส่งผลต่อปัจจยัแทรก
ซอ้นเหล่าน้ีไหม และทา้ยสุดปัจจยัเหล่าน้ีท่ีไดรั้บผลกระทบจะส่งกระทบต่อเน่ืองไปยงัการใหบ้ริการ
สาธารณะของทอ้งถ่ินหรือไม่ อยา่งไร (10 นาที)   
2d. ท่านคิดวา่วกิฤติการเมืองระดบัชาติจะส่งผลทางบวกหรือทางลบต่อการบริหารทอ้งถ่ินและต่อ
การบริการสาธารณะของทอ้งถ่ินไหม ท าไมท่านคิดเช่นนั้น (5 นาที) 
        3.    ผมคิดวา่การจดัการในสภาวะวกิฤติเป็นกลยทุธ์ท่ีส าคญัในการบริหารองคก์รสมยัใหม่ ผมอยากใหท่้าน 
ไดเ้ล่าไดไ้หมครับวา่ เทศบาลของท่านไดจ้ดัการรองรับผลกระทบอนัเกิดจากวกิฤติการเมืองอนัลากยาวคร้ัง
น้ี อยา่งไรบา้ง (5 นาที) 
ช่วยแลกเปล่ียนประสบการณ์ของท่านไดเ้ลยนะครับ โดยเฉพาะเก่ียวกบัการบริหารองคก์รใน
สภาวะวกิฤติการเมืองและกลยทุธ์การบริหารต่างๆ ท่ีท่านน ามาใชใ้นการรองรับภาวะวกิฤติการเมืองท่าน
สามารถพดูถึงผลลพัธ์ของการใชก้ลยทุธ์นั้นๆดว้ยนะครับ รวมถึงวธีิการปรับปรุงในอนาคต  
        4.  เรามาถึงช่วงสุดทา้ยของการสนทนากลุ่มแลว้นะครับ ท่านสามารถยกประเดน็ท่ีเราอาจจะไม่ไดส้นทนา 
กนัและท่านเห็นวา่มีความส าคญัและเป็นประโยชน์ไดน้ะครับ โดยผมจะใหเ้วลาท่านทบทวนสกัครู่หน่ึงนะ
ครับ และผมอยากใหทุ้กท่านไดก้ล่าวสรุปสั้นๆ เป็นรายบุคคลรอบโตะ๊นะครับ (5 นาที)  
 
ผมขอขอบพระคุณทุกท่านมากๆนะครับ ส าหรับการร่วมสนทนากลุ่มในคร้ังน้ี  
หลงัจากนั้นตรวจสอบความเรียบร้อยของแบบฟอร์มการยนิยอมใหส้มัภาษณ์และการบนัทึกเสียง 
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ค ำถำมสัมภำษณ์กำรประชุมกลุ่ม ส ำหรับผู้น ำชุมชน และ ประชำชนทัว่ไป  
ส่วนที ่1: บทน ำ 
 ผมเร่ิมตน้การสมัภาษณ์ดว้ยการแนะน าขอ้มูลของตนเองท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการศึกษา เป้าหมายการวจิยั และ
หลงัจากนั้นก็เปิดโอกาสใหผู้ใ้หส้มัภาษณ์ไดแ้นะน าตวัเอง โดยระบุช่ือนามสกลุ และบทบาทหนา้ท่ีใน
ชุมชนทอ้งถ่ิน   
 อธิบายขอ้มูลเก่ียวกบัการกรอกแบบฟอร์มยนิยอมใหส้มัภาษณ์และแจง้ผูใ้หส้มัภาษณ์ลงนามใน
แบบฟอร์มนั้นหากยนิดีร่วมการสมัภาษณ์ นอกจากนั้นขออนุญาตบนัทึกเสียงขณะสมัภาษณ์  
ส่วนที ่2: ค ำถำมสัมภำษณ์  
1. ท่านในฐานะท่ีมีบทบาทในฐานะประชาชนท่ีเป็นหุน้ส่วนส าคญัในองคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ิน ซ่ึงผมคิดวา่
วกิฤติการเมืองท่ีเกิดข้ึนในระดบัชาติลากยาวมาตั้งแต่ปี 2549 อาจจะส่งผลกระทบต่อการด ารงชีวติของท่าน
โดยเฉพาะท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการบริการสาธารณะของทอ้งถ่ิน ดงันั้นผมอยากจะฟังเร่ืองราวต่างๆท่ีเกิดข้ึน
เก่ียวกบัวกิฤติการเมืองไทยและผลกระทบทีเกิดข้ึน ท่ีท่านอาจจะไดรั้บขอ้มูลจากส่ือต่างๆ หรือท่านอาจจะ
ประสบดว้ยตนเอง  (5 นาที)  
เราจะเร่ิมการสนทนาโดยใหทุ้กท่านไดแ้ลกเปล่ียนความเห็นเก่ียวกบัสภาวะวกิฤติการเมือง และ
หากท่านสามารถระบุประเดน็ท่ีมีส่วนเก่ียวพนักบัองคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ิน ท่ีท่านเคยไดรั้บรู้มาจาก
แหล่งต่างๆ ไม่วา่จะเป็นจากข่าวหรือส่ือต่างๆ ผมจะแจกแผน่กระดาษโพสอิทใหทุ้กท่านไดเ้ขียนประเด็นท่ี
ท่านรับรู้เก่ียวกบัภาวะวกิฤติการเมืองในทศันะของท่าน ลงในกระดาษ และหลงัจากนั้นผมจะใหแ้ตล่ะท่าน
ไดร่้วมแลกเปล่ียนความเห็น   
1a. ท่านไดติ้ดตามข่าวเก่ียวกบัวฤิติการเมืองไทยบา้งไหมครับ เรามาแลกเปล่ียนกนัในประเด็นน้ี
กนันะครับ (5 นาที)  
         2.  น่ีเป็นการเร่ิมตน้การสนทนาท่ีดีมากเลยนะครับ พวกเราไดเ้รียนรู้จากเร่ืองราวท่ีเกิดข้ึนท่ีทุกท่านไดร่้วม
แลกเปล่ียน โดยเฉพาะเร่ืองผลกระทบท่ีเกิดกบัตวัท่านและชุมชนของท่าน ต่อไปเรามาคุยลงลึกถึงผลกระทบ
ของภาวะวกิฤติการเมืองระดบัชาติท่ีส่งผลต่อการบริการสาธารณะของทอ้งถ่ินกนันะครับ ท่านคิดวา่วกิฤติ
การเมืองท่ีเกิดข้ึน ส่งผลกระทบตอ่หนา้ท่ีหลกัของทอ้งถ่ินทั้ง 6 ประการในการใหบ้ริการสาธารณะแก่พวก
ท่านไหมครับ อยากใหท่้านไดร้ะบุเป็นชดัๆท่ีเกิดข้ึนในหว้งตั้งแตปี่ 2549 ถึงปัจจุบนัครับ (10 นาที)   
ท่านสามารถแลกเปล่ียนประเดน็ท่ีท่านอยากน าเสนอไดต้ามสะดวกเลยนะครับ ท่านอาจจะพดูถึง
ประเด็นใดก่อนก็ได ้รบกวนทุกท่านแลกเปล่ียนและน าเสนอใหไ้ดม้ากท่ีสุดเท่าท่ีท่านตอ้งการครับนะครับ 
โดยผมเนน้ประเดน็ท่ีส่งผลกระทบโดยตรงต่อชุมชนทอ้งถ่ินและตอ่การบริการสาธารณะท่ีท่านไดรั้บ   
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2a. ท่านเป็นหุน้ส่วนท่ีส าคญัมากในองคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ิน ในช่วงท่ีเกิดวกิฤติการเมือง
ระดบัชาติ ท่านคิดวา่ทอ้งถ่ินยงัคงสามารถใหบ้ริการสาธารณะแก่ชุมชนของท่านไดเ้ช่นเดิมไหม ท าไมถึงคิด
วา่เป็นเช่นนั้นครับ ลองยกตวัอยา่งไดไ้หมครับ (10 นาที)   
2b. มีหลายปัจจยัทางการบริหารทอ้งถ่ินท่ีอาจจะไดรั้บผลกระทบจากวกิฤติการเมืองท่ีลากยาว เช่น 
สถาบนัการเมือง ภาวะผูน้ า การมีส่วนร่วมของภาคประชาชน การประสานความร่วมมือและเครือขา่ย การ
บริหารการเงินการคลงั ตลอดจนสภาพเศรษฐกิจในทอ้งถ่ิน ท่านคิดวา่วกิฤติการเมืองระดบัชาติส่งผลต่อ
ปัจจยัแทรกซอ้นเหล่าน้ีไหม และทา้ยสุดปัจจยัเหล่าน้ีท่ีไดรั้บผลกระทบจะส่งกระทบต่อเน่ืองไปยงัการ
ใหบ้ริการสาธารณะของทอ้งถ่ินหรือไม่ อยา่งไร (10 นาที)   
2c. ท่านคิดวา่วกิฤติการเมืองระดบัชาติจะส่งผลทางบวกหรือทางลบต่อการบริหารทอ้งถ่ินและต่อ
การบริการสาธารณะของทอ้งถ่ินไหม ท าไมท่านคิดเช่นนั้น (10 นาที) 
            3. ผมคิดวา่การจดัการในสภาวะวกิฤติเป็นกลยทุธ์ท่ีส าคญัในการบริหารองคก์รสมยัใหม่ ผมอยากใหท่้าน 
ไดเ้ล่าไดไ้หมครับวา่ เทศบาลของท่านไดจ้ดัการรองรับผลกระทบอนัเกิดจากวกิฤติการเมืองอนัลากยาวคร้ัง
น้ี อยา่งไรบา้ง และเทศบาลไดเ้ปิดโอกาสใหภ้าคประชาชนชุมชนทอ้งถ่ินมีส่วนร่วมในกระบวนการบริหาร
จดัการกบัภาวะวกิฤติน้ีอยา่งไรบา้ง (10 นาที) 
ช่วยแลกเปล่ียนประสบการณ์ของท่านไดเ้ลยนะครับ โดยเฉพาะท่ีท่านเห็นวา่ ทอ้งถ่ินใชก้ลยทุธ์
ต่างๆ ในการรับมือหรือแกปั้ญหาต่างๆ ในสภาวะวกิฤติการเมืองระดบัชาติ เพ่ือรักษาและคงไวซ่ึ้งการบริการ
สาธารณะของทอ้งถ่ิน ตลอดจนการเอาภาคประชาชนเขา้ไปมีส่วนร่วมในขั้นตอนต่างๆ    
4. เรามาถึงช่วงสุดทา้ยของการสนทนากลุ่มแลว้นะครับ ท่านสามารถยกประเด็นท่ีเราอาจจะไม่ไดส้นทนา 
กนัและท่านเห็นวา่มีความส าคญัและเป็นประโยชน์ไดน้ะครับ โดยผมจะใหเ้วลาท่านทบทวนสกัครู่หน่ึงนะ
ครับ และผมอยากใหทุ้กท่านไดก้ล่าวสรุปสั้นๆ เป็นรายบุคคลรอบโตะ๊นะครับ (5 นาที)  
 
ผมขอขอบพระคุณทุกท่านมากๆนะครับ ส าหรับการร่วมสนทนากลุ่มในคร้ังน้ี  
หลงัจากนั้นตรวจสอบความเรียบร้อยของแบบฟอร์มการยนิยอมใหส้มัภาษณ์และการบนัทึกเสียง 
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Appendix E 
Informed Consent Form  
 
You are invited to participate in an interview that will be conducted by Sirisak 
Laochankham, a Ph.D. Candidate in Public Affairs and Policy, Mark O. Hatfield School of 
Government, College of Urban and Public Affairs, Portland State University. The goal of this 
interview is to explore the effects of national political crises on local public service delivery in 
upper Northeast Thailand.    
If you decide to be part of this interview, you will be asked to participate in either an in-
depth interview or a focus group interview; both types of interviews will take about one hour to 
complete. The interview will be recorded and a transcript will be used for doctoral dissertation 
and educational purposes. The information will be used for research, including publication in 
scholarly journals.  
Your participation in this interview is entirely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you 
can stop at any time without any effect on your relationship with me, Portland State University, 
your local government, or anyone else associated with this interview. In addition to signing this 
form, you will receive another copy to keep for your own records. Any information that is 
obtained in connection with this interview will be kept confidential by the researcher, and any 
identifying information will be removed. Specifically, any use of these recordings will require the 
removal of:  
 
1. Your name and any other information that would make it possible to identify you;  
2. The name and any other information that would make it possible to identify any other 
person or organization that you mention during the interview, including your local 
government/local community.  
 
However, confidentiality cannot be guaranteed in a group setting. Please respect one another’s 
privacy by not repeating what was said at the meeting or who attended.  
 
If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this interview, you may contact: 
Human Subjects Research Committee Research and Strategic Partnerships (RSP) P.O. 751 
Portland OR 97207-0751 (503) 725-4288 hsrrs@lists.pdx.edu  
 
If you have any questions about the interview itself, you may contact:  
Sirisak Laochankham, Ph.D. Candidate in Public Affairs and Policy,   
Mark O. Hatfield School of Government, College of Urban and Public Affairs,   
Portland State University (573) 529-4773 sirisak@pdx.edu 
 
-----------------------------------------   
Name of Interviewee (type or print)  
 
 
------------------------------------------     --------------------------- 
     (Signature of Interviewee)                        (Date) 
 
243 
 
Appendix F 
Informed Consent Form [In Thai] 
 
หนังสือยินยอมให้สัมภำษณ์  
 
ท่านไดรั้บเชิญเขา้ร่วมการสัมภาษณ์ ท่ีด าเนินการสัมภาษณ์โดย นายศิริศกัด์ิ  เหล่าจนัขาม นกัศึกษาปริญญาเอก สาขา
กิจการสาธารณะและนโยบายสาธารณะ ภาควชิาการปกครอง มาร์ค โอ แฮทฟิลด ์วทิยาลยักิจการเมืองและกิจการสาธารณะ 
มหาวทิยาลยัพอตแลนดส์เตท วตัถุประสงคข์องการสัมภาษณ์คร้ังน้ีเพ่ือศึกษาผลกระทบอนัเกิดจากวกิฤติการเมืองระดบัชาติท่ี
ส่งผลต่อการบริการสาธารณะขององคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ินในภาคตะวนัออกเฉียงเหนือของประเทศไทย  หากท่านตดัสินใจ
ยนิดีเขา้ร่วมการสัมภาษณ์คร้ังน้ี ท่านจะไดรั้บการร้องขอใหร่้วมการสัมภาษเ์ด่ียวเชิงลึกหรือการสนทนากลุ่ม โดยการสัมภาษณ์
จะใชเ้วลาประมาณไม่เกิน 1 ชัว่โมง การสัมภาษณ์คร้ังน้ีจะมีการบนัทึกเทป และการถอดเทปสัมภาษณ์เพ่ือน าไปใชใ้นการ
วเิคราะห์ขอ้มูลในการเขียนดุษฎีนิพนธ์ระดบัปริญญาเอกและกิจกรรมทางการศึกษาอ่ืนๆ ขอ้มูลต่างๆท่ีไดรั้บจากท่านจะใชใ้น
การท าวจิยั รวมถึงการเผยแพร่ตีพิมพใ์นวารสารวชิาการ  
การเขา้ร่วมสัมภาษณ์คร้ังน้ีถือวา่เป็นความสมคัรใจ หากท่านไม่ประสงคจ์ะร่วมสัมภาษณ์ท่านสามารถหยดุการให้
สัมภาษณ์ไดทุ้กเวลาโดยจะไม่มีผลต่อสัมพนัธภาพใดกบัขา้พเจา้ มหาวิทยาลยัพอตแลนดส์เตท องคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ิน
ของท่าน หรือบุคคลอ่ืนใดท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการสัมภาษณ์น้ี หลงัจากท่ีท่านลงช่ือในแบบแสดงความยนิยอมน้ีแลว้ ท่านจะไดรั้บ
ส าเนาอีกหน่ึงฉบบัเพ่ือเก็บไวเ้ป็นหลกัฐาน ขอ้มูลทุกอยา่งท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการสัมภาษณ์น้ี จะเก็บไวอ้ยา่งมิดชิดและรักษาความ
เป็นส่วนตวัของท่านโดยนกัวจิยั รวมถึงขอ้มูลอ่ืนๆท่ีแสดงใหเ้ห็นความเป็นส่วนตวัของท่านจะถูกลบออก โดยเฉพาะขอ้มูล
ส่วนบุคคลดงัต่อไปน้ีจะถูกลบออก: 
1. ช่ือของท่านและขอ้มูลอ่ืนๆท่ีสามารถส่ือถึงตวัท่านได ้
2. ช่ือหรือขอ้มูลอ่ืนๆ ท่ีอาจจะส่ือถึงบุคคลหรือองคก์รอ่ืนๆ ท่ีท่านกล่าวถึงในระหวา่งการสัมภาษณ์ 
รวมถึงช่ือของเทศบาลและช่ือของหมู่บา้นท่าน   
อยา่งไรก็ตาม ความเป็นส่วนตวัขา้งตน้ไม่สามารถรับรองไดใ้นการประชุมกลุ่ม โปรดเคารพในความเป็นส่วนตวัซ่ึง
กนัและกนัโดยไม่ตอ้งไปกล่าวซ ้าถึงอะไรก็ตามท่ีสนทนากนัในการประชุมกลุ่มหรือบ่งบอกถึงผูเ้ขา้ร่วมประชุม หากท่านมีขอ้
ห่วงใยหรือมีปัญหาใดๆ เก่ียวกบัการเขา้ร่วมสัมภาษณ์ในคร้ังน้ี ท่านสามารถติดต่อไดท่ี้ ส านกังานคณะกรรมการการวจิยัใน
มนุษยแ์ละความร่วมมือ ท่ี ตู ้ป.ณ. 751 เมืองพอตแลนด ์รัฐออริกอน สหรัฐอเมริกา โทรศพัท ์97207-0751 (503) 725-4288 อีเมล ์
hsrrs@lists.pdx.edu หรือหากมีขอ้สงสัยเก่ียวกบัการสัมภาษณ์ ท่านสามารถติดต่อท่ี นายศิริศกัด์ิ เหล่าจนัขาม นกัศึกษาปริญญา
เอก สาขากิจการสาธารณะและนโยบายสาธารณะ ภาควชิาการปกครอง มาร์ค โอ แฮทฟิลด ์วทิยาลยักิจการเมืองและกิจการ
สาธารณะ มหาวทิยาลยัพอตแลนดส์เตท โทรศพัท ์081-7174430 อีเมล ์sirisak@pdx.edu 
 
-----------------------------------------   
ช่ือผูใ้หสั้มภาษณ์ (พิมพห์รือตวับรรจง)  
------------------------------------------                --------------------------- 
      (ลายมือช่ือผูใ้หสั้มภาษณ์)                              (วนัที่สัมภาษณ์) 
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Appendix G 
 
Letter of Request for Interview Permission from Local Government  
Public Affairs and Policy Ph.D. Program,  
Mark O. Hatfield School of Government,  
Portland State University, P. O. Box 751,  
Portland, OR 97207-0751 
Date…., 2016 
Dear (Name & Title of Municipal Mayor or Appropriate Person),  
My name is Sirisak Laochankham. I am a Ph.D. candidate in Public Affairs and Policy at Hatfield 
School of Government, College of Urban and Public Affairs, Portland State University, Oregon, 
the United States of America. As part of my dissertation I am conducting a research study titled: 
“Local Government Service Delivery under Crisis Conditions: The Case of Thailand”. The 
purpose of the research is to explore the effects of national political crisis on local government 
service delivery and discover the coping strategies and mechanisms that local governments use in 
times of political crisis in Thailand.  
This research is a case study that uses both face-to-face, semi-structured interviews and focus-
group interviews to collect the data from the targeted participants. Prior to conducting the 
interviews, I would like to request for your permission to approach the following targeted 
participants: municipal mayor, municipal councilors, municipal division managers, municipal 
officers, community leaders, and local residents within your municipality to take part in the study. 
I will recruit the targeted participants to the study using phone and person to person conversation. 
I expect to recruit approximately 10-13 of participants.  
I can assure you that I will make every effort to ensure the interviews do not disturb the working 
environment in any way and data collection will remain highly confidential. I am applying ethical 
approval for the interviews from Human Subjects Research Review Committee, Office of 
Research and Strategic Partnerships at Portland State University, the United States of America.  
My dissertation research is supervised by Dr. Bruce Gilley, a professor of political science, Mark 
O. Hatfield School of Government, College of Urban and Public Affairs, Portland State 
University. If you have any question please contact (503) 725-3056 or email: gilleyb@pdx.edu.      
Yours Sincerely, 
 
 
(Sirisak Laochankham) 
Ph.D. candidate in Public Affairs and Policy  
Contact email: sirisak@pdx.edu  
Mobile phone: USA-573-529-4773, Thailand-081-7174430  
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Appendix H 
 
Letter of Request for Interview Permission from Local Government (In Thai) 
หลกัสูตรปริญญาเอกกิจการสาธารณะและนโยบายสาธารณะ  
ภาควชิาการปกครอง มาร์ค โอ แฮทฟิลด,์ วทิยาลยักิจการเมืองและกิจการสาธารณะ 
มหาวทิยาลยัพอตแลนดส์เตท ตู ้ป.ณ. 751 เมืองพอตแลนด ์รัฐออริกอน 97207-0751  
วนัที่ ..................................2559  
เร่ือง ขออนุญาตเก็บขอ้มูลวจิยัปริญญาเอก  
 
เรียน (ช่ือ/ต ำแหน่งนำยกเทศมนตรี) 
 
ขา้พเจา้ช่ือ นายศิริศกัด์ิ  เหล่าจนัขาม เป็นนกัศึกษาปริญญาเอก สาขากิจการสาธารณะและนโยบายสาธารณะภาค
วชิาการปกครอง มาร์ค โอ แฮทฟิลด ์วทิยาลยักิจการเมืองและกิจการสาธารณะ มหาวทิยาลยัพอตแลนดส์เตท สหรัฐอเมริกา 
ขา้พเจา้ก าลงัท าการวจิยัหัวขอ้ “การบริการสาธารณะขององคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ิน ภายใตส้ภาวะวกิฤติ: กรณีศึกษาประเทศ
ไทย” อนัเป็นส่วนหน่ึงในการศึกษาปริญญาเอกของขา้พเจา้ วตัถุประสงคข์องการวจิยัคร้ังน้ีเพ่ือศึกษาผลกระทบอนัเกิดจาก
วกิฤติการเมืองระดบัชาติท่ีส่งผลต่อการบริการสาธารณะขององคก์รปกครองส่วนทอ้งถ่ินในภาคตะวนัออกเฉียงเหนือของ
ประเทศไทย งานวจิยัน้ีเป็นการศึกษากรณีศึกษาโดยใชก้ารสัมภาษณ์เด่ียวแบบเชิงลึก และการสนทนากลุ่มจากผูเ้ขา้ร่วมการ
สัมภาษณ์ ก่อนท่ีจะด าเนินการสัมภาษณ์ ขา้พเจา้จึงใคร่ขออนุญาตท่านสัมภาษณ์บุคลากรในหน่วยงานของท่านและประชาชน
ในเขตเทศบาลของท่านโดยขอความอนุเคราะห์ท่านในการคดัเลือกและติดต่อบุคคลท่ีมีต าแหน่งต่อไปน้ีในเทศบาลของท่านเขา้
ร่วมการสัมภาษณ์ประกอบดว้ย นายกเทศมนตรี ประธานสภาเทศบาล สมาชิกสภาเทศบาล ผูอ้  านวยการกองหรือหวัหนา้ส่วน
งาน รวมถึงผูน้ าชุมชนและประชาชน ขา้พเจา้จะประสานคดัเลือกผูเ้ขา้สัมภาษณ์ทางโทรศพัทห์รือติดต่อพบตวัต่อตวั โดยหวงั
อยากจะไดผู้เ้ขา้สัมภาษณ์ประมาณ 10-13 คน 
ขา้พเจา้ขอยนืยนัวา่ ขา้พเจา้จะพยายามทุกวถีิทางในการสร้างความมัน่ใจวา่ การสัมภาษณ์จะไม่กระทบกบัการท างาน
ประจ าและจะรักษาความเป็นส่วนตวัของผูใ้หสั้มภาษณ์ไวเ้ป็นอยา่งดี ทั้งน้ี ขา้พเจา้ไดรั้บความเห็นชอบจากคณะกรรมการวจิยั
ในมนุษยแ์ละยทุธศาสตร์ความร่วมมือของมหาวทิยาลยัพอตแลนดส์เตท สหรัฐอเมริกา แลว้  
ดุษฎีนิพนธ์ของขา้พเจา้ อยูภ่ายใตก้ารใหค้  าปรึกษาของ ดร.บรูซ กิลลี ศาสตราจารยด์า้นรัฐศาสตร์ จากภาควิชาการ
ปกครอง มาร์ค โอ แฮทฟิลด ์วทิยาลยักิจการเมืองและกิจการสาธารณะ มหาวทิยาลยัพอตแลนดส์เตท หากท่านมีขอ้สงสัยใดๆ 
โปรดติดต่อ (503) 725-3056 หรืออีเมล ์gilleyb@pdx.edu.      
 
ขอแสดงความนบัถือ 
 
(นายศิริศกัด์ิ  เหล่าจนัขาม) 
นกัศึกษาปริญญาเอก สาขากิจการสาธารณะและนโยบาย 
อีเมล ์sirisak@pdx.edu มือถือ 081-7174430 
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Appendix I 
Examples of Codebook for Interview Data Analysis  
Moderating 
Variable 
Code   Description  Example of Data Excerpt  
Political 
Institutions  
Lack of 
representation  
 
 
Facilitating local 
administrative 
procedures 
Participant refers to the 
effect of electoral 
suspension eliminating the 
roles of elected 
representatives. 
Participant refers to the 
legal mechanism (i.e. 
Section 44) that the junta 
government used for 
solving complicated 
procedures in 
governmental 
administration.      
“…Nowadays, it seems like 
we don’t have people who 
represent us. We don’t have 
people who can help us. It’s 
broken and disconnected.”  
 
“Frankly speaking, I would 
say that in the absence of an 
[elected] government, when 
we needed something, Section 
44 provided a convenience for 
us. It makes things easier for 
us. It’s convenient. In the past, 
we had to get approval from 
the provincial governor or 
district chief officer. Section 
44 can order and terminate the 
inconvenient issues or the 
limitations of those 
regulations in order to 
facilitate our work when we 
want to assist people.”  
Civic 
Engagement  
Political fears  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eager to speak 
out and involving 
in local decision-
making  
Participant refers to fears 
caused by political crisis 
and the junta laws 
prohibiting political 
engagement.  
 
 
 
Participant refers to civic 
participation improved at 
local level, especially in 
local affairs.  
“Nowadays, municipality 
avoided organizing the 
activity that may involve in 
politics. They were afraid of 
being investigated for a 
gathering of more than four 
persons. Some people said, 
any activity that was 
organized by municipality, I 
didn’t want go.”  
“When we had a town hall 
meeting, local citizens were 
actively engaged in the 
meeting. They shared their 
thoughts on development 
projects.”  
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Political 
Leadership  
Fears to do thing 
wrong  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More recognition 
of local leaders  
Participant refers to the 
effects of legal constraints 
on decision-making of 
local leaders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant refers to 
positive perceptions of 
local residents on their 
local leaders in times of 
political crisis.  
“It looks like we did 
everything wrong. Why I have 
to do that? I can’t sleep and I 
am concerned about what I 
don’t want to do. I want to do 
the things that local residents 
agree is good for them. When 
we do something, the national 
auditing office told us that we 
were non-compliant on that 
project. We’ve encountered 
difficulties. We would like to 
do right, but at least they 
should provide us the right 
laws that help avoid the act of 
non-compliance. We’re happy 
if having that.”  
“I don’t know how about the 
mayor in other places, but our 
mayor went everywhere 
whenever he knew there was a 
problem, responding to the 
request of local citizens. At 
least, he can help coordinate 
and provide some basic help. 
He is concerned about the 
community’s needs and never 
ignored what we needed.” 
Governance  More centralized 
administration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant refers to the 
interaction between central 
and local government was 
more hierarchical in the 
midst of crisis (e.g. top-
down).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“These things are ordered by 
central government. The 
government directed central 
ministries and central 
departments. Those central 
authorities then ordered the 
Ministry of Interior. After 
that, the Ministry of Interior 
delivered an order to 
provincial and district 
authorities. The districts then 
ordered local governments. 
This is the pattern of their 
work.”  
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Active reaction to 
local issues  
Participant refers to local 
governments actively 
responding to solve local 
problems.  
 
“Local governments expanded 
very fast in order to respond 
to the developments. We are 
with local citizens every day. 
If people complain about the 
bad roads in our community, 
we have to provide budget in 
order to respond to that 
problem immediately. In the 
past, it took more than ten 
years to get a gravel road, but 
nowadays it is very fast.”  
Political 
Economy  
Uncertain to 
spend money or 
invest in business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central 
facilitation  
Participant refers to 
political instability causing 
uncertainty for spending 
and investing in some 
local businesses.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant refers to 
intervention of central 
government rather help to 
support local development.    
 
“…Wherever I went, I heard 
people complain about 
economic constraints. It’s 
difficult for them to make any 
money. It also affected me. 
My wife runs a grocery store 
business; she said her business 
was not good. She observed a 
decline of consumption. It 
looks like people work but 
they did not earn good 
income. When people have 
less money to spend, it caused 
the decline of money to spend 
in our local community.” 
“Currently, our economic 
status is gradually recovering 
because the military-installed 
government has boosted the 
local economy through the 
provincial administration. 
Local people can earn income 
of about 300 THB per day. It 
took just two months. It [the 
state-led development project] 
helped stimulate local 
economies. Local people have 
money to spend in the 
market.”  
 
